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F-JCC
The Second Korean War
WORLD HISTORY

Agenda Item: Open Agenda
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1. History of the Korean Peninsula: How Did One Nation Become Two?

1.1. Twilight of the Old Order (Late Choson-1910)

The first unified Korean kingdom was found in 668 AD on the peninsula and remained that way for centuries. It was nicknamed the "Hermit Kingdom" for its lack of interaction with the outside world; especially with the West. Korea entered the 19th century as one of the last sealed states in Asia between neighbors already shaken by industrial European powers. While Qing China was milked by the West, Japan -following its forceful opening by the U.S.- modernized rapidly. On the other hand, Korea clung to isolation and preserved stability at the cost of adaptation. Even limited clashes (French in 1866 and American in 1871) proved that the peninsula could not repel modern militaries with pre-modern means.

The breaking point arrived when Japan pressured Korea to open its ports. Reform efforts followed, but they only divided the Korean court between traditionalists and modernizers, and unrest like the 1882 military revolt revealed how thin domestic control had become. The 1894 Tonghak peasant uprising prompted the Koreans to request Chinese intervention. China deployed troops. Japan responded with its own, and months later, the Sino-Japanese War had erased Chinese influence from the peninsula.

There Stands No Enemy Where We Go: Surrender of Pyongyang, a scene from the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), ink and colour on paper by Migita Toshihide, 1894; in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
Source: Britannica Editors. (2025). 'First Sino-Japanese War', see https://www.britannica.com/event/First-Sino-Japanese-War-1894-1895.

Reform intensified under Japanese pressure, the Kabo Directives overturned the kingdom. In 1897, the court -trying to salvage what remained of Korean autonomy- proclaimed the Korean Empire. But the timing could not have been worse. By the 1900s, Japan beat China (again) and Russia, which gave it the leverage to influence Korean affairs up to a point that left Korean sovereignty existing only on paper. In 1910, the process was finalized and Japan imposed full annexation over Korea, effectively dismantling all organs of independent governance, and brought formal imperial rule.

1.2. Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-1945)

Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and governed it through a military-appointed-governor general who held large military and civil powers. Early colonial governance exercised mass surveillance and coercion: police and gendarmerie forces restricted speech, assembly, and political activity. Schools closed if they did not follow the colonial curriculum. Education became one of Japan's primary control utilities; Japanese education replaced Korean instruction and history. Economic measures favored Japanese interests. Land surveys forced landholders to formally register their property; many failed the process and lost their land. Although extensive transport and financial systems materialized, Koreans were excluded.

However, resistance continued. The March First Movement of 1919 mobilized nationwide protests and pressured Japan to briefly slacken its harshest controls. Limited space opened for Korean newspapers and political organizations. But, the necessity to mobilize Korea's resources -minerals in the North and arable land in the South- for Japanese war efforts reinstated authoritarian rule. Koreans forcefully adopted Japanese names and participated in state-sponsored wartime programs. During Japanese rule, national consciousness grew and unified diverse actors -from religious groups to students and clandestine political networks- around the motive of independence. Resistance persisted through guerilla groups and underground organizations with limited protests.

Japanese infantry marching in Korea during colonial occupation.
Source: Blakemore, E. (2025). 'How Japan Took Control of Korea', see https://www.history.com/articles/japan-colonization-korea.

1.3. Liberation Without Unity (1945-1948)

Japan's wartime collapse in August 1945 terminated 36 years of colonial rule and brought Korea what many called the "return of the light." The phrase was later commemorated in annual liberation celebrations. However, independence arrived without a functioning national government and produced a political vacuum. As Japanese authority

disappeared, Soviet forces entered the north, American forces occupied the south, and divided the country at the 38th parallel for administrative convenience.

Koreans celebrate their liberation from Japanese oppression.
Source: Blakemore, E. (2025). 'How Japan Took Control of Korea', see https://www.history.com/articles/japan-colonization-korea.

There was hope from liberation. But hope alone couldn't form the institutions needed for a unified state. Joint commissions meant to guide the transition collapsed as the Soviets sponsored the North, while the U.S. sponsored the South. In the north, leadership aligned with socialist reforms and Soviet preferences. In the south, a separate administration developed under officials who favored democracy.

Inter-faction clashes among two rival political entities intensified, destabilized regions, and unification negotiations stalled. By 1948, separate governments that claimed legitimacy over the peninsula were formed in Seoul in the south under Syngman Rhee, and Pyongyang in the North under Kim Il Sung.

1.4. Birth of Two Sovereignties (1948-1950)

Although Korea had been one of the most unified societies in the world -ethnically, linguistically, and administratively- the peninsula entered 1948 with two separate political systems taking shape on either side of the 38th parallel. The line, drawn only to manage Japan's surrender, gained permanence as each occupation zone built its own institutions and blocked attempts of a shared government. The collapse of colonial administration and the absence of national structures created space for outside powers to elevate competing political groups that would not have held such influence on their own.

As administrations in the north and south consolidated, they developed distinct security forces, civil systems, and political networks. The divide deepened quickly: once opposing structures were in place, each side became more rigid, and the split gained momentum beyond what the original occupying powers intended. Armed incidents along the parallel increased as both governments viewed themselves as the sole legitimate authority for the entire peninsula. The withdrawal of foreign troops in the south further complicated the

balance and encouraged the belief that the division could be overturned by force. By 1950, two rival sovereignties existed with incompatible goals and growing hostility; ready for conflict.

1.5. Prequel: The Korean War (1950-1953)

The fragile balance on the peninsula collapsed in June 1950 when DPRK forces -armed to the teeth by the Soviets- launched a rapid assault across the 38th parallel against its relatively inferior counterpart. By lute June, Seoul had already fallen; by late July, much of the south was under DPRK control. In less than three months into the North Korea operation, Southern and remaining allied forces had been pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter; a pocket in the Southeast.

Their assault was arguably quick and decisive, but not quick and decisive enough. In 1950, the United Nations (UN) was very different; PRC did not control the Chinese veto, and the Soviets were boycotting the UN Security Council (UNSC). That relatively unique set of circumstances paved the way for the UN to approve military intervention under U.S. leadership to mount a counterattack. Although many peacekeeping countries had demobilized after World War II, resource disparity grew enormously; especially at sea and in the air. DPRK forces would be pushed out, first out of ROK territory, then deep into North Korea itself.

The DPRK would be saved from collapse with PRC military intervention that pushed UN and southern forces back below the 38th parallel. As winter approached, the conflict turned very costly and exhaustive with limited gains. Negotiations opened in mid-1951 but advanced slowly. The talks were delayed by disputes over the handling of prisoners of war, the placement of ceasefire lines, and the terms for supervising an armistice. These disagreements prolonged fighting along a largely stabilized front, where air campaigns, artillery duels, and infantry assaults continued without producing meaningful change.

Phases of the Korean War (1950-1953).
Source: Millett, A. R. (2025). 'Korean War', see https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War.

The war lasted just over three years and caused roughly 4,000,000 total casualties, including civilians. ROK suffered about 1,313,000 casualties, of which 1,000,000 were civilians. DPRK forces lost an estimated 2,500,000, including 1,000,000 civilians. The U.S. recorded about 37,000 deaths, ROK another 47,000, and other UN contingents 3,194. PRC's lost 900,000 troops, while the northern military lost about 520,000. 2/5 of Korea's industrial facilities were destroyed, along with 1/3 of all homes.

The conflict stopped with an armistice in 1953. The agreement failed to create a peace treaty and resolve tensions. Instead, it restored the dividing line near its pre-war position, established a demilitarized zone (DMZ), and left both governments in place. And to this day, legally, the Korean War is not over.

The DMZ separating north and south Korea.
Source: Britannica Editors. (2025). 'demilitarized zone', see https://www.britannica.com/place/demilitarized-zone-Korean-peninsula

1.6. The Inter-Korean System (1953-2025)

1.6.1. The Armistice System

The armistice system is a set of military rules that stops fighting without settling any political issues, under which both sides are frozen within a fixed set of limits. Its core is the

DMZ. This zone is 250 km-long and 4 km-wide. Each side maintains their troops 2 km back from the Military Demarcation Line. No one may cross without permission. No weapons or hostile acts are permitted in the zone. Civilian access is secured tightly and limited numerically to separate each side and prevent clashes.

It is very difficult to prepare a new offensive unnoticed. The system restricts peninsula-wide military activity (as if any side cares) and demands cessation of hostilities. Mines and hazards in the DMZ must be cleared. Troops may rotate but only up to a set monthly limit, and only one soldier in for one soldier out. Weapons may be replaced only with the same type and only one-for-one. No side may upgrade or add new systems. Air and naval forces must stay out of the other side's territory.

Two bodies oversee the system: the Military Armistice Commission inspects compliance, investigates violations, and handles communication. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission inspects troop rotations and equipment replacement at ports of entry.

However, the armistice system is not that boring; following are a series of fun facts regarding the DMZ: It is 60 km from Seoul and 210 km from Pyongyang. According to the UN command, more than 105,000 tourists visited the JSA from the South in 2017, while nearly 30,000 visited from the North. Lastly, there are over 2 million mines in the DMZ. Their simultaneous explosion would release an energy equivalent to over 800 lightning strikes.

