BOĞAZİÇİMUN 2026

F-JCC

The Second Korean War

STUDY GUIDE

Agenda Item: Open Agenda
Under Secretaries-General: İstemihan Gökay Tatar, Ege Kaval
Academic Assistants: Uğur Cebeci, Yavuz Selim Kibar

Letter from the Secretary-General

Meritorious Participants,

I am Duru Yavuz, a senior Political Science and Sociology student at Boğaziçi University. As the Secretary-General, I would like to welcome you all to the 8th official session of BoğaziçiMUN, BoğaziçiMUN'26.

Our academic and organizational teams have been working endlessly to ensure the best BoğaziçiMUN experience for our participants. I would like to begin by thanking our Deputy Secretaries-General, Ömer Alp Şiringöz and İpek Şen for their efforts, support and friendship. And the biggest of thank you's goes to our Director-General and Club co-Coordinator Kaan Berker and our Deputy Director-General Ekin Asyalı, this conference would not be what it is without their ambition and hard work. I would also like to thank our Club co-Coordinator İrem Ayber for all her help in both academic and organizational capacities.

BoğaziçiMUN has always been a ground where we aim to achieve academic and organizational excellence, but it has also been a place where old friends get to gather and work towards a common goal, even if it is in the middle of a snowstorm. In our experience as a club and as a conference, we have broken and reshaped barriers, we have learned what it means to be in a close-knit team, we have looked to the past and embraced our legacy, and we have looked to the future to envision an improved BoğaziçiMUN.

Throughout the years, we have gained new experience, knowledge, and strength; and found a sense of community in our members and participants. In each BoğaziçiMUN; we have seen you, our participants, learn and grow with us; expanding your knowledge of international relations, world politics, and history. It was this growth and the chance to witness your dedication and curiosity that have inspired us to continue improving BoğaziçiMUN every single year. And because we get to see your enthusiasm, because we get to engage our participants' minds with the pressing issues of our time, our efforts are made worthwhile. This year, we have prepared for you a wide range of unique committees and agenda items, all thanks to our wonderful Under Secretaries-General who have worked closely with our academic team to bring fresh perspectives and discussions to the conference.

After months of preparation on top of our years of foundational experience, BoğaziçiMUN is finally ready to open its doors to you and 'Bridge the Gap' once again this February. At the intersection of diplomacy, international relations and creative decision-making, BoğaziçiMUN stands as a chance to take matters into your own hands. Let us embark on this

mission together and broaden our horizons as well as our community. It is my utmost honor to welcome you all to BoğaziçiMUN 2026, I hope to meet you soon.

Kind regards,

Duru Yavuz

Secretary-General of Boğaziçi MUN 2026

Letter from the Under Secretaries-General

Esteemed Statespeople,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to the 2026 edition of Boğaziçi University Model United Nations Conference (BoğaziçiMUN'26), where we will be hosting you in the F-JCC: The Second Korean War committee. We are İstemihan Gökay TATAR and Ege KAVAL, the two Co-Under-Secretaries-General who will be devoting themselves to making this committee proceed in a fashion that will simultaneously entertain and educate you.

Over the course of four days, we look forward to witnessing your devious plans, flabbergasting moves, and intense strategies spanning from seizing an aircraft carrier to uniting the Korean Peninsula under a single banner. Our primary objective is to make this committee as immersive and enjoyable as possible.

Attached to this letter is a study guide prepared to give you all the information you need to navigate the Second Korean War in a structured form in full detail. We wish to state that **no** additional research is required for this committee besides the provided content. Additionally, we would also like to remind you that you may see some gaps in the study guide about each country. However, do not be worried. You will be receiving cool things later on..

Additionally, we wish to extend our deepest gratitudes for both of our Academic Assistants: Uğur CEBECİ and Yavuz Selim KİBAR. Their enthusiasm, commitment to academic excellence, and passion are undoubtedly among the greatest factors that have brought this committee to life. If they had not comprehended the vision we had for this ambitious setting, you would not be reading these lines.

Before concluding our letter, we would like to extend our sincere thanks to every member of our Executive and Organizational Team for their tireless efforts in preparing the framework for this committee to become a reality.

Lastly, special thanks go to the independent editors of the Hearts of Iron IV wiki page.

If you have any questions or need assistance in regards to the committees, please don't hesitate to contact us. We are excited to see your diplomatic skills in action during the conference.

Sincerely,
İstemihan Gökay TATAR, istemihantatar@gmail.com, +90 530 077 3958
Ege KAVAL, egekaval1050@gmail.com, +90 534 773 9087



A political map of the world in 2040 showcasing ideological alignments in the fictional realm of F-JCC: The Second Korean War committee.

1. Introduction: Committee Structure and Purpose

Welcome to the F-JCC: Second Korean War committee! This study guide is intended to serve as a war manual. It presents the essential material, expressed in clear and straightforward language while carrying the conscience of producing academic material. As a wise man once said: “Sophistication is embedded in simplicity.” In another sense, while a product of academia can be curated utilizing elevated language disconnected from lucidity, it is not being materialized here.

Before proceeding, take a moment to recognize the distinction of being selected for one of BoğaziçiMUN’26’s most ambitious committees. Regardless of how you arrive, you will love this committee by the end of these four days.

1.1. Structure

1.1.1. What is a Crisis Committee?

A crisis committee is a fast-paced Model United Nations (MUN) format in which delegates react to evolving conditions defined by occasional crisis updates. They are -mostly- allocated characters to influence upcoming events by directives, personal actions, and limited debate.

This committee expands on that model. It is futuristic/fictional -built on events that may or may not occur in the future- and functions as a joint crisis committee. This is a structure that divides participants into two opposing cabinets that represents rival belligerents within the same conflict.

1.1.2. Committee Secretariat (CS)

The Committee Secretariat (CS) stands above the entire system. For BoğaziçiMUN’26 F-JCC committee, it consists of 2 Co-Under-Secretaries-General and 2 Academic Assistants.

The duties of the CS include keeping delegates informed, reviewing and approving directives, collaborating with the Creative Intelligence (CI) team to produce a final outcome, and ensuring smooth operation across the committee. It holds final authority over all decisions.

1.1.3. Cabinet Division

Delegates are separated into two rival cabinets that interact in real-time, a right-leaning bloc, the Pacific Defense Pact (PDP), and a left-leaning bloc, the Eurasian Stability Commission (ESC). The PDP comprises: United States of America (USA), Republic of Korea (ROK,

South), and State of Japan. Simultaneously, the ESC comprises: People's Republic of China (PRC) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North), and the Russian Federation.

1.1.4. The Chairboard

Each cabinet is commanded by a Chairboard which directs cabinet activity, entertains appropriate motions, ensures no delegate acts outside of their knowledge (unless they are brave enough…), and reviews all directives before submission to CS. Each cabinet has: a President Chair as the leader of its Korea and a Deputy Chair as the Military coordinator for allied states.

1.1.5. Delegates

Under the Chairboard's authority are delegates. They are the largest and most influential aspect of the committee. Each represents a political or military figure from their allocated country. They shape the committee's course through individual initiatives and collective action by using directives. Each cabinet contains 15 delegates: 7 from its respective Korean state, 8 from allied nations' military command.

1.2. Purpose

The committee exists in the name of five objectives:

1. Reenact a regional war with global implications and examine its potential consequences. This will enable the comprehension of how local warfare connects with global disruptions.
2. Study how advancements in technology shape the course of conflict: micro mobility, cyber attacks, surveillance grids, misinformation, and many more advancements. This will demonstrate the effect of these systems of escalation and control mechanisms.
3. Understand how civilians, integrated economies, and global supply chains are influenced by conflict. A war in the Korean Peninsula will disrupt energy grids, the semiconductor market, trade routes, and trigger refugee movements.
4. Test how global powers may respond to protect national security interests outside peace times. Great powers exercise various direct and indirect influence projection methods during peacetime that demand secrecy and plausible deniability. This will show what can be done without restrictions.
5. Carry out the aims of the CS and convert their plans into work.

2. Know Your World: Planet Earth in 2040

2.1. The Asia-Pacific Region

2.1.1. What is the Asia-Pacific?

The Asia-Pacific, or Indo-Pacific, is the world's most populated, most urbanized, most climate-stressed, and most economically interconnected region. It is also a major economical and geopolitical region of the world that hosts a great diversity of ecosystems, cultures, political systems, and economic stages. It encompasses five subregions. Each subregion shares similar environmental problems and socio-cultural backgrounds.

2.1.2. People and Cities

2.1.2.1. Population Size and Growth

By 2040, the Asia-Pacific population sits around 4.9 billion. American Partnership of Eosinophilic Disorders (APFDEF) and Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)'s estimations indicate that the population will continue to rise in the long-term. However, growth has slowed compared to past decades and will continue to do so towards 2050. More and more countries will experience zero or negative growth.



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition

The population will be simultaneously expanding and aging. Some subregions -especially South and Southwest Asia and parts of Southeast Asia- will continue to add population while East and Northeast Asia will shrink or stagnate and age.

2.1.2.2. Increasing Life Expectancy and Decreasing Fertility Rates

The Asia-Pacific faces low fertility and longer life spans. Fertility has fallen from 6.0 children per woman in the 1960s to below the 2.1 replacement level. About 80% of the region's 4.9 billion people live in 26 countries with fertility below the replacement rate. Only a small group of countries (13 out of 58) still have fertility of 3.0 or more. By 2050, only 16

of 58 countries are expected to have fertility at or above replacement. So most societies will remain low-fertility.

On the other hand, life expectancy has reached over 80. Many countries -especially East Asia, Northeast Asia, and parts of the Pacific- are on track to pass 80. Simultaneously, a small group, mostly in the Pacific, still sits below 70 years and will continue to stay behind. In short, fertility is below replacement almost everywhere and life expectancy continues to rise besides a few exceptions.



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition.

2.1.2.3. Young South, Old North

In 2040, the age map of the region is split between the North and South. More than 1/4 of Northeast Asia's population is aged 65 or older and is expected to rise around 30% by 2050. These societies are struggling with high old-age dependency, growing long-term care needs, and rising chronic diseases.

However, South and much of Southeast Asia remain relatively young. Their populations age too, but they still have a large working-age society and higher fertility. This means that Asia-Pacific simultaneously hosts some of the world's youngest and oldest societies.

Population pyramids for Asia and the Pacific, 2023 and 2050.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition.

2.1.2.4. Grand Urbanization and Growing Megacities

By 2040, more than 65% of Asia-Pacific lives in cities. All subregions are more urban than ever. East and Northeast Asia are the most urbanized and South and Southwest Asia are catching up quickly. Megacities keep multiplying. The region had 15 cities of over 10 million people in 2015. Now, it has many more and several have passed the 20 million threshold. Yet most new urban growth comes from small and medium-sized cities, especially from those under 500,000 people.

Urban areas are the region's main economic drivers. Yet, about 30% of people still live in rural areas, so the rural-urban connection remains important. As cities expand, they increasingly demand more land, water, energy, and construction materials. This pressures city planners and resource managers. Shortly, the region is defined by a high urban share, rising number of megacities, and rapid growth in smaller towns that struggle to keep pace with demand.



Population living in urban areas as a percentage of the total population in Asia and the Pacific and by subregion, 1990-2050.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition.

2.1.2.5. Rural to Urban Migration and Deteriorating City Stress

The Asia-Pacific is changed by constant movements of people, skills, goods, and capital between urban and rural areas. Rural-to-urban migration remains strong as people seek jobs, education, and services. Intermediate cities with fewer than 500 thousand citizens grow the fastest but struggle to expand services at the pace of arrivals. Urban centers of all sizes are economic hubs, but many cannot meet infrastructure needs which leaves 20-50% of residents in some countries to live in slums.

Urbanization consumes high energy and resources; buildings and construction produce nearly 40% of global energy-related emissions and another 11% from materials. As farms and cities expand, they compete for freshwater. These resource management projects end up displacing rural communities. Climate change, declining agricultural yields, and disasters add to internal displacement by pushing people to cities. Although COVID-19 caused some "reverse migration," not much changed.

2.1.3. Economies

2.1.3.1. Big Growth, Big Scale

By 2040, Asia-Pacific is one of the world's largest and most integrated economic regions. It connects global production, shipping routes and financial channels. It remains the fastest growing major region. But, climate losses pose a serious threat to its growth.

ESCAP reports indicate that annual losses from such factors have reached US$1.344 trillion, or about 4.2% of regional GDP. These losses hail from damage to infrastructure, housing, agriculture, and industry. If climate action is delayed, soils may be degraded, harvests may be reduced, and supply chains may be disrupted. Although the region is a major economic hub, its scale brings climatic vulnerabilities.



Relationship between climate change and population dynamics.
Source: ESCAP, elaboration based on Raworth, Kate. 'A Doughnut for the Anthropocene: Humanity's Compass in the 21st Century'. The Lancet Planetary Health, vol. 1, No. 2 (1 May 2017): e48–49, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542- 5196(17)30028-1

2.1.3.2. From Farms to Factories and Services

In 2040, most workers are in industry and services often in and around cities. Agriculture's share in workers is decreasing and now provides only a small share of output. Services make up more than half of regional GDP and keep expanding. Agriculture remains important for food security but is no longer the main employer. Rural areas are aging and losing workers while rural-urban productivity gaps increase.

Industrially, North and Northeast Asia prioritize sustainability, greener industries, circular economy practices, and more stable food systems. In South and Southeast Asia, it's the complete opposite; this worsens rural decline and raises food system shock risks.



Change in working age population (15–64 years old) between 2020 and 2050.
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition.

2.1.3.3. Globalization and Globalized Trade

Asia-Pacific is the connector of global trade. The region is a manufacturing base, information and communication technology (ICT) producer and one of the largest digital markets. Earlier export-based growth and foreign investment built dense supply chains across PRC, Southeast Asia, Korea, and South Asia. However, high dependence on the global market exposes the region to external shocks: financial crises, trade route changes, energy price swings, all of which spreads through the supply chain quickly.

Additionally, climate risks are another threat; ESCAP demonstrates that extreme weather and disrupted transport routes produce (especially in coastal manufacturing zones and ports) large economic losses. The pressure is intensified by heavy energy use and resource-intensive construction. Without structural reform, climate-induced disruption will raise costs across production, logistics, services, and food systems which will weaken the region.

2.1.3.4. Growing Gaps

By 2040, economic growth in the Asia-Pacific is still uneven. Wealthier East Asian states keep their lead while South and Central Asian economies fall behind. Inside countries, coastal areas are more developed than inland regions and rural communities.

Cities also grow unevenly. Wealthy districts enjoy high-quality services and infrastructure. Others, mainly informal settlements, lack stability, security, and public services. Poorer regions are disproportionately exposed to climate stress and food insecurity. This forces some governments to put socio-economic fairness in their agendas.

2.1.4. Energy, Environment, and Climate

2.1.4.1. Ever-Growing and Unsustainable Energy Demand

The Asia-Pacific's demand has climbed. APFED data show primary energy supply rising from 5.569 Millions Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (MTOE) in 2023, to 7.521 MTOE by 2040. The region now consumes over half of the world's energy while 52.67% of it still comes from fossil fuels (11% oil, 17% natural gas, 24.67% coal).

Fossil fuels remain central in many countries, especially in South and Southeast Asia. Electricity demand has increased 216% from 2025 to 2040 as cities and industries expanded. Despite this scale, millions lack reliable electricity and use traditional biomass (burning wood etc.) to cook and heat. With decreasing prices, many governments invested in renewable energy; its share increased from 23.3% in total power generation in 2022 to 47.33% in 18 years.