1.6.2. DPRK's Trajectory

After the armistice, Kim Il-Sung, the then Prime Minister of DPRK, found himself in a difficult position. The war had left the nation fractured, and the cracks could have led to an unstable political landscape. While the reconstruction efforts were ongoing, Kim saw this as an opportunity to rid the nation of rival factions like the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups to establish absolute authority. This led to the August Faction Incident of 1956, where extremists who were opposed to Il-Sung attempted to remove him from power; however, this was a failure on the part of the revoltists, which allowed Kim Il-Sung to transition himself to the Suryong, the Supreme Leader. After the purges of the late 50s were successful, by the mid-1960s, the Juche[1] ideology was introduced to improve the status of the Supreme Leader.

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[1] Self-Reliance

This ideology combined the socialist ideals that the nation was built upon with nationalist notions to prioritise national autonomy, a command economy, and military independence.

Foreseeing his eventual demise, Kim Il-Sung planted the seeds that would make his family name live on for decades to come. In 1972, a new constitution was adopted that made Kim transition from being the Prime Minister to the President of the DPRK. He then wanted to extend his reach and power further, and with that goal in mind, he spent the 1970s and 1980s building up the nation's economy and implementing a monolithic ideology system even more. Economically, the growth was substantial, and these funds were directly allocated to support military advancements. This did, however, cause stagnation, and with inefficient central planning, the situation only worsened. To ensure his lineage's survival, Il-Sung named his son, Kim Jong-Il, his successor, effectively breaking away from communist tradition. By doing so, after his death in 1994, Kim Jong-Il would inherit the nation along with its biggest post-war challenge: the Arduous March.

Kumsusan Memorial Palace, in which Kim Il-Sung lies in state[2]

The collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 caused shockwaves all across the globe, which of course affected the DPRK massively. After losing its primary patron, between the

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[2]

https://newsfeed.time.com/2011/12/20/photos-will-kim-jong-il-become-the-worlds-latest-embalmed-leader/slide/all/

years 1994 and 1998, the nation suffered from a large amount of famine. A series of natural disasters only worsened the situation within the country, and this chain of events is said to have taken between 240.00 and 3.5 million lives over the span of 4 years. Kim Jong-Il, fearing a potential invasion from the U.S., diverted all resources to the Korean People's Army (KPA) to ensure that if such an invasion occurred, the nation was prepared to defend itself. This reallocation caused the state's public distribution system to fail over time, and the Supreme Leader had his sights set on becoming more powerful through military improvements, specifically a newly developed nuclear program.

Despite the Sunshine Policy era with the South and the agreed framework with the U.S., Kim Jong-Il focused his efforts further on nuclear development. After the devastating late 1990s period, the focus on improving the nuclear program bore fruit, as the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. By the time of Kim Jong-Il's death in 2011, his vision for his country was becoming a reality: from being a weak, failing socialist state to a resilient, nuclear-power-backed monolith. His son, Kim Jong-un, after taking over the country, followed in his father's footsteps and enhanced them. By favouring the Byungjin policy, in which both the national economy and nuclear improvements were prioritised, the DPRK evolved from being a mere regional annoyance into a full-on global security threat.

Mansuade Hill, where bronze statues of both Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il now stand[3].

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[3] https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-marks-death-kim-il-sung-emphasizing-protection-kim-portraits-statues/

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From the early 2010s onwards, further nuclear advancements were made, resulting in 4 nuclear tests and dozens of missile launch tests. These culminated into results which led the DPRK to wield Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), making them capable of striking the United States if provoked. A short window of summit diplomacy was attempted in 2018 and 2019, in which Kim Jong-Un met with leaders of the U.S., China and the Republic of Korea (RoK). These talks didn't last long, as the nation was reluctant to meet the demands of the other nations of denuclearisation. This led the state to get even closer to Russia and China, with which they now have close relations.

1.6.3. ROK's Path

Similar to the DPRK, the Republic of Korea had its hands full with post-war reconstruction. Following the armistice, this half of the peninsula lacked industrial infrastructure, leaving the RoK with an agrarian society to work with. With hyperinflation and the refugee crisis forcing his hand, President Syngman Rhee was forced to take an aggressive approach to ensure the nation's stability through this period. After ensuring his people's safety by reaching a mutual defence treaty with the United States, his domestic rule took a more autocratic route. The late 1950s saw Rhee using the National Security Act, effectively silencing his political rivals and allowing him to manipulate the constitution to extend his presidency. In March 1960, evidence of mayoral fraud arose, which led to student-led protests throughout the country. On April 19, 1960, police opened fire in demonstrators in Seoul, resulting in the deaths of over 100 people. This led to Rhee resigning from his post and fleeing to Hawaii, leaving the country with a brief period of parliamentary

democracy, which ended with a military coup in 1961.

General Park Chung-hee seized power and, with his authority, suspended civil liberties for the people of the RoK but aimed for fast-paced economic growth. The five-year economic plans that were drawn up prioritised industrialisation through exporting goods. This plan was especially favourable for the Chaebols, massive South Korean conglomerate families that owned companies like Samsung and Hyundai. Park's leadership methods were a necessary evil, as the nation managed to lay a heavy-industry foundation which paved the way to becoming a modern state. The regime relied heavily on the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and its capability of suppressing discontent. Taking inspiration from the DPRK perhaps, the RoK announced the Yushin Constitution of 1972, which effectively made Park president for life. His assassination in 1979 shook the foundation, leaving his replacement, General Chun Doo-hwan, to face the Gwangju Uprising in 1980. This pro-democracy movement was stopped in its tracks and it left a significant scar on the nation, but also inspired the future movement in 1987. This movement resulted in the military succumbing to public pressure, leading to the restoration of presidential elections and the

©ANSA/DPA

formation of the Sixth Republic.

The 1988 Seoul Olympics acted as an announcement celebration for the new Republic, and the next decade saw Kim Young-sam, the first civilian president, targeting corruption throughout the nation. His regime aimed to dismantle the military's rooted secret political societies and make the nation a prosperous and peaceful living space. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 could have been a breaking point for the nation; however, it saw the nationalist ideals of the people unifying against the event. This sense of unity helped pay the

hefty IMF loan, which allowed the RoK to enter the digital age while embracing it more than almost every other nation in the world.

In the early 2000s, the Hallyu took over. A massive wave of Korean culture, saturated with K-pop and K-dramas, swept the world. This soft power allowed South Korea to export massive amounts of media, empowering their economy. The country remained politically polarised but democratic all through the 21st century so far, perhaps best demonstrated by the Candlelight Revolution in 2016-2017, which led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. Experts view the RoK as a high-tech middle power in 2025. It faces the problem of having the lowest fertility rate in the world, and the Sunshine Policy regarding the DPRK has evolved from being a disengagement act to being a security measure that can only be ensured by the gain of military strength.

KPop Demon Hunters became Netflix's most watched movie of all time, a title it lost only to its future sequel that came out in 2028: "KPop Demon Hunters 2: The Search for Jinu"

2. Continental Histories

2.1. Europe: The Compulsory Federation

The European Federation (EF) is the unified political body that governs the continent using federal authority in 2040. Its sub-states keep their local administrations, yet the Federation coordinates Europe's state affairs such as economy, foreign relations, and security. This transformation began more than a decade ago, when the second Trump administration pursued a phased withdrawal process from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the influence of Trump's 'America First' policy. As a consequence, the U.S. cut funding for NATO infrastructure, reduced troop counts in Europe by 60%, and refused to

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comply with Article 5 after a major cyberattack attributed to Russia. For the first time since 1945, European leaders faced existential security without American security. Thus, Europe pursued emergency security integration measures with legal authority following the soft collapse of NATO. Immediately after, an emergency security summit at Luxembourg was convened and concluded that continental integration would be the most optimal choice.

Donald J. Trump justifying his Article 5 invocation refusal at the 2031 NATO meeting in Norfolk.
Source: Diamond, J. (2018). 'Trump opens NATO summit with blistering criticism of Germany, labels allies 'delinquent'', see https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/10/politics/donald-trump-nato-summit-2018.

By 2029, Europe reinforced its efforts with the Administrative Harmonization Initiative by introducing unified governance and mutual bureaucratic structures. Many European Union (EU) member states delegated their powers in defense, borders, and industry to supranational agencies that later evolved into federal ministries. In the upcoming decade, two milestone crises erupted: in 2031, Russia launched a coordinated cyberattack that collapsed power grids in Baltic states for four days. In 2032, a Middle Eastern climate disaster pushed 2 million refugees toward Greece. Soon, fear consumed Europe, and opinions unified: centralize or perish, beginning a transformation.

Pro-European participants attending the Pulse of Europe rally in Cologne, Germany (2032).
Source: Wikipedia. (2025). 'Pro-Europeanism', see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pro-Europeanism.

The European Council approved the Euro-Atlantic Security Consolidation Treaty by emergency supermajority. They created the European Strategic Union (ESU) to better coordinate joint defense procurement, shared intelligence, security units, border authority, and industrial sovereignty funds. In the meantime, (fearing loss of sovereignty) Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Ireland temporarily suspended their voting rights in certain EU councils to

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renegotiate economic terms. Finally, Poland and Hungary agreed to integration while Italy and Ireland's sovereignty pause became permanent. They left the ESU under "Italeave" and "Irexit," respectively.