Affordable Clean Energy: Global prices of solar, wind, and fossil energy.

Source: Interagency Renewable Energy Agency (2020)

2.1.4.2. Irreversible Climate Change and Extreme Weather

In 2040, global temperatures have passed the 1.5°C threshold and Asia-Pacific has already endured years of heatwaves, intense rainfall, droughts, stronger cyclones, wildfires, and floods. It remains the most climate and disaster-prone region in the world. Climate-induced disasters occur much more frequently and strongly and occasionally threaten basic necessities. Large populations live in low-lying coasts, small island States, deserts, and mountain areas. Many people rely on agriculture and natural resources, and have limited social protection.

2040-2059 PROJECTIONS (RCP8.5 SCENARIO)	EAST AND NORTH-EAST ASIA	SOUTH-EAST ASIA	SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST ASIA	NORTH AND CENTRAL ASIA	PACIFIC
Temperature (in °C)	To increase by 2.04–2.68	To increase by 1.35–1.74	To increase by 1.41–2.51	To increase by 1.86–3.80	To increase by 1.18–1.84
Precipitation (in mm)	To increase by 33.30–87.44	To increase by 82.94–158.68	To increase by 12.36–180.30, except for Afghanistan (to decrease by 2.89)	To increase up to 108.11, Tajikistan to decrease by 11.56	Papua New Guinea and New Zealand to increase up to 284.88, Australia and Fiji to decrease by 23.74–44.05

Projections in temperature and precipitation, by Asia-Pacific subregion, 2040–2059.

Source: World Bank (2021). 'World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal', see https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/.

Biodiversity declines faster than ever. Pollution from cities, industry, and land use remains high and negatively impacts human health and ecosystems. Rural communities, coastal populations, older persons, informal workers, and residents of unsafe housing face the highest risks. Sea-level rise and declining crop yields create long-term issues. Countries that strengthened clean energy, land management and disaster systems early faced fewer losses than countries that acted late.

2.1.4.3. Water Stress



Ambition Levels Combined Index for the Asia-Pacific Region

Source: ESCAP, UNEP, UNWomen and the greenwerk. Is 1.5 C within Reach for the Asia-Pacific Region? Ambition and Potential of NDC Commitments of the Asia-Pacific countries (United Nations, Bangkok, 2021).

Water scarcity is one of the region's most serious risks. Shortages cut across food production, public health, energy supply, and migration. Some cities face "Day Zero" conditions where reservoirs run dry and water is rationed. While climate impacts are more destructive, adaptation could not keep pace. Many nations rely on fossil fuel and greenhouse gas emissions remain high, which increases heatwave, drought, and rainfall extremes.



A map demonstrating water stress levels across Asia.

Source: World Resources Institute (2023). 'Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas', see https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-risk-atlas/.

Glaciers feeding major rivers shrink and saltwater reaches inland. This threatens water security for over 2 billion people. Large parts of China and India face high water stress, depleted rivers and damaged aquifers. Asia struggles with contamination -such as arsenic in groundwater- while Mekong delta regions face repeated saltwater intrusion.



A map demonstrating coasts prone to flooding in Asia.

Source: World Resources Institute (2023). 'Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas', see https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-risk-atlas/.

Better-governed areas limit these risks. Investments in watershed protection, tighter demand control and improved treatment help stabilize supply. But the risk is always present. High temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and rising demand limits water for households and farms.

2.1.4.4. Pollution and the Worst Air Quality

Air pollution is still one of the region's most severe health problems. Many major cities record PM2.5 and PM10 levels outside World Health Organization (WHO) standards. Poorer communities face the highest exposure. Emissions hail mainly from power plants, industry, transport, and open burning. Additionally, pollution moves across borders, and makes transboundary haze and smog persistent. Air pollution is strongest in South and East Asia due to rapid urbanization, weak transport systems, filter absences, and heavy coal usage.

2.1.5. Food Systems, Ecosystems, and Land

2.1.5.1. Food Insecurity and Increasing Demand

In 2040, food security is a central risk in Asia-Pacific. Over 2 billion people face moderate or severe food insecurity. Demand is high due to growth in population, urban centers, and income. Diets now include more grains, processed foods, and insects, and total calorie consumption has increased. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that food production needs to rise by 60% until 2060 to meet growing demand. Agricultural supply cannot keep pace. Yield growth for staple crops has slowed. Soil degradation, reduced nutrient quality, and shrinking arable land cap expansion. Freshwater is mostly unavailable. Several countries in South and East Asia withdraw water at rates close to or beyond renewable supply; which leaves less for irrigation.



Yields and harvested areas for the five major crops, by region: changes 2012-2050
Source: FAO Global Perspectives Studies, based on simulations with the FAO GAPS model.

Climate stress reduces planting windows and increases crop failure risks. Coastal agriculture suffers from salinization and land loss. Fisheries decline as ocean warming and acidification affect stocks, leaving many communities deprived of protein. Food access is uneven. Income and regional gaps define who can afford stable diets. ESCAP data indicate that lower-income communities and rural areas cannot withstand sudden food price increases due to lack of adequate social protection systems and 94.67% reliance on purchased food. Many countries depend on imported cereals, oils, and animal feed.

This means food insecurity is common. Undernourishment ravages low income areas. Middle-income countries experience undernutrition and obesity side by side.



Undernourishment rates 2005-2030.
Source: FAO, 2017a, based on data from FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015a) for the periods 2005–2007 and 2014–16; and FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015b) for 2030.

2.1.5.2. Food System-Induced Environmental Damage

Food systems are a major source of environmental stress. Agriculture contributes to 70% of freshwater withdrawals while fertilizer use remains the dominant cause of nitrogen pollution, with Asia accounting for more than 50% of global fertilizer consumption. Food production and processing account for roughly 1/3 of total greenhouse gas emissions in Asia-Pacific. Deforestation, soil erosion, and agricultural biodiversity loss continue as land is pushed to meet rising demand.



Projected agricultural greenhouse gas emissions for different scenarios.
Source: FAO Global Perspectives Studies, based on simulations with the FAO GAPS model, and emission factors from FAO GLEAM (2017) and FAOSTAT

2.1.5.3. Big Drivers of Change

Asia-Pacific structures are shaped by five major drivers: (1) rising environmental awareness, (2) changing food systems, (3) rural-urban dynamics, (4) environmental governance, and (5) natural resource demand, ownership, and control. Each driver has forces "for" and "against" change. The balance of these forces determine a region's fate.

2.1.5.4. The Asia Pacific in Brief

The Asia-Pacific region covers a large area with varied dynamics. It contains the majority of the world's population and simultaneously hosts advanced economies, and countries with insufficient opportunities. Although they share many problems and conditions, there are wide differences in income and living conditions. These gaps are the main influencers of labor supply, settlement patterns, and service demands.

The Asia-Pacific economy remains strong and interconnected. Countries integrate their industries, trade networks, financial channels, investments, and supply chains. Manufacturing and services contribute the most to growth while agriculture loses workers and faces lower productivity. This integration concurrently exposes countries to external shocks such as climate stress, market disruptions, pollution, and resource shortages. There are degrees to inequalities between subregions, cities, and local groups.

Rapid development and human activity coerce land, water, air, and ecosystems. Climate change increases heat, rainfall extremes, drought, storms, and sea levels across inland areas and coasts. Poor governance and rising demand intensify water scarcity. Weakening fisheries, slowing yields, and degrading soils increase food insecurity; mainly in low-income and rural regions.

Energy demand grows while many still rely on fossil fuels. Although renewable energy has become more lucrative, efficient, and widespread, traditional systems persist. Pollution -especially in large cities- threatens public health. Environmental risks are not limited to areas anymore. Regions with stronger governance and planning reduce some impacts, but others fall behind and face greater losses. In short, not a fun place to live in.

2.2. The Geography of Your Battlefield: The Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula is the southward-pointing landform that extends approximately 1,100km south on the Northeastern edge of Asia. It is bounded by the Yellow Sea on the west, the Sea of Japan on the east, and the Korea Strait in the south.

A mountain range runs down its length and creates steep interiors, restricted east-west mobility, and narrow river valleys that open into wide plains along the western and southern coasts. Its shoreline is heavily indented and includes major bays, estuaries, and island clusters.

The peninsula hosts two states: DPRK in the north and ROK in the south. They are separated by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that follows the 38th parallel armistice line established after the 1953 armistice that only paused the war.

2.2.1. Geographical Setting, Area, and Boundaries

The Korean Peninsula stands between 33° and 43° north latitude and 124° and 132° east longitude. Its farthest points define its shape. Its easternmost, westernmost, southernmost, and northernmost points are: Dokdo, Maando, Marado, and Pungseo-ri, respectively. Stretching about 1,100 kilometers north to south, and including the 3,400 or so islands scattered off its coasts, the Korean Peninsula's territory covers about 223,516 (similar to the United Kingdom) square kilometers, about 100,363 (similar to Bulgaria) of which belongs to ROK.



Physical setting of the Korean Peninsula.

Source: National Geographic Information Institute (NGII). (n.d.). Physical setting of Korea. National Atlas of Korea. Retrieved December 3, 2025, from http://nationalatlas.ngii.go.kr/pages/page_1270.php

The peninsula forms a natural unit shaped by the lithosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere. The lithosphere provides the mountain ranges, slopes, and rock foundations. The atmosphere defines the peninsula's four season cycle. The hydrosphere surrounds the peninsula with seas and feeds the inland rivers that traverse its terrain. The biosphere covers the living systems that occupy the peninsula.

The surrounding space is defined through land, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and airspaces. Territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (22.3km) from baselines that follow the shape of the coasts, while normal baselines apply along straighter coasts. Waters extending 200 nautical miles (370.4km) from the baselines form each coastal states' EEZ, where the coastal state holds exclusive rights to marine resources. Airspace extends above the land and territorial waters of the peninsula.



EEZs (thin lines), territorial waters (thick lines) and internal waters (blue areas) of DPRK and ROK.
Source: Flanders Marine Institute (VLIZ). (2023). 'Marine Regions EEZ Mapper', see https://www.marineregions.org/eezmapper.php.

2.2.2. Topography and Major Landforms

The Korean Peninsula rests on four ancient massifs that constitute the foundation for its terrain: Hambuk, Pyeongbuk, Gyeonggi, and Sobaek. Mountain ranges run north to south and shape the land into steep eastern slopes and broader western basins. The peninsula boasts four ranges: Taebaek, Nangnim, Macheoll Yeong, and Hamgyeng chains.

Mountain ranges of Korea.
Source: Source: The Academy of Korean Studies. (2016). 'Geography of Korea', see https://www.aks.ac.kr/ikorea/upload/intl/korean/UserFiles/UKS7_Geography_of_Korea_eng.pdf.

High mountains are in the north and east, including the volcanic heights around Mount Baekdusan and the Gaema Plateau, which rises to about 1,500 meters. Most other peaks are modest in height, and more than 50% of the peninsula's mountains are below 500 meters.

Erosion basins and low plateaus appear between ranges. Volcanic landforms are monuments of Korean geopolitics.Baekdusan contains a caldera lake and wide lava plateaus. Offshore volcanic activity produced Ulleungodo and Jejudo that demonstrate crater depressions (not the emotional kind), lava tubes, and thick basalt layers.

2.2.3. River Systems, Watersheds, and Coastal Morphology

The mountain ranges of the peninsula create narrow watersheds and direct most major rivers towards the Yellow Sea and the South Sea while shorter and steeper rivers drain into the East Sea. Heavy summer monsoon rains cause sudden rises in water level, and long dry seasons leave rivers with low flow in early summer. These water patterns make water systems sensitive to drought and flash floods.

The Handgang, Nakdonggang, and Geumgang form the largest floodplains and hold dense farmland and settlement zones. Their low elevation and wide basics concentrate risk: intense rainfall quickly spreads across plains, and reduced wet-season flow constrains water security for cities and cropland upstream. Depending on slope and bedrock,rivers vary between straight, meandering, and braided forms. They carve waterfalls, cliffs, river caves, deposit deltas, alluvial fans, and wetlands. Wetlands absorb runoff and filter sediment, but shrink when coastal developments narrows their space.



Source: Amble. (2008). 'Korea rivers.svg', see https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Korea_rivers.svg.

Coastlines are opposites. The east coast forms a steep uplifted shoreline with narrow plains, rocky headlands, and sand-rich beaches. Its limited lowlands elevate exposure to erosion and storms. The west coast is low and irregular. It hosts wide tidal flats and large estuaries where major rivers meet the sea. Sediment, pollution, and saltwater collect in these shallow basins as riverflow and tides interact. The south coast presents ria inlets, island

clusters, and shallow bays sculpted by submerged valleys. Reclamation projects harm local natural integrity.

2.2.4. Climate

The peninsula sits in the middle latitudes and experiences four distinct seasons influenced by pressure systems and the East Asian monsoon. Winters are cold and dry under strong northwest winds from the Siberian high, while summers turn hot and humid as North Pacific high pushes moist air over the peninsula. Rainfall concentrates in the summer rainy season. More than half of annual precipitation arrives in a short period, and typhoons add intense downpours that flood low basins and river plains. Dry periods before the monsoon leave reservoirs and rivers at low levels. This increases water stress.



Distribution of annual rainfall in the Korean Peninsula in 2040.
Source: Lee, E.-H. and S.-S. Lee. (2019). 'Observations on changes in Korean Changma rain associated with climate warming in 2017 and 2018', see https://www.researchgate.net/figure/a-Distribution-of-annual-precipitation-amounts-in-the-Korean-Peninsula-KMA-2012-b_fig1_330346544

Temperatures fluctuate across regions. Northern inland basins record the widest annual ranges, while southern coasts remain milder due to maritime influence. Elevation intensified these contrasts. High mountain passes stay much cooler than surrounding lowlands. Climatic variability is high. The peninsula oscillates between drought and severe flood years based on monsoon timing and continental air mass strength. Urban systems, agriculture, and water supplies are strained by these swings.

Local phenomena add stress. Inland basins see frequent fog. Westerly winds carry dust each spring and reduce visibility on the west coast. Foehn winds dry interior valleys and raise temperatures along mountain slopes. Regional sunshine and evaporation differences influence moisture balance. Coastal islands receive less sunlight, while southeastern interiors receive more, which increases heat and water loss during dry spells.

2.2.5. Environmental and Resource Constraints

The Korean Peninsula is not exactly enjoying an abundance of resources due to climate change, land pressure, and urban growth. Forest area coverage has decreased from 70% coverage to 50% coverage in just 20 years. This is caused by urban construction-oriented land use traditions, expanded transport corridors, and coastal reclamation and harms habitats while increasing ecological stress.

A demonstration of deforestation in ROK.
Source: Millstein, S. (2024). 'Agriculture Affects Deforestation Much More Than Most People Realize', see https://sentientmedia.org/how-does-agriculture-cause-deforestation/.

Peninsular soils are highly sensitive to climatic and land use disturbances. Brown forest soils dominate central and southern regions. But steep slopes lose topsoil quickly during intense rainfall while prolonged heat dries upper layers and reduces fertility. These constraints negatively impact agricultural expansion and increase erosion risk in mountainous terrain. River systems depend heavily on the monsoon. Long dry spells reduce flow before the wet season, and short bursts of heavy rain trigger flooding narrow basins. Groundwater raises quality issues in several areas such as contamination in alluvial regions. Sea level rise accelerates saltwater intrusion in western freshwater supplies.

Reclamation and coastal development redefines tidal flat and alter sediment movement. These changes reduce wetland capacity, weaken natural buffers, and degrade water quality. Warmer coastal water and acidifying seas diminish marine biodiversity and disrupt fisheries. Protected landforms remain concentrated in high mountains and offshore islands, yet ecological corridors shrink as development expands.

Urban regions produce high waste volumes with limited land for disposal. Landfill sites create long-term methane and leachate risks. Air quality declines under industrial emissions, dense traffic, and recurring transboundary dust events. Heatwaves, extreme rainfalls, typhoons, and storms worsen present weaknesses. Steep river valleys flood swiftly, reclaimed costs face erosion and inundation while prolonged dry periods deteriorate water security.

3. Strategic Camps

3.1. Eurasian Stability Commission (ESC)

3.1.1. Overview

The ESC is a formal defense alliance between the DPRK, the PRC, and the Russian Federation. It exists to coordinate military, political, and intelligence actions under conditions of sustained pressure. The alliance is established on a stable foundation. Member states maintain permanent consultation, shared intelligence, and collective planning networks. Therefore, allowing responses to crises to follow pre-established protocols instead of improvised national reactions.

Authority within the ESC remains centralized at the national level. Each member retains full control over its armed forces and other sovereign functions. Alliance action is coordinated in advance to guarantee unified behavior while avoiding the creation of a single command structure. Instead of automatic military response clauses -like NATO's Article 5- collective action in the ESC is generated through organizational coordination and mutual dependence. Pressure applied to a single member produces retaliation by all three states.

The alliance is constructed for endurance through consolidation after fast and decisive first strikes. ESC's structure replicates the regimes that constitute it; regimes that assume confrontation will be prolonged and that survival is tied to coordination, mass, and the ability to absorb damage without collapsing.

3.1.2. Origins and Founding

The ESC was established in 2034 with the signing of the Eurasian Security Treaty by the DPRK, the PRC, and Russia. The treaty established the ESC as a permanent military-political alliance. Its headquarters was established in Shenyang, China, due to its location as a gravitational center and proximity to the East's last holdout: Korea and the Russian Far East. The treaty entered into force following ratification by all three member states. It formalized alliance membership, established a permanent secretariat, created standing liaison missions, and designated the ESC as the central forum for alliance consultation and coordination. With the treaty's entry into force, all prior structures were converged under the ESC.

3.1.3. Members and Internal Roles

Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

1. Main Role: Primary battlefield state. Carries the main burden of early and sustained fighting on the Korean Peninsula.
2. Command Status: Functions under centralized national command. Retains full control over its forces while coordinating actions with alliance partners through pre-determined protocols.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Provides large ground forces built around infantry, artillery, armor, and special forces. Primarily uses massed artillery and rocket forces. Employs missiles to strike critical adversarial assets. Uses air assets for localized defense, strike, and disruption without air dominance. Uses naval forces for coastal defense, mining, infiltration, and sea traffic harassment.
4. Infrastructure and Basing: Maintains hardened bases, underground facilities, artillery positions, missile launch sites, and logistics depots. Uses the underground for concealment and redundancy to maintain combat capabilities.
5. Logistics: Relies on pre-positioned stockpiles and internal transport networks. Designed to sustain combat under blockade and heavy strike conditions against limited supply.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides local intelligence and battlefield awareness. Conducts cyber operations for disruption and information gathering. Relies on Russian and Chinese space-based assets for coverage.
7. War Phase: Initiates large-scale attacks early. Applies massed fires to disrupt enemy forces and infrastructure. Transitions to prolonged attritional fighting once the war cools down.
8. Constraints: Economic limits, air and missile strike vulnerability, dependence on land-based logistics, high civilian and infrastructure exposure.
9. ROK counterpart.

People's Republic of China:

1. Main Role: Main powerhouse of the ESC and the sustainment party. Extends the conflict beyond the Peninsula and prevents rapid enemy stabilization.
2. Command Status: Operates under full national command authority. Synchronizes actions with alliance partners through pre-defined political and military structures without subordinating forces to a unified command.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Utilizes land forces to secure rear areas, protect supply routes, and support prolonged operations instead of frontline mass combat. Employs missile

forces and air assets to contest airspace, strike bases, ports, and logistics hubs, and complicate enemy air operations. Uses naval forces to contest access in neighboring waters, protect coastal routes, and pressure maritime movement. Uses the PLAN to deny freedom of movement, extending the battlefield, and sustaining pressure over time.

4. Infrastructure and Basing: Provides secure rear area bases, rail and road networks, industrial zones, and logistics centers for sustained alliance functions. Hosts alliance headquarters and other coordination facilities.
5. Logistics: Serves as the main land-based supplier of the ESC. Moves fuel, ammunition, equipment, and replacement systems by rail and road. Converts industries to wartime production to replace losses.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides early warning and targeting support. Conducts cyber operations to disrupt, collect intelligence, and protect ESC networks. Supplies space monitoring assets and communications through national systems.
7. War Phase: Occupies a supportive role in the opening phase. Becomes increasingly central as the conflict continues by replenishing supply flow, losses, and pressurizing the entire battlefield.
8. Constraints: Economic vulnerability and the need to balance military involvement with internal stability and global security interests.
9. USA counterpart.

Russian Federation:

1. Main Role: Combat and reinforcement power of the alliance. Expands the conflict to the North and East, and raises the cost of prolonged war for the adversary.
2. Command Status: Maintains a fully national command authority. Only coordinates with alliance partners through hotlines without placing forces under a unified command.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Uses land forces mainly for regional presence and pressure rather than frontline mass combat. Employs air forces for long-range strikes, air defense, and support missions. Deploys naval forces, including submarines, to threaten sea routes, apply pressure in secondary areas, and complicate enemy movement instead of local sea control.

4. Infrastructure and Basing: Maintains bases and facilities in the Russian Far East to support air, missile, and naval operations. Hosts training, storage, and preparation areas used for reinforcement and system deployment.
5. Logistics: Supplies advanced weapons, replacement systems, and specialized equipment. Supports sustainment through overland routes that converge into Chinese routes and demand-based resupply instead of continuous flow.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides intelligence support, electronic warfare capabilities, and targeting assistance. Conducts cyber activity for disruption and information gathering. Contributes space-based support through national systems.
7. War Phase: Although its role is limited in the opening phase, it becomes more active as the conflict drags on by adding strike capacity, air defense, and pressure on secondary fronts.
8. Constraints: Distance from the main battlefield, resource limitations, and collapsing demographics.
9. Japan counterpart.

3.1.4. Organizational Structure

- Supreme Council for Eurasian Stability (SCES): Top decision body of the alliance. One senior representative from each member state. Decides common positions and approves joint action.
- Eurasian Stability Commission Headquarters (ESCHQ): Permanent alliance headquarters located in Shenyang, China. All alliance activity is coordinated from this location.
- General Secretariat of the Eurasian Stability Commission (GSESC): Administrative office of the alliance. Keeps records, manages meetings, and runs secure communication between members.
- Joint Strategic Planning Directorate (JSPD): Group of senior military officers from each member state. Prepares joint military plans and response options. National armies remain under national control.
- Combined Intelligence Coordination Bureau (CICB): Shared intelligence unit. Collects reports from all member states and produces common threat assessments.
- Permanent National Representation Missions (PNRMs): Permanent delegations from each member state inside the headquarters. Connect alliance bodies directly to national governments and military leadership.

3.1.5. How Does the ESC Think?

1. Plan to seize advantages in the first phases through massed ground force and fires.
2. Accept early losses if important terrain, ports, and logistics hubs are disrupted.
3. Treat ground forces -especially artillery, rockets, and missiles- as the main tools for shaping the battlefield.
4. Prioritize land supply corridors and pre-positioned stockpiles over maritime resupply.
5. Assume maritime access will be contested or denied.
6. Use quantity and repetition to offset losses in air and precision systems.
7. Keep operations running as long as fuel and ammunition permit.
8. Change from offense to endurance when objectives are achieved or sustainment windows tighten.
9. Rely on internal control to manage civilian stress and casualties.
10. Aim to force a political settlement before opponent logistics fully stabilize.

3.1.6. How the ESC Looks to Its Adversaries?

From the outside, the ESC appears disciplined, land-centric, and prepared for prolonged conflict. Its lack of automatic response clauses creates uncertainty, but potential outcomes can be deducted easily. Heavy reliance on artillery, missiles, and land logistics is a demonstration of readiness for early shock operations. Centralized control and internal coordination suggest constrained action windows once operations begin. The alliance is viewed as difficult to dissolve but costly to confront directly.

3.2. Pacific Defense Pact (PDP)

3.2.1. Overview

The PDP is a formal defense alliance between the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. It exists to prevent rapid territorial or political collapse of the Asia-Pacific region and to defeat large-scale aggression through sustained military and logistical superiority. The alliance is founded on a stable basis. Member states are tied to one another through an indispensable interconnection network. The PDP relies on interoperability, forward basing, and global reach to ensure that forces can be deployed, reinforced, and sustained under combat conditions.

Authority within the PDP is distributed but coordinated. National command authority is retained while operational control is delegated through joint and combined command structures during crises. Thus, enabling perpetual unity across air, sea, land, cyber, and space

domains. The alliance is structured around endurance through sustainment. Its core strength is in secure maritime access, air superiority, protected logistics networks, and industrial capacity. The alliance prioritizes restoring and protecting supply routes, ports, and airfields to maintain long-term war-waging abilities.

The PDP is constructed against rapid initial action and to regain superiority over time. It assumes that initial phases may be costly but that sustained throughput, precision strike capabilities, and coalition unity will ultimately overwhelm opponents reliant on early mass and land-based pressure.

3.2.2. Origins and Founding

The PDP was established in 2034, shortly after the ESC's establishment, with the signing of the Asia-Pacific Treaty by the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. The treaty established the PDP as a permanent military-political alliance. It was headquartered at Yokosuka, Japan as a demonstration of the alliance's maritime orientation, rear area security, and need for continuity under missile threat. A Forward Combined Operational Command was established in the ROK to direct theater-level military operations. The treaty entered into force following ratification by all three member states. It formalized alliance membership, established a permanent secretariat, created standing liaison missions, and designated the PDP as the central forum for alliance consultation and joint operational coordination. With the treaty's entry into force, prior bilateral structures and national-level coordination mechanisms were converged under the PDP framework.

3.2.3. Members and Internal Roles

Republic of Korea:

1. Main Role: Primary battlefield state. Defends national territory and carries the main burden of ground combat on the Peninsula.
2. Command Status: Retains national command under all circumstances. Coordinates joint PDP land operations due to its geographic proximity and deep knowledge of Korean people.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Provides the bulk of land forces, built around mechanized and infantry formations for urban, mountainous, and defensive combat. Uses ground forces to hold terrain, absorb attacks, and prevent rapid breakthrough. Employs air forces primarily for air defense, close support, and counter-missile missions rather

than air control. Uses naval forces mainly for coastal defense, sea denial near the Peninsula, and protection of ports and sea approaches.

4. Infrastructure and Basing: Hosts ports, airfields, headquarters, and logistics hubs, with Busan and Incheon being the most important. Serves as the physical base for most frontline and combined alliance movements.
5. Logistics: Provides local transport, storage, and distribution of supplies within the Peninsula. Relies on allied sealift and airlift for resupply but manages last-mile sustainment for ground forces.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides local intelligence, surveillance, and maintains public awareness. Conducts cyber defense and internal network protection in coordination with the PDP. Relies on allies for most space-based capabilities.
7. War Phase: Absorbs the initial shock of massed attacks. Holds ground during the early phase. Enables allied reinforcement and counteroffensive operations once PDP reinforcements arrive.
8. Constraints: Geography, population density, frontline proximity, and dependence on allied command, airpower, and sustainment.
9. DPRK counterpart.

United States of America:

1. Main Role: Primary force provider and the PDP's military base. Enables the alliance to fight beyond the opening phase and sustain operations over time.
2. Command Status: Holds main leadership within combined command structures. Retains full national command authority while directing coalition operations through established alliance commands.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Uses air and naval forces to establish and maintain air superiority and maritime access. Employs aircraft carriers, attack submarines, long-range bombers, and advanced combat aircraft for sustained strike and control missions. Deploys ground forces mainly as reinforcements, specialists, and follow-on units rather than mass formations. Uses ground forces for base defense, counter-missile operations, force protection, and later-stage offensive actions once access is secured.
4. Infrastructure and Basing: Provides major command facilities, rear area bases, and access to global military infrastructure. Maintains forward bases and facilities across Japan and the Pacific.

5. Logistics: Supplies nearly all of airlift and sealift. Maintains large pre-positioned stockpiles of equipment, fuel, and ammunition. Sustains coalition forces through long-distance transport and resupply.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides the majority of intelligence collection and early warning. Operates cyber divisions and space-based systems for defense, offense, surveillance, communications, and navigation.
7. War Phase: Accepts early losses to stabilize the situation. Becomes the main determinant after reinforcement and logistics lines are established. Long-term fighting.
8. Constraints: Internal dissidence suppression, alliance unity requirements, and global commitments outside the Peninsula.
9. PRC counterpart.

State of Japan:

1. Main Role: Primary rear-area support state of the alliance. Enables sustained operations by keeping forces supplied, repaired, and protected.
2. Command Status: Operates under national command with PDP unity. Supports alliance operations through designated commands without directing coalition combat.
3. Land, Air, Sea Roles: Uses naval forces to secure surrounding seas and protect allied shipping. Conducts submarine hunting, maritime patrol, and escort missions to keep sea routes open. Employs air forces primarily for air defense and missile interception rather than offensive strike. Deploys ground-based air and missile defense units to protect bases, ports, and cities. Ground forces remain in defense and support roles.
4. Infrastructure and Basing: Hosts major naval bases, air bases, logistics facilities, and repair yards used throughout the conflict. Serves as the main preparation and transit area for the PDP.
5. Logistics: Supports partial airlift and sealift into the Peninsula. Provides maintenance, repair, refueling, and storage for allied forces moving towards the warzone.
6. Intelligence and Cyber Role: Provides maritime surveillance and early warning. Conducts cyber defense on national and alliance infrastructure. Supports space-based surveillance through American systems.
7. War Phase: Secures rear areas during the opening phase. Becomes increasingly important as the conflict continues by sustaining flow, repair, and reinforcement.
8. Constraints: Constitutional limitations, domestic political sensitivity, and dependence on alliance protection beyond defensive duties.

9. Russia counterpart.

3.2.4. Organizational Structure

- Pacific Defense Council (PDC): Top political body of the alliance. One senior civilian leader from each member state. Decides alliance goals and approves joint military action.
- PDP Strategic Headquarters (PDP-HQ): Main alliance headquarters. Located in Japan. Keeps the alliance functioning during crisis and war and handles long-term planning.
- Forward Combined Operational Command (FCOC): Main battlefield command. Located in the Republic of Korea. Runs joint fighting on the Peninsula.
- PDP Secretariat: Main battlefield command. Located in the Republic of Korea. Runs joint fighting on the Peninsula.
- Joint Force Coordination Staff (JFCS): Military staff made up of officers from all members. Matches national forces to alliance plans and assigns tasks during war.
- Combined Intelligence Fusion Center (CIFC): Shared intelligence center. Collects reports from all members and produces threat warnings and target information.
- Permanent National Representation Missions (PNRMs): Permanent teams from each member state. Placed inside alliance bodies to link decisions directly to national governments and militaries.