The long-awaited EF arrived under the Federative Charter of Europe in 2036 by applying the principle of constitutional dualism: member states retain domestic constitutions while a continental body governs shared affairs. The Federation's first move was the Defense and Industrial Mobilization Act in 2037 to challenge the Russian threat. The EF provided tax advantages for workers, automated factories, nationalized failing industries, and permanently allocated 3% of annual GDP to defense against Russian militarism. At the act's conclusion, Europe had a continental industrial ecosystem that rivaled its enemy.

Then they set eyes on producing a subtly militarized society; enacting the Civic Renewal Program (2037-2039) to disguise societal militarization as education and family planning. In education, the EF mandated technical training in secondary school and universal civic service while providing massive subsidies for families, prioritizing STEM, healthcare, and defense workers, and tightening border controls with aggressive deportation in demographics.

Having initiated projects in rescuing its mainland, the EF followed its colonialist past to fuel its expanding industry. They expanded into Africa for its virgin resources through security, mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and energy cooperation to win hearts and minds. However, they collided with the PRC in that matter; turning Africa into a Euro-Sino development competition. Europe influenced north and south Africa while China held onto central Africa to cut off Europe.

To top everything off, the EF secured its eastern frontier with Russia under the Eastern Shield System in 2039. The Federation constructed a continental missile defense structure, built early warning systems, fortified drone bases in Poland, Finland, Baltics, and Romania, and deployed rotational armor brigades. Although tensions remain high with high commitment by both sides, Eastern Europe is secure.

Federation troops patrolling the East European Border.
Source: European Parliament. (2019). 'Defence: how the EU is boosting its security', see
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20190612STO54310/defence-how-the-eu-is-boosting-its-security.

Today, the EF is a politically loose but powerful entity that hosts a population of 541 million, the third largest economy with a GDP of $23.7 trillion, and the fourth strongest military with 1.9 million active and 2 million reserve personnel. <u>Gaining the EF's favor strengthens you and confines the opponent.</u>

2.2. Africa: Haunted by the Past

In 2040, Africa is a continent that could not free itself from its colonial past. Its states remain sovereign while foreign-built infrastructure and networks shape their policies. Although governments maintain control, Africa's resources, people, and environment are exploited. On the good side, they are not exploited as harshly as in the Colonial Era. This arrangement materialized in the late 2020s when Europe decided to further fuel its industry, and China disagreed.

Therefore, Africa greeted the late 2020s with an EF-PRC rivalry for rare earths and metals, agricultural relocation, and energy production known as the Resource Renaissance. But this rivalry differed from others; both sought subjugation without sovereignty claims instead of direct control. Finally, an Africa with governments holding massive bargaining chips as resource gatekeepers, high foreign investment, insufficient civil societies for transformation absorption, and corrupt/elitist bureaucracies was forged. For example, African people had modern roads, but did not own cars to travel.

A Photo from an African village demonstrating the elite-public gap in infrastructure projects.
Source: Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). (n.d.). 'How to improve infrastructure in Africa amid transport challenges', see
https://www.dbsa.org/article/how-improve-infrastructure-africa-amid-transport-challenges.

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Later, the Corridor Consensus of 2030-2033 confined African foreign policy to infrastructure development. The EF and PRC had a single mutual goal: prevent African unification. Thus, they integrated Africa into different external power's geoeconomic networks by development corridors. The EF constructed the Mediterranean Energy Road in North Africa, the Stabilization Belt that suspiciously caused more coups in the Sahel, and the Southern Africa Green Minerals Route. The PRC, on the other hand, led the Central African Rare Earths Belt, Congo Basin-Indian Ocean Export Line, and the Digital Silk Road. On paper, governments retained sovereignty. In practice, they lost control over transport, energy, logistics, and security.

As policies steadily took root, the EF and PRC hit the jackpot: North African governments requested EF security and humanitarian intervention when insurgencies and a record climate failure erupted. In the Congo Basin, a contested election turned conflict halted mineral production. PRC responded by deploying "stability advisors" and expanded military-backed corridor protection to reinstate order. In conclusion, African governments embraced external security and development guarantees, populations gained no say in policies that shaped their lives, and EF and PRC perpetuated their influence.

Chinese "Stability Advisors" (left) and French Federal District Counter-Insurgency Units (right) in North Africa.

Source: Devermont, J., Harris, M., & Albelda, A. (2021). 'Personal Ties: Measuring Chinese and U.S. Engagement with African Security Chiefs', see https://www.csis.org/analysis/personal-ties-measuring-chinese-and-us-engagement-african-security-chiefs.
Source: Brown, Will. (2024). 'Aligned in the sand: How Europeans can help stabilize the Sahel', see https://ecfr.eu/publication/aligned-in-the-sand-how-europeans-can-help-stabilise-the-sahel/.

By 2034, Africa was bipolar, and split between the EF and PRC. The EF-aligned North Africa provided energy, the contested Sahel sourced gold, while Southern Africa assisted in mineral processing. Simultaneously, the PRC exploited Central Africa for resource extraction and East Africa for their Belt & Road complexes and rail hubs. This system saturated governance until 2036. Governments saw record tax revenues, foreign investment, security partnerships, and political insulation. But populations struggled with stagnant industrial employment, weak education, heavy foreign-built logistic network dependencies, and constrained upward mobility. Soon, the system began revealing its flaws: megacities

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exceeded planning capacity, youth-skill mismatch, and new worker absorption of informal economies prevailed.

But, there were also some more benefits: in 2038 Africa became the world's largest exporter of battery minerals, hydrogen and solar energy, agricultural bulk commodities, low-value industrial outputs, rare earths, and PRC-harvested digital data. GDP inflated, but GDP per capita remained low due to horizontal modernization: infrastructure was tied to foreign powers rather than the people. By 2040, Africa stands as the world's youngest continent and the most contested resource zone. They host a population of 2.1 billion, a GDP of $5 trillion, PRC-backed stabilization missions in Central Africa, and EF-backed border and anti-insurgency measures in the North, Sahel, and the South. It is trapped in a cycle, unable to convert demographic and resource wealth into self-sustaining development. <u>Both the EF and the PRC want Africa, maybe introduce something in there?</u>

2.3. Americas

2.3.1. North America: Embodiment of Rational Unity

By 2040, North America is an interdependent continental system. Canada, the U.S, and Mexico maintain sovereignty. However, all rely on interstate coordination in energy, migration, industrial planning, and infrastructure. This structure materialized throughout the 2030s as climate displacement, South American economic decline, and Pacific trade route instability pressured the region. Although there is no formal supranational governance, the continent's financial and human networks form a unified economic-logistical space.

North America changed when global alliances weakened, external conditions deteriorated, Transatlantic engagement decreased, migration flows from Central to North America arose, economic stability declined in South America, and Pacific developments demanded greater attention. Therefore, North America was forced to prioritize internal stability over external commitments; and had to treat hemispheric issues as existential concerns.

In 2029, the Continental Coordination Concord (CCC) was ratified by Canada-U.S.-Mexico to manage mutual pressures without introducing political integration. They agreed on cross-border grids against blackouts, standardizing freight movement, constructing facilities in Mexico and the U.S. to process migrants, and adopting unified structures against cyberattacks. Although Canada and Mexico retained sovereignty, they increasingly relied on American infrastructure.

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Flags of the U.S., Mexico, and Canada standing side by side on the day of CCC's ratification.
Source: Reuters. (2024). 'Mexico doing all it can to protect trade agreement with US, Canada, official says', see
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-doing-all-it-can-to-protect-trade-agreement-with-us-canada-official-says-2024-12-06/.

When calendars showed 2031, three hemispheric disruptions forever changed the continent. The Central American Displacement displaced over 3 million people due to failed harvests and hurricanes, administratively overloading southern Mexican states. In 2032, the Andean Recession collapsed copper and agricultural exports, and diverted North America to internal sourcing and stockpiling. Finally, the 2033 Pacific route instabilities skyrocketed interdiction risks and insurance prices; which forced North American firms to use internal rail and trucks.

These issues found solutions with the North American Stabilization Compact in 2034 by reducing system-wide weaknesses. The Compact registered prominent supply chains by identifying suppliers and chokepoints. It integrated border infrastructure by upgrading major migration routes. Formed shared grains and protein reserves across the Plains, Ontario, and Northern Mexico, and evaluated annual trilateral plans for water, energy, and mineral storage. Thus, North America began founding an integrated economic-logistical zone.

From 2034 to 2036, Mexico began adjusting its policies to align with new continental requirements. They established Manufacturing Reliability Zones in the Northwest for drone, battery, and electronics production, ratified a Refugee Redistribution agreement with the U.S. to absorb a portion of Central Americans, allowed American military intervention against cartel activities, and expanded security operations across the trade corridors of Monterrey-Laredo, and Tijuana-San Diego to become the main manufacturing and logistics stabilizer for continental industry.

A Mexican military convoy headed to the U.S.-led and reinforced anti-cartel operation.