3.2.5. How Does the PDP Think?

1. Expect the opening phase to be unfavorable and survive it.
2. Prioritize keeping ports, airfields, and sea lanes usable.
3. Restore logistics flow before seeking major battlefield gains.
4. Use air and sea control to reduce enemy freedom of movement over time.
5. Rely on precision strikes to degrade enemy artillery, missiles, and logistics.
6. Trade early losses for long-term operational superiority.
7. Protect sustainment systems as critical combat assets.
8. Escalate force employment gradually to not overarch alliance capabilities.
9. Use global lift, reserves, and industry to outlast the opponent.
10. Define success as sustained throughput and operational dominance rather than rapid breakthrough.

3.2.6. What the PDP Looks Like to its Adversaries?

From the outside, the PDP appears networked, maritime-centric, and built for sustained operations rather than immediate attacks. Its strength lies in air and sea control, global lift, and the ability to restore logistics after early disruption. Dependence on ports, airfields, and a long supply chain is an element of vulnerability during the opening phases. Political coordination requirement suggests slower initial reaction exchanged for high capabilities when mobilization is complete. To adversaries such as the ESC, the PDP is seen as an alliance that becomes increasingly dangerous the longer a conflict persists.

4. State Affairs Structure

4.1. Government

4.1.1. Political Power (PP)

Political Power represents a state's capacity to initiate, sustain, and modify its domestic political action. It is a finite, everchanging, and intangible national resource.

1. Storage: The amount of PP that can be stored at the same time is between -500 and 2000. If a country reaches -500 political power, they cannot do anything until their political power is a positive number again and all of their continuous PP spendings will be cancelled automatically.
2. Passive Generation: Each country in the committee generates a base amount of PP per session based on its size, capability, and power.
3. Modifiers: In addition to passive generation, PP income may be increased or decreased by multiple factors:
    a. Stability
    b. War Support
    c. National Spirits
    d. Leaders
    e. Other actions taken by directives
4. Expenditures:
    a. Law Changes: Changing a law, policy, spending level costs 400 PP.
    b. Appointments and Dismissals: Appointing or removing any top-level government officials costs 500 PP.

c. National Focus Commitments: Selecting a focus costs 200 PP and maintaining it costs 100 PP per session.
d. Directives: Sending one directive costs 25 PP no matter the length or type.

4.1.2. Ideology

Every country in the world has one of the five ideologies that designate their national courses. These are very difficult to change and affect a country's administrative mechanisms. The five ideology groups and their wartime strengths and weaknesses are as follows:

1. Democracy
    a. Positives:
        i. High effectiveness in coalition warfare and joint command environments.
        ii. Strong logistics coordination and institutional redundancy.
        iii. Military professionalism.
    b. Negatives:
        i. Civil-military infighting increases as casualties rise.
        ii. Public pressure constrains prolonged offensives.
        iii. Visible battlefield failures translate quickly into public unrest.
2. Communism
    a. Positives:
        i. Strong central control over manpower, industry, and information.
        ii. High tolerance for sustained losses and material attrition.
        iii. Ability to maintain war effort despite severe economic stress.
    b. Negatives:
        i. Very rigid and inflexible command structures.
        ii. Internal pressure accumulates quietly and may surface suddenly.
        iii. Limited flexibility in operational pauses or withdrawals.
3. Authoritarian
    a. Positives:
        i. Rapid execution of orders and centralized operational control.
        ii. Strong internal security against wartime dissent.
        iii. High short-term battlefield unity and uniformity.
    b. Negatives:
        i. Leadership competence-bound effectiveness.

ii. Vulnerable regime confidence in stalled offensives and heavy losses.
iii. Limited tolerance for prolonged stalemate.

4. Nationalism
    a. Positives:
        i. Very high tolerance for casualties and material loss.
        ii. Identity and propaganda-reinforced strong morale.
        iii. Military setbacks' convenience in being labeled as necessary sacrifice.
    b. Negatives:
        i. Low strategic flexibility due to rampant loyalist admission.
        ii. High overcommitment and overextension risks.
        iii. High political danger against standbacks and stalls.
5. Neutrality
    a. Positives:
        i. High flexibility in diplomatic positioning.
        ii. Lower internal pressure to pursue offensive operations.
        iii. Administrative unity remains intact as long as the homeland is safe.
    b. Negatives:
        i. Low mobilization capacity.
        ii. Low tolerance for sustained high-intensity combat.
        iii. Rapid loss of effectiveness if frontlines collapse.

Ignoring or mismanaging the values of an ideology will **harm** the country.

4.1.3. Elections

Elections only occur in Democratic and Neutral countries every four years. However, wartime conditions necessitate different approaches to elections. Therefore, delegates must take appropriate action.

4.1.4. Stability

Stability represents the people's support for the current government. It is expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100%. Stability has various effects including resistance strength in occupied territories. At high stability, the nation receives bonuses. At low stability, various crises can ravage the nation. Details below:

- Stability above 50% gives the following bonuses, which scale linearly from none at 50% to the full amount at 100%. At 100% stability, the bonuses are:

+10% PP gain, +50% Production Output

- Stability below 50% gives the following penalties, which scale linearly from none at 50% to the full amount at 0%. At 0% stability, the penalties are:

  -10% PP gain, -50% Production Output

4.1.5. War Support

War Support represents the willingness of the population to endure the privations of war. It is expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100%. The default value at which war support grants no benefits is 50%, with bonuses above that value and drawbacks below it. Details below:

- War Support above 50% gives the following bonuses which scale randomly, but never negatively. The bonuses are:

  Increased mobilization speed, army attack, army defense, commander faith

- War Support below 50% gives the following penalties which scale randomly, but never positively. The penalties are:

  Decreased mobilization speed, army attack, army defense, commander faith

War support can be changed through the preservation or addition of certain national values and policies that incentivize war-waging.

4.1.6. Command Power (CP)

Command Power represents the ability of the government to bypass the chain of command and directly influence the military. CP is capped at 80 and each session replenishes 10 CP. Assigning new top-level military officials will increase CP by 20 per official. CP can be spent for one-time actions to perform the following:

1. Impose Strategic Military Priority - 30 CP: Forces the armed forces to concentrate efforts on a specific matter of desire. Can be used to change directive operations that have not received an update.
2. Air Supply Mission - 0.05 CP per aircraft: Allows transport planes to conduct air supply drop missions.
3. Sustained Exceptional Tempo - 40 CP: Drives forces beyond normal operational limits for a short period to increase effectiveness at the cost of exhaustion and attrition.
4. Hire a Top-Level Military Official - 25 CP: Acquire new top-level commanders to command their respective army groups and increase the CP cap.

5. Send an Attaché to an Ally - 50 CP: Sends a technical expert on a country's diplomatic staff at a foreign capital resulting in higher military cooperation and giving benefits to both countries.
    - Attaché Benefits: Increased intelligence, surveillance, and planning efficiency and increased war support.

4.1.7. Country Leaders

Each country has a leader. Every leader has an affiliation with a certain party, is aligned with the country's current ideology, and carries certain positive and negative traits. The aspects of a country leader is as follows:

(1) Full Name, (2) Country, (3) Political Party, (4) Positive Traits, (5) Negative Traits

4.2. Income Sources and Government Expenditures

4.2.1. Tax Revenue

Taxes are required payments of money to governments, which use the funds to provide public goods and services for the benefit of the community as a whole. Details below:

Country Name	Tax Income per Million People per Session
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	$40 million
Russian Federation	$70 million
People's Republic of China	$55 million
Republic of Korea	$85 million
State of Japan	$90 million
United States of America	$95 million

4.2.2. Production Revenue

Production is the action of making or manufacturing from components or raw materials, or the process of being so manufactured. Civilian Factory is the only revenue-generating production facility. Each Civilian Factory Generates $2 billion per session.

4.2.3. Assets and Property Revenue

Assets and property revenue is income earned from government-owned land, buildings, enterprises, or financial investments.

Building	Revenue Generated per Session

Electrical Grid Facility	$1 billion
Nuclear Power Plant	$4 billion
Fossil Fuel Power Plant	$2.5 billion
Renewable Energy Field	$2 billion
Mines	$3 billion

4.2.4. Resources Revenue

Resource revenue refers to income generated from the extraction or use of natural resources owned or controlled by the state. Resource revenue is measured by access to a resource rather than its amount because we are also people and need to keep track of things. Details below:

Resource	Possession Income (Unit/Session)	Import Cost (Unit/Session)	Export Income (Unit/Session)
Oil	$30 million	$75 million	$60 million
Aluminum	$11 million	$20 million	$16 million
Rubber	$60 million	$160 million	$128 million
Tungsten	$20 million	$40 million	$32 million
Steel	$9 million	$20 million	$16 million
Chromium	$13 million	$26 million	$21 million
Consumer Goods	$24 million	$50 million	$40 million

4.2.5. Administration Spending

Administration Expenditure is used to describe the budget allocated by a government to regulate and fund its bureaucratic systems. There are five degrees of administration spending that constrain and relieve certain state aspects. Details below:

Type	Cost (% of total income)	Political Effects	Industrial Effects
Decentralized Bureaucracy State	5%	-25% Stability -25% PP Gain	+50% Production Output +2 Construction Speed Factor
Basic Civil Service State	10%	-10% Stability -15% PP Gain	+25% Production Output +1 Construction Speed Factor
Large Civil Service State	15%	-	+10% Production Output

Centralized Bureaucracy	17.5%	+10% Stability +15% PP Gain	-1 Construction Speed Factor
Extensive Centralized Bureaucracy	20%	+25% Stability +25% PP Gain	-10% Production Output -3 Construction Speed Factor

4.2.6. Defense Spending

Defense spending refers to the financial resources allocated by a nation to support its military and defense operations. There are five degrees of defense spending. Details below:

Type	Cost (% of total income)	Political Effects	Industrial Effects
No Military Spending	0%	-100% Manpower -20% PP Gain	-75% Production Output -3 Construction Speed Factor
Small Military Spending	2.5%	-75% Manpower -10% PP Gain -10% Stability	-50% Production Output -2 Construction Speed Factor
Medium Military Spending	10%	+5% Manpower +5% PP Gain -5% Stability	+15% Production Output -1 Construction Speed Factor
Large Military Spending	25%	+15% Manpower +10% PP Gain -15% Stability	+40% Production Output +2 Construction Speed Factor
Total War	50%	+25% Manpower +25% PP Gain -25% Stability	+60% Production Output +3 Construction Speed Factor

4.2.7. Internal Security Spending

Internal Security Spending represents a state's allocated financial assets to maintain internal order, societal cohesion, and enforcing the law through police and intelligence services. There are five degrees of internal security spending. Details below:

Type	Cost (% of total income)	Effects
Minimal Police Funding	5%	-
Basic Police and Security Funding	7.5%	+5% Stability -20 PP Gain Better Counterintelligence
High Police and Intelligence Funding	15%	+10% Stability -25 PP Gain Enhanced Counterintelligence
Extensive Police and Intelligence Funding	20%	+15% Stability -30 PP Gain Extensive Counterintelligence
Police State	25%	+20% Stability

		-50 PP Gain Nearly Impenetrable Counterintelligence

4.2.8. Social Welfare Spending

Social Welfare spending is a type of government support intended to ensure that members of a society can meet basic human needs including but not limited to food, healthcare, education, and shelter. There are four social welfare spending degrees. Details below:

Type	Cost (% of total income)	Effects
Minimal Subsistence Subsidies	5%	-
Basic Pensions for Elderly and Disabled	15%	+6% Stability +15% PP Gain
Substantial Safety Net	25%	+9% Stability +20% PP Gain
Welfare State	35%	+12% Stability +25% PP Gain

4.3. Policies and Advisors

4.3.1. Conscription Laws

The conscription law of a country mainly determines the available manpower for the armed forces. Besides its political power costs, it is fairly safe to increase conscription laws until Extensive Conscription since each law beyond it imposes restrictive penalties. Details below:

Modifier	Abolished Military	Volunteer Service	Partial Draft	Extensive Draft	Mandatory Service	All Adults Serve	Scraping the Barrel
Recruitable Population	1%	2.5%	3.5%	5%	10%	20%	25%
Production Output	-	-	-	-	-10%	-30%	-40%
Constructin Speed Factor	-	-	-	-	-1	-2	-3
Training Time	-	-	-	+10%	+20%	+30%	+50%

4.3.2. Trade Laws

The trade law of a country determines what percentage of a country's controlled resources can be exported to increase income and efficiency in factories, dockyards, and construction speed. The more free trade is, the greater the benefits for production output, and construction speed. However, freer trade also increases intelligence and espionage vulnerability. Details below:

Modifier	Globalized Trade Economy	Export Economy	Mixed Economy	Semi-Consumption Economy	Consumption Economy	Closed Economy
Resources to Market	80%	60%	50%	30%	15%	0%
Production Output	+50%	+30%	+20%	+15%	+10%	-
Construction Speed Factor	+3	+2	+1	-	-1	-2
Additional Income	+20%	+15%	+10%	+5%	+1%	-

4.3.3. Economic Laws

The economy law of a country defines how many factories of all civilian factories are needed to produce Consumer Goods, the Construction and conversion costs of factories, and the efficiency of energy production. Higher tiers of economic law are generally more efficient than lower ones, especially when constructing factories. Details below:

Modifier	Civilian Economy	Early Mobilization	Partial Mobilization	War Economy	Total Mobilization
Consumer Goods Unit Rate	5 Units/1 Million Citizens	4 Units/1 Million Citizens	3 Units/1 Million Citizens	2 Units/1 Million Citizens	1 Unit/1 Million Citizens
Construction Speed Factor	-2	-1	-	+1	+2
Factory Upkeep Cost	-50%	-25%	-10%	+10%	+25%
Prerequisites	-	+15% War Support	+25% War Support	+50% War Support Nationalist, Communist, Authoritarian	+80% War Support Nationalist, Communist, Authoritarian

4.3.4. Political Advisors

Political Advisors are individuals emerging from within the government to change the political environment of a country through their variety of aspects. Up to three political advisors may be chosen. The aspects of a political advisors is as follows:

(1) Full Name, (2) Trait, (3) Benefits, and (4) Drawbacks

4.3.5. Military High Command

Up to four members of the military high command may be chosen for Military High Command positions, giving global bonuses to their branch of service. Their degree of skills

vary between -from the least skillful to the most- Specialist, Expert, and Genius. The aspects of a military high command advisors is as follows:

(1) Full Name, (2) Area of Expertise, (3) Skill Level, (4) Benefits,

4.4. National Focus

National Focus is the concentration of a country's attention, resources, and efforts in achieving a military, industrial, or political goal. A country may take only one focus at one time. There are two types of focuses.

4.4.1. Regular Focuses

Regular Focuses are focuses that require a session to be completed. After its completion, they generate tangible outcomes related to their content. They can be taken once. Taking a regular focus costs 100 PP per session. Regular focuses are as follows:

1. Emergency Industrial Expansion:
    a. Initiates a concentrated effort to rapidly expand wartime industrial capacity.
    b. +2 Civilian Factories or +2 Military Factories in desired location, -$10 billion
2. Strategic Infrastructure Fortification:
    a. Prioritizes reinforcement and expansion of critical military and logistical infrastructure.
    b. +1 Supply Hub and +2 Forts (both land and coastal) in desired locations
3. Political Consolidation Measures:
    a. Takes decisive actions to secure internal authority during wartime.
    b. Grants +10% stability and spends an additional -100 PP
4. Military Command Restructuring:
    a. Subjects the armed forces to a targeted reorganization to address operational weaknesses exposed by the war.
    b. +20 CP cap and replace one top-level military official without additional PP cost

4.4.2. Continuous Focuses

Continuous Focuses are focuses that can be taken indefinitely. They remain active until manually dropped. As opposed to a regular focus which provides one-time effects, the effects of a continuous focus benefit the nation whilst the chosen focus remains active. Taking a continuous focus consumes 200 PP per session. Continuous focuses are as follows:

1. Naval Production:
    a. Focuses resources on shipyards and exempts skilled shipbuilders from military service.
    b. Increases dockyard output by 25%.
2. Air Production:
    a. Reorganizes the aviation industry to reduce waste and streamline production.
    b. Increases aircraft production output by 25%.
3. Army Production:
    a. Creates specialized advanced production units within each Military Factory.
    b. Increases land unit production output by 25%.
4. Construction Repair and Engineering:
    a. Forms specialized teams from factory and construction workers and centrally controls their deployment
    b. Increases construction speed factor by 2.

4.5. Construction

Constructions are fixed assets that can be built in desired locations to serve certain purposes and meet certain necessities using labor, money, and time. There are five categories of constructions, each with its own buildings designed to serve unique purposes and meet different needs. [Name; Purpose; Construction Time (Very Slow | Slow, Moderate | Fast | Very Fast); Construction Cost]

4.5.1. Infrastructure

1. Territorial Infrastructure: Improves operations involving the utilization of support buildings; Moderate; $2 billion per region.
2. Network Infrastructure: Improves digital coordination and control regionally; Moderate; $1.5 billion per region.

4.5.2. Logistics

1. Supply Hub: Distributes supplies from railways that arrive from the capital. Must be connected to a railroad; Fast; $3 billion per hub; multiple supply hubs can be built in a province.
2. Naval Port: Stations naval fleets, and can send and receive supplies and resources via convoys; Moderate; $15 billion; hosts 20 ships.

3. Railroads: Transports supplies from the capital to supply sources like cities, ports or supply hubs. Speeds up transport of divisions doing strategic movement; Fast (km)r; $50 million per km.

4.5.3. Industrial and Production

1. Civilian Factory: Produces consumer goods and other civil assets; Slow; $20 billion; 4 Civilian Units/Session base output.
2. Military Factory: Produces all kinds of military assets used on land and in the air; Slow; $30 billion; 50 Military Units/session base output.
3. Naval Dockyard: Produces and repairs ships; Very Slow; $60 billion; 60 Naval Units/session base output.

4.5.4. Energy and Resources

1. Electrical Grid Facility: Transmits and delivers electricity to target locations; Slow; $5 billion.
2. Nuclear Power Plant: A type of power plant that uses the process of nuclear fission in order to generate electricity; Very Slow; $50 billion.
3. Fossil Fuel Power Plant: A facility that generates electricity through the combustion of nonrenewable fossil fuels; Slow; $30 billion; requires oil possession.
4. Renewable Energy Field: A facility that creates energy, fuels, or chemicals directly from renewable energy sources such as the sun; Moderate; $20 billion.
5. Fuel Silo: Silos are used for the storage of fuel materials for power generation or industrial processes; Slow; $4 billion; 2 million barrels capacity.
6. Mines: Mines are used to reach underground levels on the Earth's surface systematically to extract natural resources; Very Slow; $15 billion.

4.5.5. Military Buildings

1. Radar Station: Detects enemy forces, especially incoming aircraft. Radars also help detect enemy ships at sea and can increase intelligence in other nations; Fast ; $10 billion; 1000km range.
2. Coastal Defense Complex: Increases the defensibility of a coastal region; Fast; $10 billion; 10,000 unit capacity.

3. Land Defense Complex: Increases the defensibility of a land region; Fast; $10 billion; 10,000 unit capacity.
4. Surface-to-Air Missile Site: A military complex that houses multiple SAM launchers against air attacks and incoming missiles to intercept them; Very Fast; $15 billion.
5. Ballistic Missile Silo: A vertical cylindrical structure constructed underground, for the storage and launching of any type of ballistic missiles; Very Fast; $20 billion..
6. Air Base: Bases and repairs air units; Fast; $5 billion per 200 aircraft capacity (expandable).
7. Field Hospital: A temporary hospital set up to provide emergency medical care for people wounded in military action; Very Fast; $2 billion; 1,500 patient capacity (expandable).
8. Prison: A high-security facility operated to contain lawbreakers, defectors, prisoners of war, or resistance members; Slow; $5 billion; 1,000 capacity.

4.6. Production

4.6.1. Production Facilities

The following facilities are the only available production buildings, their efficiency is influenced by Output rates.

1. Civilian Factories:
    a. These factories prioritize the production of consumer goods to keep the population stable, then they can produce any desired civilian asset.
    b. A Civilian Factory has a base output of 4 Civilian Units/Session, which can be increased and generates $2 billion per session.
    c. The base upkeep cost of a Civilian Factory is $500 million.
2. Military Factories:
    a. These factories produce land and air-based military assets to maintain military supplies and sustain warfare.
    b. Every land and air-based military asset has a Military Unit cost. This value represents how many Military Units must be produced to build one unit of that asset.
    c. A Military Factory has a base output of 50 Military Units/Session, which can be increased.

d. The base upkeep cost of a Military Factory is $1 billion.

3. Naval Dockyards:
    a. These dockyards produce military and civilian naval equipment necessary to sustain a state's maritime operations.
    b. Every naval military asset has a Naval Unit cost. This value represents how many Naval Units must be produced to build one unit of that asset.
    c. A Naval Dockyard has a base output of 60 Naval Units/Session, which is expandable.
    d. The base upkeep cost of a Naval Dockyard is $2 billion.

Their base output modifiers are influenced by laws, advisors, and other independent state actions taken through directives.

4.6.2. Production Lines

Military and naval equipment production are organized into production lines, each of which produces a single type of equipment at a time using assigned military factories for land and air-based assets and naval dockyards for naval equipment.

Up to 150 Military Factories may be assigned to a single military asset production line. Up to 15 Naval Shipyards may be assigned to a single naval asset production line.

Additionally, each military/naval asset consumes a designated amount of certain resources in proportion with the amount of Military Factories/Naval Shipyards assigned to their production.

4.6.3. Resources

Each nation can use a percentage of its resources on its territory for military production, with the rest being reserved exclusively for trade. This percentage depends on the active trade law. Resource production can be increased by excavation and constructing infrastructure.

Resource	Description	Domain
Oil	Principal fuel for any land, air, and sea vehicle.	Land, Air, Sea
Aluminum	Important for the construction of aircraft frames, missiles, and lightweight military vehicles.	Land, Air
Rubber	Required for tires, seals, electronics insulation, and vehicle maintenance.	Land, Air, Sea
Tungsten	Used for high-precision equipment, armor-piercing munitions, and	Land, Air, Sea

	specialized industrial tools.	
Steel	The foundational material for ground vehicles, ships, artillery, structures, and industrial machinery.	Land, Air, Sea
Chromium	Used in high-performance alloys for engines, armor plating, and heat-resistant components.	Land, Air

4.6.4. Military Unit Costs Per Military Asset

Each military asset has a designated production points that designates the necessary amount of Military Units to complete the production of one asset of that kind.

5. Global Foreign Affairs Structure

5.1. Diplomacy

There are several essential diplomatic functions. Essential diplomatic functions are as follows:

Action	**Description**
Ask for Military Access	Military access allows moving troops through the territory of another country, allied or not.
Offer Military Access	Offer to provide military access to another country. If they accept, it will not automatically grant you military access.
Ask for Docking Rights	Docking rights allow moving ships into the ports of another country, allied or not.
Offer Docking Rights	Offer to provide docking rights to another country. If they accept, it will not automatically grant you docking rights.
Send Attaché	Sends an attaché to a country.
Start Lend Lease	Send any equipment to another non-enemy country currently at war. It's possible to send a single shipment of a specified amount, or set a specified monthly amount or percentage of monthly production to be sent.
Request Lend Lease	Ask a country to send lend-lease of specific equipment archetypes.
Send Expeditionary Forces	Send an unlimited number of divisions to a fellow member of the faction. Control over the units is transferred.
Return Expeditionary Forces	Recovers control over all units currently sent as Expeditionary force to the target country.
Stage a Coup	Starts preparations for a Coup d'État in the target country. (YOU must plan for it.)
Issue Trade Embargo	Prevents trade with another country. May compel other countries to join your embargo

5.2. Occupation

Regions are divided into two categories.

1. Core Regions: An integral part of the country, and the inhabitants are fully available for military service.

2. Occupied Regions: A former core region under the control of a country that is not its original owner. The inhabitants are mostly rejective towards the new regime.

5.2.1. Resistance

Resistance against occupation is the sustained effort by an occupied people to defend their autonomy, identity, right, and sovereignty against an external authority that governs them through force or coercion.

Resistance strength measures the severity of the populace's resistance to the controller's Occupation of the state. It is expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100%. Upon the state being captured, the initial resistance is set to 1%. From there, it either grows or falls based on the ruling country's rooting policies. When resistance strength reaches certain thresholds, various difficulties emerge per-state basis:

Name	Resistance Level	Effects
Organized Resistance	25%	- Underground networks. - Locals collaborate with enemy forces. - Recruitment operations.
Emboldened Resistance	50%	- Occasional assaults against friendly units. - Mass demonstrations. - Local governance compliance refusions.
Uprising	75%	- Riots and intensified guerilla warfare against friendly units. - Open armed fighting groups. - Friendly division attrition.
Rebellion	90%	- Independence declaration imminent. - Hostile irregular forces rampant. - Constant attacks on friendly units, infrastructure, and factories.

5.2.2. Compliance

Compliance is the representation of a non-core population's loyalty to the occupying regime; in other words, the proportion of people in the local population that are loyalists.

It is expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100%. Once a state capitulates or is annexed, the initial compliance is set to 0%. If a collaboration government has been prepared beforehand, starting compliance will be 25%. The average level of compliance has certain benefits per state:

Name	Compliance Level	Effects
Informants	15%	- Local loyalists collaborate with friendly units on partisans and enemy activities.

Local Police Force	25%	- Local police force maintained by regional assets under friendly supervision enforces local order.
Reorganized Workforce	40%	- Local factories operate near normal capacity. - Regional resource production increases.
Volunteer Program	60%	- A small portion of loyalists wish to join friendly forces. - Local population integration into zonal governance structure begins.
A New Regime	80%	- A fully functional collaboration government forms.

5.2.3. Garrison

In order to combat resistance and police the population, occupied states will need to be garrisoned by military troops to perform police duties under occupation laws. Occupation laws are scaled with garrison efficiency. If a garrison reinforcement order is not fulfilled, all benefits from the occupation law will be reduced accordingly.

Occupation Laws: (they are customizable and expandable, these are the fundamentals)

1. No Garrison
2. Civilian Oversight Implementation
3. Local Police Force Formations
4. Secret Police Deployments
5. Military Governor Appointment
6. Forced Labor Policies
7. Harsh Quotas for Production
8. Martial Law Application

5.3. Intelligence Agency and Espionage

An intelligence agency is required for most of the espionage actions. It can be used to recruit operatives to perform missions or operations, and it can be further enhanced. Below is the most basic structure of an intelligence agency. Delegates may directly refer to this or enhance it to strengthen their capabilities.

5.3.1. Operatives

Operatives are field agents capable of carrying out espionage under an intelligence agency. The total amount of operatives employed by a nation at a time varies. An operative may be assigned to one operation at max. The aspects of an operative is as follows:

(1) Full Name, (2) Nationality, (3) Department, (4) Skill Level, (5) Traits

5.3.2. Intelligence Branches

1. Economy-Civilian Department: Responsible for intelligence related to civilian economy, industry, infrastructure, resources, society, and internal stability.
2. Army Department: Responsible for land warfare intelligence, and gathers information on enemy troop movements, ground forces, logistics networks, defensive positions, and command structures.
3. Naval Department: Responsible for maritime intelligence, and gathers information on naval deployments, convoy compositions, enemy maritime routes, amphibious ambitions, and undersea activity.
4. Aviation Department: Responsible for air and aerospace intelligence, and monitors air force assets, airbase activity, missile forces, air defense networks, and aerospace capabilities.

5.3.3. Defense Branches

1. Counterintelligence Department: Responsible for detecting, preventing, and neutralizing enemy intelligence activities, and prevents hostile operatives, protects sensitive information, secures communications, and prevents espionage.
2. Anti-Partisan Department: Responsible for monitoring, suppressing, and dismantling resistance and insurgent networks in occupied or unstable regions.

5.3.4. Operations

1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence gathering through human sources such as informants, agents, defectors, and interrogations.
2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intelligence derived from intercepting communications, electronic emissions, and data transmissions.
3. Psychological Warfare: Operations aimed at impacting enemy morale, decision-making, and public perception through information manipulation and psychological pressure.
4. Intelligence Network Creation and Maintenance: The establishment and sustainment of covert information channels, assets, and safe infrastructure within a target area.
5. Infiltration: The covert insertion of operatives or assets into restricted or hostile environments

6. Collaboration Government Preparation: Efforts to identify, cultivate, and organize local actors capable of supporting or forming a cooperative governing structure under foreign control.
7. Coup Orchestration: The covert planning and support of actions aimed at overthrowing a regime hostile to friendly security interests.
8. Rooting Out Resistance: Intelligence efforts to identify, disrupt, and dismantle resistance or insurgent networks.
9. False Intelligence Plantation: The intentional introduction of fabricated or misleading intelligence into enemy data networks.
10. Captured Operative Rescue: Operations designed to locate, extract, or recover compromised intelligence personnel.

6. Global Warfare Structure

6.1. Theater

Theaters are Chairboard-defined high-level groups of military units. Theaters enable better coordination of military assets through grouping their operation in a specific region. They can contain military units from all domains. If the Chairboard wants to form a Theater, they must declare its name and assign relevant Command Groups through a directive.

6.2. Logistics

Logistics consists of getting personnel, and equipment where they need to be in order to support the fighting forces, as well as ensuring the level of supply where units are, is high enough for them to operate effectively.

6.2.1. Supply

Supplies represent support capacity. The level of supplies in a region is made up of three different sources:

1. Land Supply: Provided by the network of supply hubs and railroads that distribute supply from the capital to forces at the front.
2. Aerial Supply: Provided by Transport Planes on a dedicated mission through air bases.
3. Maritime Supply: Provided by convoy routes to ports for inland distribution. Convoys are freighter ships owned by the state to deliver maritime supplies.

There are different percentages ranging from 0% to 100% that indicate the supply situation at a region:

Supply Level	Explanation
0-20%	There is insufficient supply for the units in this province.
20-40%	There is a small amount, or no available supply, but there are no units suffering.
40-60%	There is insufficient supply for the units in this province, but there is still enough to provide a reasonable partial level of supply
60-80%	Supply unavailability is negligible.
80-100%	There is a large amount of available supply.

6.2.2. Supply Requirements for Each Domain

1. Land: Land forces require a continuous flow of material to maintain combat effectiveness.
2. Air: Air forces, although very advantageous, are very supply-intensive and highly sensitive to disruptions.
3. Naval: Naval forces depend on sustained logistics but retain short-term endurance.
4. Cyber: Cyber operations rely on infrastructure and human capital, not physical mass.