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As continental systems integrated, Canada's position became increasingly subordinated to U.S. leadership. Arctic administration for route security is delegated to U.S. agency command, Canadian energy facilities conformed to American standards and nuclear output was achieved through U.S. models, mineral policy benefits American industrial needs, and infrastructure & energy systems adopted U.S. operational protocols; which subjected Canadian agencies to American data and management. Formally, Canada was sovereign; practically, it was the 51st American state.

In 2037-2039, a continental industrial system was developed for self-reliant production. Automated freight corridors spanned from Guadalajara-Dallas-Chicago-Toronto. It became the main continental logistics line. U.S. design centers were connected with Arizona, Ontario, and Chihuahua fabrication sites to produce domestic semiconductors. Canadian minerals fed U.S. refining and Mexican component manufacturing. Lastly, geothermal expansion and hydrogen pilots fueled continental grids. In conclusion, North America was centralized in production and has minimized external supplier reliance.

Final integration was achieved when the Arctic-Priere Belt provided resources, hydrogen, and northern logistics; Great Lakes Basin provided high-value manufacturing and data output; Sonoran Belt provided solar power, battery storage, and electronic assembly; while the Continental Water grid formed shared reservoirs and channel networks to feed population centers. In the end, North America hosts a population of 565 million and a diversified economic basin with strong production capacity. It yields an annual GDP of $58 trillion. Its interdependent economic system, although shaped by leftist principles, has forged a stable continent without political union. Cartels can be suppressed, but never eradicated, perhaps this is an exploitable trait.

2.3.2. South America: The Spectators

Moving to the south, lies a fully sovereign region whose states never integrated despite global necessities. Its governments chose to abstain during Pacific trade route instabilities and witnessed the economic collapse of their fiscal systems. Foreign corporations exploited this vacuum by promising revitalization to subtly seize control over infrastructure, extraction, and digital systems. South America remained politically while externalizing economically. In the end, all continents defined their futures by collective action, South America defined theirs by collective inaction.

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In 2026, as Pacific trade routes grew increasingly unstable from PRC-Taiwan tensions, many warning signals were broadcasted by skyrocketing insurance prices and unreliable freights. North America acknowledged these to push economic integration while South America failed to implement anything coherent. Although Chile and Peru tried to build consensus in the Union of South American Nations, Brazil and Argentina's disagreements on mutual maritime policy sabotaged all efforts.

A Scene from the Union of South American Nations emergency security meeting with foreign observer participation (2026).
Source: U.S. Southern Command Public Affairs. (2023). 'South American Defense Leaders Meet to Discuss Regional Threats, Cooperation', see https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3505731/south-american-defense-leaders-meet-to-discuss-regional-threats-cooperation/.

After 3 years of failed lobbying, South America resorted to its old habit: abstentionism. It abstained from maritime security policies, joining emerging trade agreements, infrastructure modernization, unified response against climate stress, and many more. The most intense moment arrived in 2032 when a U.S. tanker group misunderstood Venezuelan directives. Venezuelan gunboats rushed, fired volleys, and seized nearby merchant tankers to prove authority. The U.S. responded by sinking 2 Venezuelan strike aircraft with a destroyer when they locked their radars. Although Venezuelan shore batteries retaliated with hasty coastal bombardment, they, their radar stations, and responding Venezuelan naval assets were destroyed by a U.S. carrier strike group. But the continent abstained, and just watched.

U.S. Navy officers searching for survivors in the sunk Venezuelan navy ship (left).
U.S. carrier strike group stationed off the coast of Venezuela (right).
Source: Lapadula, I. (2025). 'U.S. sends three warships toward the coast of Venezuela; Maduro mobilises 4.5 million militia members', see https://latinamericareports.com/u-s-sends-three-warships-toward-the-coast-of-venezuela-maduro-mobilises-4-5-million-militia-members/12121/.
Source: CNN. (2022). 'Dozens of sailors missing after Thai navy ship sinks', see https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/12/19/thailand-royal-navy-warship-sinkage-ovn-contd-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn

Concurrently, South American urban burden worsened when inland populations migrated to coasts, energy and transport systems aged faster than states' repair capabilities, crime and informal economies expanded in rural borderlands, and state presence vanished in parts of the Amazon, Andean corridors, and interior rivers. This triggered the Andean Collapse and all-time high Amazon deforestation. As joint Mexico-U.S. forces combated cartels up north, cartels began exploiting inland vacancy and expanding their operations southward; worsening South American stability.

They greeted 2036 with severe economic vulnerability by declining to join hemispheric stabilization agreements. In conclusion, European, North American, Chinese, and even Southeast Asian corporations flooded in by promising revitalization, development, and anti-cartel security. In reality, they seized energy networks, regional economies, infrastructure, and minerals. Governments accepted such deals for immediate relief and cash injections. By 2040, South America is depleted by the choices it did not make. It hosts a population of 505 million and an annual GDP of $4.8 trillion. Its economy is stagnant, increasingly dependent on foreign corporations with weakened institutions and a shrunk ability to negotiate. Opportunities for foreigners to capitalize never end in South America.

2.4. Asia

2.4.1. Central Asia: Russo-Sino Steppe

Central Asia lives between two political gravities in 2040. It consists of formally sovereign states whose autonomies have been narrowed without conquest. Recurrent economic stress, resource pressure, and localized unrest eventuated in the externalization of governance functions. While Russia became the mind of Central Asian states with doctrines and management, China became their bodies with digital control systems and infrastructure. The region stabilized as a transit-oriented buffer that is managed by external powers rather than internal choice.

Everything changed in 2026, when Russia understood that Europe would be tougher than it could pierce in the future. Therefore, Moscow turned to Central Asia. Through pre-established influence channels; Russian political advisors, language programs, and "security consultants" reappeared in local ministries. Additionally, Russian energy firms signed long-term contracts over pipelines and refineries through coercion and bribery of government officials while former Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) channels quietly reactivated under "training missions."

Russian president Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin on a foreign relations trip to Central Asia.
Source: President of Russia. (2025). 'Second Russia – Central Asia Summit', see http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78180.

Also, there was another player: the PRC. Chinese logistics hubs functioned along the Almaty-Kashgar corridor, surveillance suites entered markets as public security modernizations, and state-backed corporations acquired shares in mining, transit, and data. Although there was no partition, the region was gradually reorganized by two gravitational fields.

Between 2029-2032, as PRC entrenched its influence and Russia rebuilt its ideological presence, Central Asia found that their sovereignty still existed, just not their autonomy. Although there were no explicit statements, North Kazakhstan, Kygrygz military, and Tajik political elite leaned toward Russian sponsorship. Concurrently, East Kazakhstan, Uzbek industrial parks, and Turkmen energy systems aligned with the PRC. Due to governments following two political paths -neither fully nor safely- there was a growing population tired of being a corridor.

In 2033, the first wave of unrest struck Central Asia. Economic dependency produced winners and losers. Hence, the losers began to move. Due to worsening water scarcity, spiking food prices following two poor harvests, fewer local employment in Chinese industries, and Russian technical labor rehiring in Russian firms, demonstrations erupted; Western Kazakhstan from cut fuel subsidies, Uzbekistan Fergana Valley from factory layoffs, and Northern Kyrgyzstan from infrastructure land disputes. After local governments called for technical assistance, Russian advisors rewrote policing protocols, Chinese security contractors provided high-tech law enforcement equipment, and governments detained organizers under foreign agitation laws. .

By 2034, the second wave of unrest hit. As the global environment stressed, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan clashed over water rights, Kazakh rural communities protested against unfair land leasing to foreign agribusinesses, and Turkmen border towns were ravaged by Afghan migration. In response, Moscow deployed "peacekeeping advisors" to

mediate conflicts and embed influence, Beijing deployed monitoring systems to track dissident leaders, and joint training operations conveniently coincided with every major protest wave. While states were sovereign on paper, unrest suppression tools were imported.

The steppe acquired a digital iron curtain in 2036 after China introduced the Steppe Information Grid to relieve their immediate problems. They monitored potential protest organizers, analyzed social media trends, map smuggling routes, and automated public security responses. Simultaneously, Russia enacted policing cooperation programs, media partnerships, youth academies, and anti-extremism task forces to refresh its influence. Spontaneously, a wave of youth demonstrations appeared in Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent, and Dushanbe that demanded jobs, nationalization, liberty, and autonomy. After 6 months of unrest, Chinese algorithmic systems identified protest leaders, Russian-trained units dispersed crowds, and Russian-sponsored state media flooded the airwaves with foreign rhetoric.

A scene from the Almaty Youth Protests (2036).
Source: Penn Today. (2022). 'Kazakhstan unrest, explained', see https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/kazakhstan-unrest-explained.

Today, Central Asia is a region where security culture is dictated by Russia and economic structure by China that hosts a population of 94 million with an annual GDP of $703 billion. Its economic revenue flows outward, people are dissatisfied and monitored, and civil unrest is constant. Russia stabilizes the west, China stabilizes the east, and Central Asia stabilizes nothing. The ESC severely lacks public support in Central Asia.

2.4.2. South Asia: Land of Perpetual Warfare

By 2040, South Asia is defined by a sustained and active war in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Continuous fighting along the Line of Control has persisted since 2026 and sustained by foreign patronage. China supports the Pakistani war effort while Western intelligence and technology are embedded in Indian military command. Water stress, economic fatigue, and polarization has worsened the conflict. Thus, a resolution is impossible without the collapse of at least one patron system. On the bright side, SPECPOL committees in MUNs still have a classic agenda item at hand.

Unlike many continents, South Asia began 2026 with rapid and open and sustained military hostilities between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region. Infantry clashes erupted across multiple Line of Control sectors, artillery duels took place, counter-maneuvers were put into effect, and both armies maintained forward positions year-round. While the U.S. assisted India with intelligence, satellite feed, and cyber support, Pakistan -with severe financial inabilities- relied on Chinese aid to maintain troops, replace losses, and sustain logistics.

Line of Control between India and Pakistan.
Source: VOA News. (2023). 'Pakistan: Civilians Killed in Kashmir in Indian Cross-Border Fire', see
https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-civilians-killed-in-kashmir-in-indian-cross-border-fire-/7151330.html.

Up until 2032, the war was sustained by foreign powers. Chinese loans, drones, air-defense systems, ammunition, and aid to Pakistan helped it continue to fight. Without China, Pakistan would have collapsed. Meanwhile, the West supported India through intelligence cells in its command, reconnaissance data, and economic channels to curb Chinese influence. While shells fell in Kashmir, water became another weapon and grievance. Himalayan water irregularities erupted, Pakistan accused India of withholding water, India denied it by shifting the blame to climate, and China offered Pakistan hydrological support. On the ground villages suffered while both sides reinforced their positions and exploited water insecurity to intensify operations.

Indian troops (Left) and Pakistani troops (Right) clashing in Kashmir.
Source: Anadolu Agency. (2020). 'Pakistan army warns of change in Kashmir status', see
https://www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/pakistan-army-warns-of-change-in-kashmir-status.
Source: Pandey, V. & Masroor, R. (2017). 'Kashmir's stone-throwers: The girl who didn't back down', see
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-38950506.

By 2034, constant warfare began taking its toll on both sides. Pakistan struggled with economic stress from military expenditures, survived off of Chinese emergency fundings, and

tackled protests against rising costs and rationing. India, on the other hand, constantly reinforced the Kashmir front, was forced to balance Kashmir with Ladakh standoffs against China, and experienced domestic polarization. By 2036, the war was permanent. In the meantime, China utilized the Kashmir conflict to violate Bhutan for settlement construction and initiated border clashes with Nepal.

China became Pakistan's indispensable war partner, every operation depended on Chinese backing, and Pakistani leaders privately acknowledged that without Chinese aid, they would collapse. Eastward, Western intelligence networks were embedded in India's command structure, satellite systems were interconnected with the Indian military, and India was further strengthened by Western technology.

Today, South Asia hosts 2.1 billion people with an annual GDP of $11 trillion. It is still disturbed by the active military conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Artillery duels, drone sorties, special forces raids, territorial probing operations, fortifications, and many more are being conducted. Pakistan is sustained almost entirely through Chinese aid and needs more, while India retains the upper hand that may be lost any moment. Kashmir conflict is now a reality of South Asia, and it cannot be resolved without the collapse of at least one patron system. <u>Pakistan's loss will hurt the ESC, while India's loss will hurt the PDP.</u>

2.4.3. Southeast Asia: China's Playground, USA's Holdout

By 2040, Southeast Asia is absorbed through its climatic weaknesses and economic dependence. As extreme weather conditions, energy-intensive development, and urban overload exponentially rose, the PRC stepped in as the region's principal system provider to compensate local governments' constrained state capacities. The PRC, today, offers the region exclusive deals in cyber control, crisis logistics, and economic development to conquer these territories without a single boot on the ground. This situation divided the region into three components: the PRC-aligned Core that substitutes autonomy for stability, the Neutral side that tries to navigate between U.S.-PRC markets with depleting leverage, and the U.S.-aligned Holdouts that preserve independence through U.S. support at the cost of regional exclusion. Therefore, power in Southeast Asia is measured by the degree of a nation's compatibility with greater power and the integrated international system along with adaptability to external conditions. In the end, the region is stabilized through division.

This time, the path was different: Southeast Asia experiences incremental dependence. Climate-exposed economies buckle under rising disasters, cities grow too fast to manage, and industrial sectors remain resource and energy intensive. As systemic weaknesses grow, China steps in as the "savior" of Southeast Asia with offers too good to be true. However, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand resist. The Philippines classified PRC influence as national subjugation and continued tackling maritime territorial disputes with them. Vietnam, due to its history with China, expressed that "the day they ally with China, is the day their government has collapsed." Concurrently, Thailand feared losing monarchical-national identity and military control. The U.S., already assisting sovereignty preservation for American-aligned states, provided economic and political aid to maintain this alignment.

The Port of Singapore.
Source: Nikkei Asia. (2017). "Southeast Asian countries vie for port supremacy." See https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Southeast-Asian-countries-vie-for-port-supremacy.

From 2029 to 2032, Sino-Russo-Northern Korea ideological convergence in the ESC began to formalize. Simultaneously, Southeast Asian states -already dependent on PRC investments- were discreetly labeled "aligned participants" in Beijing's scope as integrated economies. Laos, Myanmar, Brunei, and Cambodia struck long-term agreements for port modernization, energy terminals, digital identity and taxation systems, and security training exchanges with China.

Across the water, Indonesia and Malaysia refused alignment but were unable to oppose; their export-centric industries needed Chinese markets while their infrastructure required financing for reconstruction due to climate stress. As these developments unfolded, the Philippines-Vietnam-Thailand triad became U.S.-aided "Sovereignty Zones." The Americans established economic relief lines, infrastructure funds, and intelligence coordination centers. The four signed agreements to modernize government systems without PRC inclusion while militaries reformed logistics to be inoperable with PRC forces. Thereby, leaving the three outside PRC influence through isolation.

By 2032, Southeast Asia entered a period of governance transformation through gradual system rewiring. The ESC-aligned states embraced PRC-style administration after receiving biometric ID and predictive policing systems, PRC-integrated economic planning agencies, local elite training in stability governance, and mixed PRC-state-operated digital infrastructure. Climate stress is among the largest contributors; extreme conditions and huge migration waves overwhelmed national systems which prompted governments to further align with PRC-backed crisis logistics. In the end leaving Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines to battle with trade retaliation and neighbor pressure. However, the U.S. would offset this with targeted subsidies and preferential trade.

Cambodian soldiers carry aid including medical equipment from China.
Source: Lye Liang Fook. (2020). 'China's aid to Southeast Asia amid adversity — a sign of deeper cooperation ahead?', see https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/chinas-aid-southeast-asia-amid-adversity-sign-deeper-cooperation-ahead.

In 2036, Chinese efforts had split the region into three: the PRC-aligned Core, the Neutral Block (Indonesia and Malaysia), and the U.S.-Aligned Holdouts. The core states were using mutual taxation systems, participated in joint governance boards, received PRC disaster reliefs, and permitted PRC ideological programming in civic institutions. The neutral block, in the meantime, remained on relatively good terms with both sides and struggled with internal political divide. Lastly, the holdouts had become U.S. investment zones that had modern energy systems against fossil fuel reliance and held joint maritime patrols to deter Chinese aggression. The holdouts' independence survived because external actors needed it to survive; thus, drawing U.S. aid.

In 2040, Southeast Asia is the embodiment of contradiction: the most interconnected and urbanized region, yet the most vulnerable. The Core runs economies on PRC systems, operates ports and industrial parks that are a part of China's extended supply chain, and maintains often-diluted sovereignties. The Neutrals still insist on non-alignment, buy PRC products and rely on the U.S. market, and are the regional balancing space with shrinking room to maneuver. Finally, the Holdouts remain the sole clear Western partners, receive U.S. assistance, and experience slower economic growth due to regional integration penalties. In

the end, these conditions forge a Southeast Asia that hosts a population of 754 million with an annual GDP of $6.7 trillion. Half of the continent hates the PDP, the other half hates the ESC; use this.

2.4.4. The Middle East: Where the Sun Rises

By 2040, the Middle East is a relatively stable region stabilized through enforced energy predictability. The partial military neutralization of Iran and the permanent securitization of the Strait of Hormuz reorganizes the region around energy flow. A U.S.-centric security structure and a Gulf-induced production capacity divide the Middle East into PDP-aligned energy cores and managed peripheries. Power today is measured by compatibility with trade corridors and infrastructural reliability. Simultaneously, stability derives from the universal recognition that disruption has become costlier than alignment.

In 2026, following the EU's recent signals toward supranational unity, Russia faced geopolitical containment. However, behind closed doors, the EU had discreetly set a goal to simultaneously pressure Iran while evading direct engagement in the Middle East to reinforce its energy policies. Therefore, EU states intensified sanctions on Iranian supply networks and conducted joint intelligence missions to directly monitor Iranian military programs. By 2028, the U.S., utilizing its ties with Israel and petroleum-rich Gulf states, began to share maritime intelligence, air defense protocols, and coordinated counter-proxy operations in secrecy under the name "Gulf Axis." As Iran felt the impact, it misinterpreted the EU's caution as weakness and saw the Gulf Axis as its main adversary.

Donald J. Trump holds a proclamation formalizing a new U.S.-backed strategic partnership, joined by Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House.