Domain	Requirements
Land	- Fuel - Ammunition & Ordnance - Maintenance & Spare Parts - Personnel - Food, Water, Medical Supplies - Electricity - Infrastructure Support Materials
Air	- Fuel - Ammunition & Ordnance - Maintenance & Spare Parts - Personnel - Food, Water, Medical Supplies - Electricity - Infrastructure Support Materials
Naval	- Fuel - Ammunition & Ordnance - Maintenance & Spare Parts - Personnel - Food, Water, Medical Supplies - Infrastructure Support Materials
Cyber	- Fuel - Maintenance & Spare Parts - Personnel - Infrastructure Support Materials

6.2.3. Impact of Insufficient Logistics

1. Land units experience reduced combat effectiveness, increased attrition, insufficient reinforcements, decreased morale and responsiveness, and extreme fuel shortages which constrict their movements.
2. Aerial units experience reduced flight readiness, aircraft remain grounded due to missing spare parts and fuel, degraded precision, increased accident rates, and additional non-combat losses.
3. Naval units experience reduced ranges, delays in maintenance, and increased vulnerability.

6.3. Land Warfare

Land warfare is conducted by ground forces operating across connected territories. Land power determines control of territory, infrastructure, and population centers. Control of land enables the use of supply networks and denies them to the enemy. Ground forces can influence other domains by securing critical infrastructure or threatening decisive objectives.

6.3.1. Command Groups

A command group is a collection of multiple units that operate on land. Each command group is part of a theater and can be reassigned to a different theater at will. Command groups allow units to be given orders much easier, ensure cohesion, and prevent mixtures. If Delegates want to form a command group they must declare its name and assign them a theater through a directive. A Delegate may lead one or more Command Groups.

6.3.2. Defense

Military defense refers to the strategies and actions taken to protect a nation or territory from enemy attacks. It aims to prevent an adversary from successfully invading or conquering land.

6.3.3. Offensives

An offensive is a military operation that seeks through an aggressive projection of armed forces to occupy or recapture territory, gain an objective or achieve some larger strategic, operational, or tactical goal.

6.3.4. Special Operations

Special Operations (SO) encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. They require units with combinations of trained specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces.

6.4. Naval Warfare

Naval warfare is conducted by ships which operate in the world's interconnected seas and oceans. Naval power is key to protection of convoy traffic, or disruption of enemy convoys. Control of the sea can facilitate naval invasions, or prevent the enemy from performing an invasion of their own. Ships can influence land combat by performing shore bombardment, or block straits to impair enemy movement.

6.4.1. Concepts

1. Navy: A navy is a country's collective naval force.
2. Ship: Navies are fundamentally composed of ships.
3. Task Force: Task forces are Delegate-defined groups of individual ships. They are the most basic unit of ship control since ships cannot be ordered individually. Their declaration must be officialized via a directive.
4. Fleet: A fleet is a Chairboard-defined group of one or more task forces. Their declaration must be officialized via a directive.

6.4.2. Naval Missions

1. Naval Exercises: A task force assigned to the naval exercises mission will perform exercises in the region adjacent to the nearest port.
2. Patrolling: A task force assigned to the patrol mission will search for enemy ships. A single task force can only patrol a single strategic region at once, so multiple task forces are required to patrol multiple regions. There are two engagement rules that must be specified:
    a. *Reconnaissance*: The patrolling task force will observe the enemy from a safe distance despite the risk of detection and relay desired information about hostile vessels.
    b. *Engagement*: After an enemy force is fully spotted, the patrolling task force will engage the enemy immediately.

3. Strike Force: A task force assigned to the strike force mission can automatically intercept and engage enemy forces within their fleet's assigned regions based on engagement rules, after an enemy force has been fully spotted by a patrolling task force belonging to the same country.
4. Convoy Raiding: This mission assigns a task force to look for enemy convoys in the fleet's operational area. The raiding force needs to spot the convoys before attacking them.
5. Convoy Escort: A task force assigned to the convoy escort mission will protect convoys belonging to the player or their allies if they are attacked. It is worth noting that troop transfers across water are performed using convoys.
6. Minelaying: Ships with minelaying equipment can be assigned to minelaying missions during wartime. They will continue adding mines to each assigned strategic region until 1000 mines have been laid in each region.
7. Minesweeping: When equipped with minesweeping gear, destroyers can be assigned to minesweeping missions during wartime. They will remove mines until their assigned regions are fully clear.
8. Naval Invasion Support: Task forces assigned to the naval invasion support mission will escort convoys which are ferrying friendly troops to perform a naval invasion. Once these convoys have arrived at their destination safely, the assigned task forces will hold positions adjacent to the landing site to provide support via shore bombardment as long as a battle is taking place.

6.5. Air Warfare

Air warfare consists of the deployment of air wings to strategic regions, where they can undertake missions targeting enemy air forces, land units, naval units or buildings.

6.5.1. Deployment

1. Air Base: Air bases are needed for the operation of aircraft. Each land-based air base can support 200 aircraft for every $5 billion invested. The maximum number of aircraft an air base can host is 2000 aircraft. Additionally, an air base can be overcrowded due to certain reasons in exchange for reduced quality. All types of planes may be accommodated at these air bases. They can only be damaged by strategic bombing missions.

2. Aircraft Carriers: Aircraft carriers act as additional, floating air bases. Their capacity is determined by their deck size, which is 80 aircraft per carrier. Most carriers can only support carrier-capable aircraft. Planes on aircraft carriers automatically participate in wnaval battles when they do not have another active mission.
3. Air Wing: Air wings are a Delegate-designated group of planes forming an air unit attached to an air base that can be assigned to a Theater. The size of an air wing is 100 planes for land-based ones and 10 for carrier-based ones. All planes in an air wing must be of the same type or capable of the same missions; it is not possible to mix fighters with bombers, for example. However, different models of plane within the same type or same missions may be mixed in the same air wing. Their declaration must be officialized via a directive.

6.5.2. Mission Efficiency

The mission efficiency of a wing influences how successfully they can carry out a mission. The following variables negatively impact mission efficiency:

1. Range Insufficiency
2. Air Base Overcrowding
3. Bad Weather
4. Lack of Fuel

6.5.3. Air Missions

1. Pilot Exercises: Pilot exercises can be used to gain experience for the air wing and to gain additional experience, practice upcoming missions, and maintain readiness.
2. Air Superiority/Escort: Wings with this mission will fight and disrupt any enemy air wings operating in the area. The air superiority mission doubles as an escort mission, protecting bombers operating in the region by reducing disruption from enemy fighters.
3. Close Air Support: Close air support, also known as air support or ground support, is the use of aircraft to assist troops in land combat.
4. Interception: Wings with this mission will only participate in air combat if enemy bombers, transport planes, or scout planes are detected. They will still engage enemy fighters escorting those planes, but will not contribute to that region's air superiority.
5. Strategic Bombing: Strategic bombing is the act of damaging enemy buildings, industry, and infrastructure via planes designed to drop bombs. Wings with this

mission can prioritize the type of target (such as airbases, radar installations, forts, infrastructure, etc.).

6. Naval Strike: Wings with this mission target enemy ships. They may get targeted by naval anti-air. Naval strikes can attack enemy convoys carrying resources, supplies, or troops. However, many aircraft are too weak to sink a convoy in one attack. The situation is quite different if naval strikes are combined with an attack by warships (including submarines). In this case, resource and supply convoys can also be the target of an aerial attack, more types of aircraft can end up destroying convoys.
7. Port Strike: A port strike mission is an air attack against enemy ships located in a naval base.
8. Logistics Strike: A logistics strike mission is an air attack against enemy trucks, trains and railways.
9. Air Supply: Air supply is a method of delivering people, supplies and equipment into difficult-to-reach or enemy-held areas using Transport Planes.
10. Naval Minelaying: Planes capable of naval minelaying can be assigned to naval minelaying missions. These planes will continue to air drop mines to the assigned strategic region until 1000 mines have been laid in the region. Best planes to minelay are: Tactical Bombers and Transport Planes.
11. Naval Minesweeping: Planes capable of naval minesweeping can be assigned to naval minesweeping missions. These planes will continue removing mines from their assigned strategic region until the region is fully clear of mines. Best planes to minesweep are: Tactical Bombers.
12. Air Reconnaissance: Aircraft on this mission perform aerial scouting and intel gathering, adding additional intel to the total intel from all sources on the countries in the target air zone. If a country has scout planes in an air zone, they will contribute towards air superiority in that air zone, even though they will not actively engage enemy targets.
13. Naval Patrol: Scout Planes on this mission perform aerial scouting in the target sea zone without engaging enemy ships. These planes help friendly task forces patrolling the sea zone to spot enemies.

6.6. Electronic Warfare

Electromagnetic warfare or electronic warfare (EW) is warfare involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EM spectrum) or directed energy to control the spectrum, attack an

enemy, or impede enemy operations. The purpose of electromagnetic warfare is to deny the opponent the advantage of -and ensure friendly unimpeded access to- the EM spectrum. It can be applied from air, sea, land, or space by crewed and uncrewed systems and can target any electronic military and civilian assets.

6.6.1. Electronic Warfare Environment

An EW system, whether configured to attack, protect or support, must have a way to collect and make sense of the signals in its environment. EW systems can be configured for a variety of different missions and use a host of different subsystems. But despite this incredible sophistication and diversity, there are three main capabilities common to most electronic warfare systems:

1. Sense and Understand the Environment: Detects, identifies, and classifies electronic signals in the operational area to enable threat recognition, spectrum awareness, and early warning of hostile electronic activity.
2. Address Threats Head On: Analyzes detected threats and selects appropriate countermeasures to neutralize or degrade hostile electronic actions across land, air, and sea.
3. Jam, Broadcast, Transmit: Projects electromagnetic energy to disrupt, deceive, or override hostile systems.

6.6.2. Electronic Attack Functions

Electronic attack is used to degrade, disable or destroy an adversary's use of the spectrum. The following are the applicable functions:

1. Communications Jamming: Communications jamming interferes with enemy communication systems to disrupt the transmission of voice and data between units.
2. Radar Jamming: Radar jamming degrades the performance of enemy radar systems by reducing their ability to detect, track, or identify targets.
3. GNSS/GPS Jamming: GNSS/GPS jamming denies satellite navigation and timing signals and degrades navigation, weapon guidance, and synchronization of electronic systems.
4. GNSS/GPS Spoofing: GNSS/GPS spoofing introduces false navigation and timing signals and causes platforms or systems to calculate incorrect position, velocity, or time data.

5. Data Link Disruption: Data link disruption interferes with digital communication links and prevents the reliable exchange of sensor data, commands, and targeting information between networked systems.
6. Spectrum Denial: Spectrum denial restricts enemy access to the electromagnetic spectrum and forces reliance on degraded, overloaded, or less effective communication and sensing methods.
7. Sensor Blinding: Sensor blinding degrades radar, infrared, or electro-optical sensors and reduces the enemy's ability to detect, track, and understand activity in the operational environment.
8. Electronic Deception: Electronic deception presents false or altered EM information and causes enemy systems and operators to form incorrect assessments of the situation.
9. EW-Enabled Suppression of Air Defenses: EW-SEAD applies electronic attack effects to degrade air defense sensors, networks, and command elements in order to enable safer friendly air operations.
10. Suppression of Enemy EW: SEEW targets enemy EW systems and reduces their ability to sense the environment, interfere with friendly systems, or adapt to electronic attack.

6.6.3. Electronic Protection Functions

Electronic protection is used to deny adversarial forces' use of the electromagnetic spectrum, but its posture is defensive. The following are the applicable functions:

1. Counter-Jamming: Counter-jamming preserves the effectiveness of friendly communications and sensors by reducing the impact of enemy jamming attempts.
2. Anti-Spoofing: Anti-spoofing detects and rejects false navigation or timing signals to maintain accurate positioning and synchronization.
3. Frequency Hopping: Frequency hopping rapidly changes transmission frequencies and reduces the enemy's ability to intercept or jam communications.
4. Adaptive Spectrum Management: Adaptive spectrum management allocates and adjusts frequency use dynamically to maintain system performance in contested EM environments.
5. Hardened Communications: Hardened communications protect electronic systems against interference, damage, or degradation through resistant design and protective technologies.

6. Redundant Systems: Redundant systems guarantee continued operation by providing alternative communication paths or networks if primary systems fail or are disrupted.
7. Waveform Agility: Waveform agility allows communication systems to change signal characteristics and maintain reliability under electronic attack.
8. Encryption and Signal Security: Encryption and signal security protect transmitted information from interception, exploitation, or manipulation by hostile forces.
9. Electromagnetic Shielding: Electromagnetic shielding reduces the vulnerability of electronic equipment to external interference and electromagnetic effects.

6.6.4. Electronic Support Functions

Electronic support measure (ESM) technology enables warfighters to passively monitor and understand how the spectrum is being used across the battlespace. The following are the applicable functions:

1. Signal Interception: Signal interception captures electromagnetic emissions to collect information about enemy communications, sensors, and electronic activity.
2. Electronic Surveillance: Electronic surveillance monitors the EM environment to observe patterns of activity and detect the presence of enemy systems.
3. Electronic Reconnaissance: Electronic reconnaissance collects detailed electronic information over time to support intelligence preparation and operational planning.
4. Emitter Detection and Identification: Emitter detection and identification recognize and classify electronic signals to determine the type and function of enemy systems.
5. Emitter Localization: Emitter localization determines the geographic position of signal sources to support targeting, threat assessment, and situational awareness.
6. Direction Finding: Direction finding measures the bearing of EM emissions to assist in locating and tracking enemy emitters.
7. Spectrum Monitoring: Spectrum monitoring observes frequency usage across the EM spectrum to identify interference, congestion, or hostile activity.
8. Signals Mapping: Signals mapping records the location and behavior of electronic emitters to build an understanding of the operational electromagnetic environment.
9. Electronic Order of Battle Mapping: EOB mapping organizes identified emitters into a structured picture of enemy electronic capabilities and deployment.

6.7. Army Planning

Army Planning refers to government activities concerned with controlling the flow of equipment and manpower into new and existing divisions as well as lend-lease to best coordinate their resources in delivering military assets to the front.

6.7.1. Deployment

Deployments facilitate the creation of one or multiple military units. Numerous units can be trained in parallel in one deployment. Units can also be trained sequentially. Deployment location of trained troops must be specified.

6.7.2. Training

A division cannot be deployed immediately and must first complete training. Once sufficient manpower and equipment are available to a division, they may begin training, which will grant them experience over time. Experience levels are as follows:

1. Rookies: 0-20% training. Cannon fodders.
2. Trained: 20-50% training. Competent combat uwnits.
3. Regular: 50-80% training. Experienced contingents with practical and theoretical knowledge.
4. Veterans: 80-100% training. Can only be trained through real war. Extremely capable and lethal combatants.

Training only takes place in military bases containing sufficient equipment. Increasing training levels by 10% requires a month of training.

6.7.3. Reinforcements

Units in the field will request reinforcement if they are lacking manpower or equipment. This insufficiency usually arises from taking damage during conflict. Reinforcement directives stating reinforcement compositions must be sent to perform this action.

7. Available Technology

7.1. Land

7.1.1. Motorized Infantry

These are the fundamental units of the ground army. These are soldiers who fight on foot but are transported by rapid, light armored vehicles. Vehicles are for transportation rather than direct combat support. Soldiers must dismount and battle on foot. Each vehicle can carry up to ten soldiers. They are easily redeployed and can be utilized for flanking and quick response to enemy movement. They are ideally suited for situations where speed is more important than survivability. However, these troops rely heavily on supply lines and are exceedingly vulnerable without air assistance.