Source: Cook, J. (2019). 'The "deal of the century": US blessing for Israel's land theft and ghettoisation of the Palestinians', see https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israelthe-deal-century-simply-us-blessing-its-mass-theft-land-and-cantonisation.

As calendars showed 2030, the Gulf Axis implemented its operation in three phases to put an end to Iranian nuclear arms production. In the first phase, Israel conducted precision strikes on Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) command centers, drone hubs, and production facilities, Gulf aircraft suppressed proxy corridors in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon,

and the U.S. neutralized Iranian naval and missile assets along Hormuz. Iranian airspace was functionally denied within weeks. In 2032, a multinational ground force composed of U.S. Marine and Army expeditionary units, Israeli special forces, and Gulf support brigades entered Iran. They occupied Iran's south and its Iraqi borders. The Gulf Axis swiftly seized ports, refineries, IRGC regional command centers, and population centers without occupying Tehran. In the final phase, they subjected Iran to controlled attrition to militarily defeat Iran without politically conquering it; thus, IRGC retreated inland, Iranian regular army collapsed, and urban resistance was suppressed.

F-35 stealth fighter jets of the Israeli Air and Space Arm preparing for takeoff to strike Iran at night.
Source: Canadian International Council. (2025). 'CIC Victoria: Operation Rising Lion…the Israel-Iran conflict (Zoom event)', see https://thecic.org/event/cic-victoria-operation-rising-lion-the-israel-iran-conflict/.

In 2034, the Gulf Axis had occupied the Strait of Hormuz coastline, and southern oil and gas infrastructure. The ESC (fearing Eastern Shield and U.S. confrontation, loss of energy trade stability, and blame shift to China and Russia) settled with providing humanitarian aid into non-occupied Iran, medical assistance to civilians, digital forensics to assist Iranian civil administration, and pressured Gulf states to prevent escalation. They only prolonged Iran's suffering.

By the end of the operation, the U.S. had permanent ground presence in coastal Iran and controlled the Strait of Hormuz through maritime supremacy. Nobody could object because Europe required energy stability, China was preparing for something bigger, Gulf states saw it as insurance, and Iran could not resist. In the end, -besides Türkiye, Syria, and Egypt- all most Middle Eastern states adopted a PDP-aligned posture.

F-JCC: *The Second Korean War*

A U.S. soldier looks on while an assault helicopter flies above during a patrol by South Iranian oil refineries.
Source: AFP. (2021). 'Pro-Iran militia fires shells at US base in Syrian oil field', see
https://www.dailysabah.com/world/syrian-crisis/pro-iran-militia-fires-shells-at-us-base-in-syrian-oil-field.

In 2037, the most significant reassurance happened: modest but symbolically important oil reserves were found in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and deep Basra extension. Gulf governments were reassured that hydrocarbons still mattered. However, it did not mean that this idyll would last forever. Gulf states began constructing massive solar energy complexes across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to retreat when oil depletes. They utilized these complexes to establish high-voltage transmission lines to Europe and Africa. Thus, transforming the region into the world's largest stable solar basin. However, the most politically volatile region of the world will not stabilize that easily. In 2038, despite stability, two conflicts stubbornly persisted. Iraq's Kurdish region experienced intermittent insurgencies, oil revenue and federal power disputes, occasional Turkish operations, and U.S. governance advisors. Yemen was still excluded from this new order because Gulf states prioritized containment over reconstruction; leaving the region to deal with insurgencies in the north by itself.

ACWA's solar power plant in Al Shuaibah, Mecca. (Actually in Morocco but come on its FJCC who cares)
Source: CB Insights. (2023). 'Saudi Arabia is doubling down on EVs and renewable energy', see
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/saudi-arabia-electric-vehicle-energy-investment/.

By 2040, the region is mostly aligned with the PDP due to prosperity and security dependencies. This alignment is reinforced by a weakened, isolated, and contained Iran along with the power vacuum it creates. Regarding energy, oil matters, but solar matters more. Regional stability is sufficient to protect trade and serve global interests while tension is enough to remind the world what instability resembles. Although local state governance remains, their infrastructure, security grids, and energy markets are influenced by the U.S. Speaking of the U.S., the Hormuz Zone has become a permanent reality as a globally sanctioned presence tolerated by everyone; because the alternative is unthinkable. When combined, all of these factors produce a Middle East with an annual GDP of $13.5 trillion and a population of 592 million. <u>Iran is still infuriated and geographically close to ESC partners, maybe something can be propped up in there?</u>

F-JCC: *The Second Korean War*

2.5. Oceania: The Balance

In 2026, as the world displayed initial signs of polarization, Oceania once again found itself in the geopolitical interest zone. Its importance lay in the increasing importance of Pacific sea lanes and the military leverage of undersea cables, refueling stations, and air corridors. However, Oceania's lack of population and its industrial and military lightness rendered it as strategically expendable. Although this was the case, they discovered that Oceania's alignment would advantage one bloc while disadvantaging the other; recognizing leverage. Therefore, Oceanic leaders unified behind closed doors to determine their future policies. In 2029, Oceania began publicly entertaining physical and digital infrastructure cooperation with Russo and Sino-linked entities, while coordinating security, maritime patrol, and disaster response exercises with Japan and the U.S. As a result, Oceania saw intensifying aid competitions, increased fundings, and unmatched political attention. Thus, learning that threatened alignment extracts more benefit than commitment.

When 2032 arrived, climatic vulnerabilities converted Oceania's leverage into recurring rent. Rising sea levels threatened habitation, cyclones exceeded government capabilities, and fishery decline deprived the people of seafood. While the West provided disaster response forces, relocation financing, and insurance guarantees, the East offered port reconstruction, digital administration tools, and climate infrastructure loans to compete. While Oceania accepted both, it realized that both sides had monetized its climate stress. But it was too compartmentalized to return now. By 2035, the pattern stabilized with a system that hosted overbuilt ports without permanent basing rights, dual-use airfields without integrated command, and unnecessary communication infrastructure. Thereby, no bloc acquired Oceania as a strategic asset and it became strategically useful but never decisive enough to justify confrontation.

By 2040, Oceania is an aid-dependent continent that hosts severely divided and intentionally non-aligned sovereignties buffered by external competition. Strategically, its only value is relational as its alignment would disadvantage one bloc while its neutrality disadvantages none. Oceania's geopolitical system is an ingenious design that extracts benefits by threatening choice while preserving stability by never making it. Oceania today hosts a population of 67 million with an annual GDP of $2.3 trillion as a result of its rivalry-subsidized continuity. <u>One needs a decisive move to finally bound Oceania to itself.</u>

2.6. Antarctica: ???

In 2027, all human activity in Antarctica ended abruptly: every human infrastructure was evacuated under accelerated protocols, and the continent was treated thereafter as a practical exclusion zone. Immediately after, a number of NATO, Russian, and Chinese military sorties separately attempted to retrieve personnel, data and high-value assets. But, several inland missions suffered high losses, abandoned units, and withdrew permanently. Therefore, no follow-up deployment was authorized. From 2028 onward, the only "presence" is distant satellite observation and intermittent automated sensor pings, which continue to generate unresolved anomaly reports; especially of unusually aggressive and highly-resistant wildlife and behavior patterns inconsistent with baseline ecology. Yet, no state re-enters and no single treaty changes. By 2040, Antarctica remains untouched because the cost of going back exceeds the value of anything left behind. Th s p   co   ed in   el ng sno . <u>Don't even bother. But if you bother…who knows?</u>

Photo of an ecologically unusual animal captured by a Chinese military retrieval unit.

3. Foundations of Today: The Second Cold War (2025-20…)

Before the following events unfolded, a peculiar occurrence within the Republic of Türkiye caught the world's attention in 2040 due to its accuracy in predicting the future. An MUN conference named BoğaziçiMUN'26 hosted a Fictional Joint Crisis Committee. Its topic was centered on the idea of a Second Korean War. This idea was formulated and executed by the committee's Co-Under-Secretaries General İstemihan Gökay Tatar and Ege Kaval along with their Academic Assistants Uğur Cebeci and Yavuz Selim Kibar. These young masterminds are still searched by many intelligence services across the world for their political intellect. However, no evidence has been found to locate them, yet. <u>Find one of them for critical insight! Hint: They are each in one of the six main countries.</u>

3.1. Collapse of the Post-Cold War Order (2027-2029)

3.1.1. End of the Povnomashtabka

By early 2027, the Trump-brokered Russo-Ukrainian War (or the "Special Military Operation") peace negotiations had collapsed and the conflict reached the sustained attrition phase. Russian forces now prioritized systematic degradation over large-scale maneuvers against Ukrainian assets. They increasingly utilized long-range artillery systems, glide bombs, missile strikes, and drone swarms against Ukrainian air defense sites, rail junctions, repair depots, and power generation facilities; even striking Chernobyl accidentally. As Western supply fell short with the pace of consumption due to NATO's impending soft collapse, Ukrainian forces faced growing shortages of interceptors, trained crews, and spare parts. Throughout the year, Russia expanded and consolidated across northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russian forces seized heavy industries, agricultural export zones, ports, and inland transport corridors to further strangle Ukraine while replenishing themselves.

Surprisingly, Moscow did not push for Kiev; subsequently, permeating energy rationing, declining exports, and internal displacement for its adversary. Facing internal struggles, European governments pressed Ukraine toward negotiations under the guise of stabilization over surrender. Finally, Ukraine surrendered. Russia formally annexed what the Kremlin referred to as "Novorossia" and northern Ukraine along the Dnieper River. While Ukraine retained sovereignty on paper, the Russians were installing their stewards, penetrating coordination mechanisms, energy transit oversight, reconstruction access, and selective sanctions relief. Following this, the rooted assumption that European territorial change could be reversed by legal or diplomatic means collapsed.

3.1.2. A Years-Long Promise Breached: the Union State

With the Ukrainian front stabilized, Russia moved to eliminate residual uncertainty along its western flank. Lukashenko's Belarus, whose regime's survival was already dependent on Moscow, accelerated the Union State integration beyond symbolism and occasional cabinet meetings; hoping to acquire equal say in Russian politics without effort. While Belarussian military planning was folded into Russian regional command nodes, joint administrative bodies assumed authority over customs, border enforcement, and internal security; Moscow sought to extend its claws deep into Poland and the Baltic states. Therefore, 5% of all Russian air defense systems, missile units, intermediary-distance logistics bases, and electronic warfare assets were permanently deployed across Belarus.

The Union State initiative was further reinforced in late 2027 through economic integration. The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation aligned Belarussian fiscal planning with Russian federal ministries and restructured Belarussian industries to support Russian defense supply chains. However, just as Lukashenko believed he had succeeded, he was found to have shot himself six times in the back with a sniper rifle in a Moscow hotel room. Nikolai Lukashenko, his son, quickly substituted his father; enabling the Kremlin to integrate Belarus as a federal subject of Russia. Although domestic opposition was present, it was suppressed under expanded extremism statutes coordinated with Russian security services including the Federal Security Service (FSB).

3.1.3. Strong Voices, Weak Hands

While Russia was achieving its national security interests one by one, international institutions responded continuously but ineffectively. While sixty-seven UN General Assembly resolutions condemned Russian actions, Russia's veto privilege in the Security Council paralyzed enforcement. The global community retaliated through expanding sanctions' coverage. Unfortunately for them, they failed to overcome exemptions, secondary market adaptations, and uneven compliance. Subsequently, Russia maintained its position while diplomats deceived themselves. Over time, Russian administrative bodies expelled all monitoring missions in annexed territories and bureaucratically excluded legal proceedings from field realities. Despite perpetual two international forum conventions and 103 strongly-worded statements, procedural legitimacy lost operational authority over great power behavior.

3.1.4. Defeated Male Leaves

European stability and trust in the Trump administration deteriorated after America's irrational geopolitical actions and the president's countless failed peace initiatives while Pacific tensions were rising. Subsequently, Washington began reallocating attention and resources to a new playground. American defense budgeting exponentially prioritized naval construction under the Golden Fleet investment, autonomous combat forces, space assets, and Pacific basing. Thereafter, the U.S. acknowledged that it could not sustain two full-spectrum theaters indefinitely. It reduced European troop rotations under NATO by 60%, and long-term procurement planning drifted away from land-heavy continental contingencies to maritime and aerial systems. Additionally, the Department of War downgraded Europe from a primary military theater to a managed risk in the context of strategic planning. NATO's requests for

expanded deterrence measures were either deferred or redirected toward European self-capacity. U.S. officials settled with encouraging allies to assume greater responsibility without offering tangible help. In the end, U.S. guarantees were no longer immediate or unconditional; prompting Europeans to plan around delayed or selective intervention.

3.1.5. The Reunification Campaign

2027 was also the host for another milestone in human history: the 2027 Reunification Campaign. It was simultaneously the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Chinese leadership labeled the year internally as a closure for unresolved sovereignty claims. Throughout early 2027, Beijing observed rapid U.S. expansion in the Pacific: enlarged basing agreements, accelerated missile deployments, ROK-Japan relationship improvement, and greater intelligence cooperation with Taiwan. Chinese assessments decided that waiting longer would harden an unfavorable military balance and raise the cost of action beyond acceptable margins. Concurrently, Beijing -despite Washington's denials- exposed evidence of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coordination with Taiwanese military intelligence from advisory presence to contingency planning for rapid external intervention. In late July, PRC announced that the traditional centennial military parade would be substituted by large-scale "distributed readiness exercises." Under this cloak, PLA forces moved directly into operation.

Sudden missile strikes, cyberattacks and space domain disruptions degraded Taiwan's airbases in the face of high readiness. Simultaneously, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) imposed a maritime and air blockade upon Taiwan. It was composed of layered exclusion zones enforced by missiles, air sorties, and naval assets; halting commercial shipping, energy imports, and civilian air traffic. Taiwan's semiconductor industry and centralized command could not resist longer and collapsed due to power instabilities. Thus, global shipping pathways were immediately rerouted as insurance markets suspended coverage across the Taiwan Strait. The long-anticipated semiconductor shortages strangled automotive, defense, computing, manufacturing, and energy sectors on a global scale, which forced nations to rely on their limited stockpiles and secondary procurement channels.

The U.S. immediately convened emergency consultations but refrained from direct military intervention given that breaching a fully prepared A2/AD environment reinforced by aircraft, submarines, and coastal missile batteries demands immediate, large-scale escalation;

something the U.S. Pacific geopolitical infrastructure disallowed in 2027. Additionally, the Department of War had assessed that there was no clear path to restoring the pre-war status quo. Instead, Washington turned to sanctions, cyber retaliation, additional carrier strike group deployment, and intensified Pacific rearmament. Within two weeks, PRC state media declared that the PLA had completed its historic mission in its centennial year and explicitly cited foreign intelligence interference and U.S. encirclement as justification. Thus, demonstrating that rapid blockades are more effective than prolonged invasions, economic interdependence does not prevent wars, and U.S. guarantees are conditional on timing and preparedness.

3.1.6. New Markets

Following the Reunification Campaign's success, the semiconductor industry was in ruins by 2028; destroyed by the former Taipei administration days prior to the PLA landings. Beijing was forced to take matters into its own hands if it wished to own a monopoly. The Taiwan disruption triggered cascading effects across global markets. Semiconductor shortages dashed through automotive, defense, energy, telecommunications, and many more sectors, reducing their effectiveness by more than 67%. Concurrently, insurance premiums quadrupled prices along contested shipping routes, direct government supply chain allocation interventions materialized and the recently-settled Just-in-Time production model was abandoned for stockpiling. Soon, many governments with access to rare earth metals promised security and financial assurances, propelling many corporations to relocate production in accordance with political alignment rather than cost efficiency. Soon after, even corporations were politicized. Therefore, globalized companies reorganized into parallel, security-aligned economic systems. Amid this bloc-based corporate division, new semiconductor contenders with state backing emerged from Shanghai.

3.1.7. Third Time is the Charm

After perpetual failures in Palestine and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, international organizations attempted to reassert their relevance by politically isolating Russia and China through procedural exclusion, agenda control, and voting blocs. However, this terribly backfired: rather than restoring authority, Russia and China accelerated bypass efforts through third-party engagements, parallel structures, and discreet supranational agreements. Foreign commodity imports into Central Asia increased by 967%, satellite tracking later revealed that truck convoys and railways were utilized to transport large volumes of products

to Russia and China from these countries. Although some parties advocated to impose sanctions upon Central Asian nations for this, it was concluded that such a measure would be technically unjustified. From that point forward, it had become clear that global governance migrated decisively from universal institutions to great powers.

3.2. The Selective Reliability Phase (2029-2031)

3.2.1. History Repeats Itself

Right after the geopolitical blows to the West in Ukraine and Taiwan, regional crises perpetually emerged without a clear resolution in sight: cyber assaults, maritime disputes, sanctions enforcement debates, and infrastructure disruptions. While all incidents carried unique properties within themselves, each necessitated emergency coordination. Over time, a pattern emerged: same sets of states repeatedly responded together, while others remained peripheral. Thereafter, the global ad hoc crisis management gradually transitioned to a repetitive deed.

As global unity deteriorated rapidly, coordination increasingly bypassed formal international mechanisms, propelling states to pursue their ambitions in restricted working groups, military hotlines, intelligence exchanges, and executive-level administration cells for speed over consensus. The convention of large multilateral forums could not withstand getting substituted by patterned crisis response when states learned who actually shows up when costs are accounted for.

3.2.2. A NATO Duplicate?

When global attention once again shifted from Europe to the East, three beacons of democracy (perhaps two beacons of democracy and a poser) gradually decreased institutional distance among them. Japan, ROK, and the U.S. -against repeated DPRK missile activities, Chinese maritime pressure, and Russian expansion- densified operational coordination. The three integrated their Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) structures by sharing early-warning data, inter-satellite sensor fusion, radars, and undersea detection networks. They developed their independent national level systems into coordinated missile interception zones, radar cueing, and layered A2/AD doctrines. Lastly, the triad instated a joint logistics network through pre-positioned fuel, munitions, and spare parts depots and establishing interoperability standards for conflict resupply.

To secure each development, governments justified these measures publicly as technical efficiency improvements rather than groundwork for a supranational alliance. For instance, politically sensitive steps such as joint planning beyond declared contingencies were willfully kept informal and engineered to maintain plausible deniability. Therefore, the foundation for the PDP was laid: ROK, Japan, and the U.S. stopped planning alongside one another and began planning through one another. Although operational dependence increased, it was a small price to pay for salvation.