7.1.2. Main Battle Tanks

These are the core units of high-intensity combat zones, providing decisive firepower and armored protection. They are heavily armored and designed to conduct breakthrough operations, dominate open terrain, and counter enemy armored forces through direct fire and shock action. However they are not as mobile as motorized troops and are vulnerable in mountainous terrains and cities.

7.1.3. Light Tanks

Light tank units are armored formations equipped with lighter, more mobile vehicles designed to provide fire support rather than engage in tank-on-tank combat. Compared to main battle tanks, they lack protection and firepower, therefore can not duel main battle tanks. On the other hand, if used in coordination with other units, they are more mobile and useful in urban and rough terrain.

7.1.4. Armored Reconnaissance Battalions

These are mobile ground units capable of limited combat, tasked with gathering battlefield intelligence, screening main forces, and providing early warning of enemy movements. These are very fast vehicles, and the intelligence gathered, when combined with intelligence obtained from unmanned aerial vehicles, can be very useful. compared to unmanned aerial vehicles, their recon sensors are more advanced, especially for underground intelligence. However they are not suitable for prolonged combat zones.

7.1.5. Towed Artillery

Towed artillery remains relevant in 2040 due to its cost-effectiveness, adaptability to mountainous terrain and suitability for defensive and attritional warfare. These units are capable of sustained indirect fire over long periods and distances. They play a crucial role in shaping the combat zone, supporting defensive lines and disrupting enemy movements. They are transported by trucks and lack self-mobility, making them more vulnerable than other types of artillery. These are best suited for defensive operations, mountainous terrain and pre-decided positions where mobility is less critical.

7.1.6. Self Propelled Artillery

These units are highly mobile, long-range fire support formations that are capable of rapidly repositioning after firing. This mobility allows them to employ tactics in high intensity conflicts such as “shoot and scoot” which reduces their vulnerability to counter attacks while maintaining continuous support for ground forces. However, their effectiveness depends massively on ammunition supply, protection from air and ground threats and information obtained from radars.

7.1.7. Rocket Artillery

Rocket artillery units are designed to deliver large volumes of fire over wide areas in a short period of time by using multiple rocket systems to overwhelm enemy fronts. They are exceptionally effective against troop concentrations, logistical hubs and defensive networks. However, they consume massive amounts of ammunition, less precise than any other unit, and pose significant political and civilian risk requiring careful employment in regions that are populated with civilians.

7.1.8. Ground-Based Air Defense Brigades

These are the units protecting ground forces from aerial attacks. They are equipped with surface to air missiles (SAMs) and radars, and operate Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to detect and destroy airborne threats. They are crucial in denying enemy air superiority and protecting cities and military formations. However, since they are essential for the survival of other units, they are targeted early by enemy forces.

7.1.9. Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

Infantry Fighting Vehicles are similar to Motorized Infantries in their primary role of transporting infantries. In addition to transportation, they fight alongside infantry units,

providing direct fire support rather than serving only as transport. Each IFV is capable of transporting 5 infantries. These vehicles are heavily armed compared to motorized infantry and are equipped with autocannons capable of firing explosive rounds, machine guns and anti-tank guided missiles. They are vulnerable to heavy anti-armor weapons when operating without any support. Their effectiveness depends on close coordination with dismounted infantries and other ground troops.

7.1.10. Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs)

MLRS units are artillery formations equipped with vehicle-mounted launchers capable of firing large numbers of rockets or guided missiles in rapid succession over long distances. Unlike regular artillery, these units specialize in strikes against enemy troop concentrations, air defense units and logistic hubs. However, they are logistically demanding systems as well as being solely dependent on resupply planning and careful targeting backed by intelligence and surveillance for their effectiveness.

7.1.11. Self-Propelled Mortar Carriers

These units consist of armored vehicles mounting large-caliber mortars, providing fast, close-range indirect fire support to frontline forces, especially in urban and complex terrains. Their mobility allows them to operate close to the frontiers and rapidly position after firing. They have short range and light firepower compared to artillery and MLRS systems, making them heavily dependent on coordination with higher-level fire support.

7.1.12. Tank Destroyers

These specialized units' names clearly state its primary purpose. They are equipped with light armor and highly powerful anti-tank guided missiles designed for neutralizing enemy tanks. Tank destroyers usually ambush the enemy tanks over long distances and relocating themselves after striking enemy tanks. Their limited protection makes them vulnerable in prolonged engagements and direct confrontations with tanks.

7.1.13. Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft (SPAA)

SPPA units are highly mobile air defense systems armed with short range SAMs to protect ground forces from aerial threats. These systems provide immediate defense against helicopters, drones and low flying aircrafts. Their high mobility allows them to reposition in emerging threats. Their limited range poses an obstacle to providing wide-area air defense.

Their primary value is protecting maneuver forces during combat rather than defending fixed infrastructure.

7.1.14. Armored Cars

Lightly armored cars are vehicles that are a combination of high mobility and firepower of a tank. They are equipped with large-caliber direct-fire cannons similar to tanks. Their purpose is not to battle tanks but to provide mobile fire support mostly in reconnaissance missions, rapidly destroying relatively vulnerable targets and securing supply routes. Their effectiveness relies on their mobility rather than its firepower due to its relatively light armor.

7.2. Air

7.2.1. Air Superiority Jets

Air Superiority jets are numerous. American F-35 models, Russian Su-57, Korean KF-21 and Chinese J-20 models are the face of the fifth generation jets. All of them have stealth capabilities, incredible maneuverability and can easily out-fight any other types of planes in the air. Due to the cheapness of drones in lower altitudes, Air Superiority jets have adapted to fight in higher altitudes. They ensure friendly control of air spaces through air-to-air engagements. Their role mostly revolves around fighting enemy interceptors and air superiority jets.

7.2.2. Interceptor Jets

Interceptors are very similar to Air Superiority jets. All of them are actually different configurations of Air Superiority jets, which in this committee can be designated with an “I”. Their role is different in the sense that their air-to-air engagements are against enemy bombers, transport planes and close air support planes. They are meant to protect friendly targets from enemies through pre-emptively fighting the strikers.

7.2.3. Tactical Bombers

Tactical Bombers of the conflict are modified models of Air Superiority jets with increased load capacity and air-to-ground capabilities. For this committee, they can be designated with a “TB” at the end of the plane model. Their role is to strike critical enemy assets in short ranges. Examples may include supply lines, depots, command outposts, reinforced positions.

7.2.4. Stealth Bombers

Some Strategic Bombers have evolved to become relatively independent of their escorts and operate alone with an overreliance on stealth. Strategic Bombers such as the Xian H-20 of China and B-21 of the U.S. are meant to operate behind enemy lines without any escorts and seek out high-value targets that have significant importance. Examples may include government buildings, critical supply junctures and bunkers with VIPs inside. Stealth bombers are extremely valuable and expensive.

7.2.5. Strategic Bombers

Traditional Strategic Bombers such as the B-52 Stratofortress and Tu-95 are still in service with many updated capabilities. These old behemoths have extremely high payload capabilities that allow for incredible destruction. These days, their role is to destroy large targets such as entire city blocks, forests and more. Strategic Bombers can be equipped with a large variety of bombs, ranging from ordinary ordnance to firebombs and missile platforms that launch many air-to-ground missiles (for reference, look up Rapid Dragon).

7.2.6. Air Logistics and Command Planes

AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) planes and air-refuel planes are meant to escort a large group of aircraft into enemy air-space. Command planes can interpret radio signals to more accurately read enemy positions and coordinate friendly units in a more cohesive manner. Refuel planes are especially critical in long range missions. Maybe more commonly, large groups burn more fuel to stay in formation so a proper strike group has to contain refuel planes.

7.2.7. Precision Strike Drones

Drones have evolved to largely dominate low-altitude air warfare. However, Precision Strike Drones have a closer role to tactical bombers. Such drones are well-equipped and well-made, making them maneuverable and fast enough to reach high-value targets and drop big payloads on them. Standoff missiles and cruise missiles deployed from Precision Strike Drones can make or break battles. However, they are both expensive and easy to target when alone or in open fields.

7.2.8. Reconnaissance Drones

Non-orbital reconnaissance has been completely reduced to drone work, as the drones are far cheaper compared to recon planes. Recon drones have stealth measures embedded in them.

They can survey enemy positions by infiltrating their air-space, gathering valuable intelligence. Such drones are still not cheap though, because of their stealth capabilities.

7.2.9. Drone Swarms

Drone Swarms are operated best with good autonomous systems. A swarm is made out of dozens of drones, which are cheap, slow and have very few capabilities. These are enough in numbers though, as land targets such as tanks have few weapons to counter swarms and a swarm is the best weapon against tanks. Despite their cheapness, they can be equipped with anti-tank missiles and even if one drone can take only one missile and if only three of them manage to shoot one before exploding, that means one swarm can take down a tank certainly. Their role is especially important in urban areas, when their opponents can get natural cover and their maneuverability becomes extremely valuable.

7.2.10. Close Air Support Jets

Close Air Support variants have capabilities that can counter land equipment. Anti-tank missiles, firebombs and more can be deployed with Close Air Support jets. Their main difference from Tactical Bombers is that CAS jets are meant to fight at the frontline while tactical bombers are meant to push into enemy space to strike secure targets. CAS bombardments can come in handy when an enemy makes moves and a strike group of CAS can mow down their vanguard to break their momentum before they reach friendly units.

7.2.11. Transport Planes

Transport planes can be used for a variety of things but most of it boils down into two: transporting troops and transporting equipment. Transporting troops may be very regular or it may be a paradropping mission. While equipment is much more straightforward. Transport planes are critical to strategic maneuvers and they need to be protected when they are deployed. It can carry 150 units.

7.2.12. Utility Helicopters

Transport helicopters are chiefly used in tactical maneuvering, moving troops -and limited supply- in short distances. Each can carry 10 passengers. Of course, their function is more apparent when they’re used to deploy special forces. Such helicopters are slow and defenseless though and mostly operate deep in friendly air-space. Drones are very effective against them when caught close to frontlines.

7.2.13. Attack Helicopters

Attack helicopters largely had their role superseded by the drones but their role was to provide direct and close air support against ground targets. They're still very effective, considering their impressive arsenal of guns. An attack helicopter typically has missiles, autocannons, rockets and more in their arsenal and they can devastate ground targets in short range. Their role can be more effective against infantry formations when compared with drones.

7.3. Sea

7.3.1. Carriers

The U.S. and the PRC's signature weapon is aircraft carriers. Carriers carry up to 80 planes on them and since their invention, they have largely dominated naval warfare. Ships are tough, but none can withstand 80 anti-ship cruise missiles. Innovation of carriers ended the battleship's reign on the seas, as a very expensive but powerful ship could be brought down by relatively cheaper planes. Carriers are incredibly expensive, need to be defended navally with escorts and take extremely long to build. However, they are the lynchpin of any navy fighting in the ocean.

7.3.2. Attack Submarines

These are traditional submarines, their role being hunting enemy vessels in secret and surprising them. Torpedoes and cruise missiles are their weapons. Attack submarines are extremely dangerous even by their lonesome and are any navy's way of disturbing enemy naval space. Penetrating enemy space with just one submarine and waiting for a golden opportunity can make or break naval campaigns.

7.3.3. Missile Submarines

Missile Submarines are the most important asset in striking enemy land targets without having to deploy extremely high value targets near enemy spaces. Missile Submarines can penetrate enemy naval space and target enemy land targets. They can be used to target enemy vessels as well but their most important function is striking high-value targets and then bailing out.

7.3.4. Missile Cruisers

These types of ships have evolved to mostly provide extensive air defense to the navies. They have more than one hundred missiles with mixed capabilities and autoguns. This makes sure the ship can fight against submarines, planes and ships all at once very effectively and from very long range. It also gives them critical strike capabilities against ground targets, similar to

Missile Submarines. These ships are heavy and valuable, providing critical firepower in engagements. Aside from Carriers, a strike force's success largely depends on how well they protect their missile cruisers. They're weak against ships that are fitted dominantly for anti-ship warfare, such as missile destroyers, as their capabilities are limited.

7.3.5. Missile Destroyers

Missile Destroyers are similar to Missile Cruisers, they're smaller though and thus have less firepower in their disposal. They also differ in role, with their missiles mostly fitted for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare with some surface-to-air capabilities. The definitive difference between missile destroyers and missile cruisers comes down to capabilities against ground targets, with the former not able to hit those with the intended type of missiles. Of course, system overrides can be done under dire circumstances but that is very unlikely.

7.3.6. Frigates

Frigates are light vessels with their main roles revolving around escorting larger ships in strike groups or escorting convoys. They're well-fit for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and cheap to mass produce. They're very needed because of their low costs, as navies can hardly spare destroyers or cruisers to escort convoys.

7.3.7. Corvettes

Corvettes are fast and small ships that only specialize against anti-ship combat. They're the tip of the spear and the first responders to any incidents. However, they're nigh useless in open oceans and excel in shallower seas due to their low fuel capacity and long-term speed.

7.3.8. Amphibious Assault Ships

Amphibious assault ships have evolved to mostly resemble aircraft carriers. They're only fitted for vertical takeoff though, so they operate helicopters and some VTOL aircraft. Their role is to transport close air support for amphibious operations. They're also used for mass troop transport so they also function as landing ships but they differ from landing ships with their capabilities as helicopter carriers. The variety of helicopters give them many capabilities though; anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-tank missiles all can be fitted onto the helicopters. Thus, amphibious assault ships can sometimes dominate naval engagements with them as well. Each can carry 10 VTOL aircraft or 15 helicopters along with 1,500 troops.

7.3.9. Dock Landing Ships

Modern landing ships are not as defenseless as their predecessors. Dock Landing Ships are used to transport troops and landing craft for them. These ships have fewer armaments to make room for the large amount of troops and landing craft they carry. They are a navy's main tool to invade land. The ships are armed with cannons, machine guns, surface-to-air missiles and an automated gun on them. They can carry up to 500 marines and their landing craft.

7.4. Electronic Warfare

7.4.1. Electromagnetic Warfare Sensors

These sensors are operated by specialized intelligence units positioned mostly behind frontlines of the combat zones to passively detect, intercept, and analyze electromagnetic emissions such as: radar pulses and communication signals. Their primary mission is providing early warning, threat identification without revealing its own position. However, these data collected by sensors requires careful analysis since they might be depicted.

7.4.2. Electromagnetic Warfare Effectors

EW effectors are also operated by specialized intelligence units, and might be located in mobile ground units, aircrafts, naval platforms or logistic hubs. These systems can be used to jam, disrupt or degrade enemy communications, radar and navigation. They are best known for their immediate effects in reducing enemy coordination and sensing capabilities. However, their use is highly detectable and might cause collateral interference with friendly systems causing signal congestion in friendly communication.

7.4.3. Electromagnetic Warfare Deception Assets

EW deception assets can be used to manipulate how enemy systems and operators perceive electromagnetic environments to confuse enemy forces. Instead of simply preventing the enemy from communicating, sensing or navigating like EW warfare effectors do, these systems introduce false signals, altered data or misleading patterns that cause incorrect threat detection and false targeting decisions. Deception requires precise intelligence and timing. Once detected, its effectiveness drops rapidly.

7.4.4. Electromagnetic Warfare Protection Assets

These Assets are used across all military divisions and units even including frontline infantry. They are embedded in units rather than being actively operated by specialized intelligence units. These systems include encryption in communication, frequency hopping and anti-jam

navigation. They are able to maintain operational continuity in contested electromagnetic environments instead of withdrawal. However, depending on the scale of electromagnetic attacks, they can not guarantee immunity.

7.4.5. Electromagnetic Warfare Carriers

EW carriers are platforms whose primary role is to transport, locate and sustain electronic warfare capabilities across battlespace. These carriers exist because electronic warfare effects are highly dependent on distance and line of sight. They are enablers that determine where, when and how electronic warfare can be applied. However, owing to their importance of being high-value targets make them first targets or enemy forces.

7.4.6. Electromagnetic Warfare and Control (C2) Assets

EW C2 assets are operated by senior officers and joint command staff, located far away from immediate combat zones. These systems coordinate sensing, decision making and execution across multiple EW assets, ensuring that electronic attacks, protection, and deception synchronize with broader military operations and purposes. Key advantage of EW C2 asset is preventing uncoordinated EW actions in dense electromagnetic environments and high-intensity warzones. They rely on secure communications between operators and forces at the frontline, if disrupted EW operations may become fragmented or delayed.

7.4.7. Electromagnetic Warfare Autonomous Assets

These are semi-autonomous systems that extend the area that our EW devices can operate. These are combined with other EW devices to conduct sensing, limited jamming in high risk areas from long distances. Their primary benefit is scalability and reduced risks especially for high-intensity combat zones. However, autonomy introduces challenges related to control and reliability.

7.5. Missiles

7.5.1. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

SRBMs are tactical ballistic weapons designed for rapid strikes within a regional battlefield. They are typically road-mobile and difficult to intercept. Their optimization for speed decreases their precision. SRBMs are used to strike frontline bases, troop concentrations, logistics hubs, and nearby stages in early conflict. Their short flight time gives defenders very little warning, which renders them ideal for opening salvos or retaliation strikes.

7.5.2. Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)

MRBMs extend the strike envelope beyond the immediate battlefield and are used to target rear area bases, ports, airfields, and command centers deeper inside enemy territory. These missiles are often employed to disrupt reinforcement flows and degrade enemy capabilities.

7.5.3. Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs)

IRBMs are strategic-level conventional strike weapons designed to threaten entire war theaters. Their role is to hold major infrastructure, industrial centers, and enemy installations at risk. In a high-intensity conflict, IRBMs are used to apply sustained pressure on an enemy's ability to mobilize and sustain war. They are not ideal for individual battles.

7.5.4. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

ICBMs are the longest-ranged ballistic missiles and represent the highest level of deterrence. Although capable of carrying conventional payloads, their primary function is to carry nuclear warheads. The deployment and movement of ICBMs is fundamentally accomplished by road-mobile systems, while their storage is maintained in missile silos.

7.5.5. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs)

LACMs are precision-guided weapons that fly within the atmosphere to strike ground targets with high accuracy. Unlike ballistic missiles, they can maneuver during flight and approach targets from unexpected directions. LACMs are good against air defenses, command centers, and other critical assets with minimal collateral damage compared to ballistic strikes.

7.5.6. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)

ASCMs are designed to penetrate naval defenses and destroy surface vessels. They are often sea-skimming, fast, and difficult to detect until the final moments of flight. ASCMs are the primary reason why modern naval warfare has developed layered air defenses and electronic warfare. Even a single successful hit can cripple or sink a major warship.

7.5.7. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

ALCMs are carried by bombers or strike aircraft and released from outside heavily defended airspace. Their purpose is to extend the reach of air power while minimizing risk to high-value aircraft. They are commonly used in coordinated strike packages against critical infrastructure and high-value military targets.

7.5.8. Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)

SLCMs are launched from submarines, allowing states to strike land or naval targets covertly. Their primary strength is surprise. Missile submarines are equipped with cruise missiles and can operate undetected near enemy shores. They are often used for decapitation strikes.

7.5.9. Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs)

AAMs are used by aircraft to destroy other aircraft. Short-range variants are optimized for dogfighting and close engagements, while long-range variants enable beyond-visual-range combat. Control of the air depends heavily on missile quality, guidance systems, and electronic countermeasures.

7.5.10. Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)

SAMs are the backbones of air defense networks. They are used to deny airspace to aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles. Modern SAM systems rely on radar integration, electronic warfare environments, and layers. SAM sites are high-priority targets in any air campaign.

7.5.11. Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)

ABMs are designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during various flight phases. While no system guarantees full protection, ABMs complicate enemy strike planning and reduce confidence. Their deployment is often defensive.

7.5.12. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs)

ATGMs are precision weapons designed to destroy armored vehicles. They are deployed by infantry, vehicles, helicopters, and drones. In modern warfare, these are the greatest threat to MBTs. Its abilities force reliance on electronic countermeasures and active protection systems.

7.5.13. Hypersonic Missiles

Hypersonic Missiles travel at extreme speeds while retaining the ability to maneuver during flight. This combination makes them extremely difficult to intercept and predict. Their primary role is to defeat advanced air and missile defense systems and strike time-sensitive, high-value targets. Even limited hypersonic deployments have outsized strategic impact due to their psychological and deterrent effects.

8. Individuals of Prominence

Both the PDP and the ESC's cabinets are composed of 15 people. Each individual has -of course- a name, a title, and an assigned duty. Each person is unique, and will serve different purposes in leading their respective cabinets to victory. Therefore, it is important that Delegates understand what their roles are, so that they can focus on necessary aspects.

8.1. Eurasian Stability Commission

8.1.1. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

1. Kim Yo-Jong: Kim Yo-Jong is, first and foremost, the Supreme Leader then the President of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK. She was raised inside the Kim regime's inner core, and is known for her sharp instinct, personal authority, and ability to project both restraint and ruthlessness when needed. She is the regime's most reliable crisis manager. She exercises supreme political authority, sets national direction, authorizes major state decisions, and serves as the final decision-maker. President Chair.
2. Dyun Ki-Bok: Dyun Ki-Bok is the Minister of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. He is a shadowy figure who built his career away from public view and is rumored to have overseen sensitive operations abroad and survived multiple internal purges because of his utility rather than loyalty alone. He manages the DPRK's intelligence and espionage activities at home and abroad. Delegate.
3. Ri Tong-Yong: Ri Tong-Yong is the Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department. A master of narrative construction, he is known for blending ideological rigidity with opportunistic messaging and adapting state narratives quickly during crises. He shapes public perception, manages information flows, maintains morale, and aligns political messaging. Delegate.
4. Ma-ryam Al Sal-re: Ma-ryam Al Sal-re is the Minister of State Infrastructure and Planned Economy. Originally trained as an engineer, she gained prominence by keeping systems functioning under extreme constraints and earned a reputation as a pragmatic survivor. She oversees economic administration, state construction, and resource allocation during war. Delegate.
5. Yabujŭ Serim Kibarŭ: Yabujŭ Serim Kibarŭ is the Commander of the Korean People's Army Ground Force. He is a disciplined veteran who has been shaped by decades of

large-scale exercises (yeah, not war) and internal security operations. He directs all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.

6. Son In-Law: Son In-Law is the Commander of the Korean People's Army Air Force. He rose through a technically demanding branch and earned trust through his caution and redundancy planning. Some say he is the son in law of a high-ranking state official. He coordinates all military operations concerning the air force. Delegate.
7. Kim Chi-Fo: Kim Chi-Fo is the Commander of the Korean People's Army Navy. He is a reserved commander who is known for his asymmetric thinking and fondness for Kimchi (a Korean dish of spicy pickled cabbage). He is patient and favors timing rather than force concentration. Delegate.
8. Mun *Goon*-Sul: Mun Goon-Sul is the Head of DPRK Missile Administration. He is a technocratic hardliner whose career advanced alongside the missile program itself, which gives him institutional confidence and political leverage. Nobody knows if his name is related to his actions. He oversees all military operations concerning missiles. Delegate.

8.1.2. People's Republic of China

1. StimiHan Guokai Tata: StimiHan Guokai Tata is the General-Secretary of the Eurasian Stability Commission Pacific Joint Command. He is a senior Chinese strategic coordinator known for his lubricating position between alliance commitments and national interests. He serves as the primary liaison across ESC member states. Deputy Chair.
2. Yang Fuqing: Yang Fuqing is the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force. He is a career missile forces officer whose rise followed China's expansion into precision strike and deterrence doctrine. He is responsible for all military operations concerning missiles. Delegate.
3. We Tu Lo: We Tu Lo is the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. He is a modernist commander defined by joint exercises and high-tech warfare concepts. He always likes to lay low, sometimes with his colleagues, he calls it "We Too Low." He administers all military operations concerning the air force. Delegate.
4. Zhao Medong: Zhao Medong is the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Navy. He is a naval strategist closely associated with China's blue water ambitions. He is experienced in fleet operations. He is very interested in China's founding history. He commands all military operations concerning the navy. Delegate.

5. Sum Ting Wong: Sum Ting Wong is the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force. He is a traditional ground forces commander with experience in large-scale formations and internal security. He commands all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.

8.1.3. Russian Federation

1. Igor: Commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. Igor. Delegate. 
2. Vladimir Putout: Vladimir Putout is the Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Some claim he is Vladimir Putin's son who changed his name. He is an ambitious aerospace commander experienced in long-range strike doctrines, air defenses, and space operations. He oversees all military activities concerning the air force. Delegate.
3. Vladislav Kuzmin: Vladislav Kuzmin is the Commander of the Russian Navy. He is a cautious naval commander influenced by submarine warfare and strategic denial rather than surface dominance. He leads all military operations concerning the Navy. Delegate.
4. Vladivov Petrov: Vladivov Petrov is the Commander of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation. He is a blunt and operationally focused land commander specialized in attritional warfare and large-scale ground engagements. He directs all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.

8.2. Pacific Defense Pact

8.2.1. Republic of Korea

1. Lee Cheol-Jun: Lee Cheol-Jun is the President of the ROK. He is a career politician shaped by coalition politics and national security crises. He is also known for balancing alliance commitments with domestic pressure. He leads the state politically, authorizes major national decisions, coordinates leadership, and represents Seoul at the highest level. President Chair.
2. Min Peka-Gud: Min Peka-Gud is the Director of the National Intelligence Service. She is a discreet intelligence professional who rose through counterintelligence and regional threat analysis. She is trusted for her caution and she knows things. She manages the ROK's intelligence and espionage activities at home and abroad. Delegate.
3. Baek Ka-Bed: Baek Ka-Bed is the Minister of Information and National Trust. He is a civilian official with experience in communication and public trust management

(propaganda in short). He is in the intersection of media, policy, and morale. He also hates the Inferno Tower. He shapes public perception, manages information flows, maintains morale, and aligns political messaging. Delegate.

4. Mega Naite: Mega Naite is the Minister of Industry, Infrastructure, and Finance. He is an industrial technocrat with strong ties to Korea's manufacturing sector, experienced in economic mobilization and infrastructure. He has over 10,000 trophies in Clash Royale, but plays a low-skill deck, using Mega Knight. He oversees economic administration, state construction, and resource allocation during war. Delegate.
5. Ugureu Jebeji: Ugureu Jebeji is the Commander of the Republic of Korea Army. He is a frontline-oriented officer defined by constant readiness on the Peninsula, and is known for his discipline. He oversees all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.
6. Bing Dong-Yul: Bing Dong-Yul is the Commander of the Republic of Korea Air Force. He is an air force commander trained in high-tempo operations and educated in allied system coordination. He engages in all military operations concerning the air force. Delegate.
7. Ahn Men-Daement: Ahn Men-Daement is the Commander of the Republic of Korea Navy. He is a maritime officer experienced in coastal defense, sea lane protection, and alliance naval operations. He is known to amend many things he perceives as mistakes. He leads all military operations concerning the navy. Delegate.
8. Gae Park-Tae: Gae Park-Tae is the Commander of Autonomous Combat. He is a rising figure from the ROK's advanced defense technology sector, closely associated with unmanned systems, missiles, and automation. He coordinates all military operations concerning missiles and special autonomous vehicles. Delegate.

8.2.2. United States of America

1. Adrien Piper: Adrien Piper is the General Director of the Pacific Defense Pact Indo-Pacific Directorate. He is a senior strategic official with experience in coordinating multinational commands and renowned for prioritizing alliance cohesion under pressure. He oversees PDP-wide coordination, aligns member state actions, and facilitates joint planning. Deputy Chair.
2. John Smith: John Smith is the Chief of Space Operations of the United States Space Force. He is a technically oriented officer born into the militarization of space and

satellite-dependent warfare. He has a reputation for long-term thinking. He commands all military operations concerning space-based assets and missiles. Delegate.

3. Kail Davey: Kail Davey is the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. He stands as a Political Sciences graduate from Bahçeşehir University with a 4.0 GPA. His airpower strategist experience in large-scale joint operations earned him a good reputation. He supervises all military operations concerning the air force. Delegate.
4. Keith Albert Cyr: Keith Albert Cyr is the Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy. He is a seasoned naval commander educated and experienced in carrier strike group operations and global presence missions. He coordinates all military operations concerning the navy. Delegate.
5. September Water Blackadam: September Water Blackadam is the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Alongside her pragmatic personality and sustained land campaign-influenced leadership, she is a very good debater. She runs all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.

8.2.3. State of Japan

1. Takagi Orochi: Takagi Orochi is the Chief of Staff of the Japan Strategic Aerospace Command. He is a technically focused officer associated with Japan's expanding aerospace and missile defense stance. He is a big fan of pufferfish just for the thrills. He administers all military operations concerning missiles and space assets. Delegate.
2. Kawahara Tetsuo: Kawahara Tetsuo is the Chief of Staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. He is an air defense specialist who is highly accustomed to constant readiness and supranational defense cooperation. He directs all military operations concerning the air force. Delegate.
3. Takeshita Takao: Takeshita Takao is the Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. He is a maritime commander experienced in sea lane protection, submarine hunting, and escort operations. He commands all military operations concerning the navy. Delegate.
4. Nagasawa Eiji: Nagasawa Eiji is the Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. He is a land forces officer shaped by homeland defense doctrine and a slight glimpse into offensive combat. He oversees all military operations concerning the land forces. Delegate.

9. Committee Embarkation, Expectations, and Disclaimers

As this Study Guide (War Manual) reaches its end, it is time that the last details are defined.

9.1. Embarkation

The F-JCC: The Second Korean War committee will begin on 25 March 2040, approximately 3 months prior to the First Korean War's initiation day and month in 1950. The war will begin on 25 June 2040 and it will be delivered through an update. The world is extremely polarized, the Peninsula is extremely militarized, and all eyes are watching Korea. You may refer to the *World History* document for further details.

9.2. Expectations

1. We expect each cabinet to discuss their paths, plan their operations, and deploy their troops on Session 1.
2. We expect this committee to simulate what is commonly referred to as "Hot War."
3. We expect Delegates to engage with each other using combined arms armies and all forms of conventional and asymmetrical tactics.
4. We fully trust that each Delegate will read the Study Guide as it will allow them to understand how you are going to shape your actions. Reading the World History Document is optional.
5. We expect all delegates to participate and try to contribute meaningfully. Some of you may feel like your role is not related due to the committee's topic. But, if your role was not related, we would not have allocated it. Try to do what you can.

9.3. Disclaimers

1. We will be hosting a Session 0 on our respective BoğaziçiMUN'26 Committee WhatsApp Group through an online meeting to answer your questions.
2. Documents containing each country's national dynamics, unit type and count, finances, factory amounts, etc. (confidential information in brief) will be hand-delivered on Session 1.
3. You will be provided with a table containing the costs of each unit.
4. We will be operating a computer software in the background to keep track of all directives, numerical values, and other standardized aspects and providing your chairboards with different softwares to command their respective cabinets.