3.2.3. A Warsaw Pact Duplicate?

In parallel, the embodiments of totalitarianism -PRC, Russia, and the DPRK- formulated counterplans. Possessing state-of-the-art government technology (besides the DPRK), they could not be deceived as easily as the general populace. These states tightened coordination in fields designed to blunt Western pressure rather than projecting global power. They evaded sanctions through establishing mutual shipping networks, payment channels, commodity rerouting, and undocumented activities using unmarked assets. Additionally, they set out to conquer the cyber domain and subsequently conquer the systems they had been exporting to other nations; deconflicting offensive cyber operations, sharing tooling, and coordinating signalling campaigns to achieve their goals. Finally, they concluded their foundation through establishing vast land-based logistics networks by integrating rail, pipeline, and overload transport corridors to reduce maritime weaknesses.

Their symbiotic relationship materialized with Chinese economic and technological infrastructure, Russian experience and escalation tolerance, and DPRK geographic positioning and expandable forward capacity. In the end, the first seeds of ESC were sowed when the three began mutually reinforcing each other instead of functioning as isolated revisionists.

3.2.4. Habitual "Temporary" Arrangements

On both sides, leaders insisted these arrangements were temporary, technical, and reversible. However, 2030 took off with whatever contradictory to official statements: officers trained together repeatedly, planners reused the same contingency assumptions, logistics chains were designed around the same partners, and political leaders began consulting the same counterparts first. Over time, these practices generated path dependence. Thus, positioning reversal coordination in such a state that an attempt would impose real

costs in readiness, planning, and crisis response. Now, the cost of disengagement was higher than the cost of remaining engaged.

3.2.5. Neutrality as a Liability

As Proto-bloc solidification took place, it brought along another criticality: conditional access to systems. Markets were screened for political reliability, a country's security alignment determined its access to infrastructure, strategic trust became conditional in technology transfers, and insurance, finance, and logistics penalized obscurities. This global system of forced alignment imposed higher costs upon states that attempted strict neutrality. Even non-aligned states were pressured to align sector-by-sector: defense, energy, data, or trade. On the other hand, South America stood as the perfect epitome of abstentionism's cost. From this point onward, neutrality could be treated as a strategic disadvantage.

3.2.6. The End of Universal Commitment

By 2031, states began to ask three decisive questions that defined their alignment: Who will absorb economic loss? Who will afford escalation? Who will remain engaged after the first shock? A select number of nations, precisely the U.S. and PRC, possess the capability to function under harsh conditions with limited concessions. Such a capability provided each with the ability to rally states around their orbits of influence; thus, rendering reliability measurement empiric, through past behavior under pressure. Subsequently, the Cold War-style alliances became history; changing alliance logic from "who agrees with us" to "who endures with us."

3.3. Neutrality is Dead! (2031-2033)

3.3.1. Abstention Only as a Resolution Paper Voting Option

Throughout the early 2030s, UN and other multilateral mechanisms such as trade unions and cooperation forums continued to function only on paper. Inspections continued to be scheduled, arbitration panels convened, world leaders stood on the dais to touch upon important issues and deliver empty promises, and resolutions were debated. However, in practice, the process was exponentially distanced from real decision-making due to repeated compliance enforcement failures. The Security Council's veto mechanism paralyzed every critical decision concerned with international order, inspection teams were denied access or delayed indefinitely, compliance reports arrived months after facts have changed,

underreporting and overreporting became the norm, arbitration rulings were ignored or selectively interpreted, and enforcement measures required a consensus that was no longer achievable.

The timelines dictated by multilateral procedures were outpaced by the speed of the modern, interconnected world and became incompatible with effective crisis response. As a result, states stopped routing urgent decisions through formal institutions and instead sought localized resolutions by leveraging the support of greater powers. In this sense, MUN conferences are the only multilateral forums in which such procedures still function as intended.

3.3.2. Ow, My Eyes!

While international bodies were increasingly isolated from global developments, one of their primary information acquisition organs was being amputated: monitoring bodies. Each body faced mounting constraints: host states denied access due to "national security concerns," difficult and harsh residence conditions were imposed, data sharing agreements lapsed, competing intelligence assessments decayed confidence in neutral reporting, and observers became dependent on secondhand information provided by interested parties.

Then, the very states that implemented everything in their power to discredit reports and claimed that international observer reports had lost credibility; thus, their political value declined. Shortly after, monitoring outcomes were labeled as selective and eventually disregarded entirely. In the end, verification ceased to be authoritative, facts became congested by default, and enforcement thresholds could not be triggered reliably; producing a world in which reliable information was no longer a thing.

3.3.3. Decision-Making Migrates to Parallel Structures

As confidence in formal institutions -primarily the UN- eroded, states relied increasingly on parallel coordination structures; including but not limited to, restricted intelligence sharing groups, executive-level crisis cells, military hotlines, and ad hoc planning forums limited to trusted state partners. Real-time decisions were handled by these structures: force posture adjustments, sanctions enforcement, escalation management, and contingency planning. Although formal institutions remained in use, their sole purpose now was to legitimize outcomes already decided elsewhere.

This appeared mundane in practice, but defense ministers resolved incidents over secure calls before ambassadors packed their suitcases up, sanctions lists circulated privately

to banks days prior to public declarations, and military movements were organized via hotlines while officials were selecting "Attending" on their calendar apps. Thus, authority wriggled out of institutional constraints and moved through words; institutions only ratified actions after the fact.

3.3.4. The Sun is Rising

In 2031, repeated regional crises finally exposed the operational cost of Japan's constitution. The fundamental law once treated as the symbol of peace by the Japanese people was now perceived as a constraint. People and politicians agreed that the ambiguity that provided political flexibility now delayed authorization, limited response options, and complicated inter-partner coordination. During several incidents, Japanese forces were forced to await political clearance while allied assets moved immediately. This situation necessitated partners to plan around Japanese delay rather than integrating Japanese action from the outset.

Finally, Japanese defense planners concluded that such ambiguity creates response asymmetry rather than nurturing stability; prompting the National Diet to realign domestic debate from the necessity of obscurity to the degree of delay acceptability in a crisis. Thereafter, Japan identified legal hesitation as a direct security weakness.

3.3.5. The Sun has Risen…Partially

However, Japan knew it could not pursue unilateral remilitarization. Instead, it signalled its intent to expand constitutional independence within a controlled legislation by formally repealing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in late 2031. Surprisingly, the U.S. supported this shift. But, there was a catch: the U.S. bound this more independent Japan tightly into emerging Pacific cooperation. Finally, Japanese operational planning became more integrated, command relationships were clarified, interoperability standards tightened, and Japan acquired greater latitude to act. In the end, while Japan could assume routine exercise participation from the outset with increased autonomy, its outside independence decreased.

3.3.6. Some Things Do Not Need a Name

By 2032, what would later be called the PDP already functioned in practice. The aforementioned joint planning assumptions were shared, logistics chains were aligned, and ISR and missile-defense structures had shifted from episodic operations to continuous activity. The separate national conditions of Japan, ROK, and the U.S. amassed into an

informally unified command structure. Although no founding treaty or political declaration was present, the arrangement existed; because reversing it would degrade readiness and decelerate response times. In conclusion, a de facto security bloc roamed the Pacific before it existed politically; thus, deeming neutral participation in Pacific security impossible.

3.4. Bloc Formalization Through Necessity (2033-2035)

3.4.1. The Netizen State

As external pressure increased and economic growth decreased, the PRC accelerated its transition towards digitally mediated governance. Central authorities expanded the integration of national digital ID systems, real-time financial tracking, AI-assisted policing, and automated and customized regulatory enforcement. Beijing tightened the leash over labor mobility, capitals flows, and politics flows through fusing data across civilian, industrial, and security domains. The PRC designated cyber sovereignty as a strategic priority, subsequently segmenting domestic networks. They fully restricted external systems and foreign platforms while substituting each domain with rapidly-scaled and state-controlled alternatives.

In practice, the PRC tied access to banking, travel, employment, and communication to a real-time compliance status tracker for each of its citizens, effectively discarding every formal legal process by redefining legality. At last, the technocratic mindset of the Chinese government produced a nation that managed internal stability algorithmically. This way, the PRC procured the ability to resist sanctions, unrest, and information warfare while shortening decision cycles.

3.4.2. Demographic Decline is Ignorable Until a Certain Point

Both China and Russia greeted 2033 with an accelerating population decline and aging demographics. Soon, labor shortages, rising dependency ratios, and -most prominently- shrinking recruitment pools followed; severely limiting economic and military planning. In the face of a case in which many would have scrambled and pursued disruptive political reform, both maintained calmness and prioritized collective stability and external leverage to offset internal weakness.

Their policy responses comprised extended service requirements, selective automation, controlled immigration, and expanded security authorities to achieve longer service obligations, tighter labor controls in decisive sectors, and larger internal security mandates. Moscow and Beijing leveraged the power of media and narrative control to frame

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these policies as necessity rather than reform. They utilized external pressure as a utility to consolidate domestic legitimacy, exaggerate scarcity as siege, and justify centralization. Therefore, paving the way for long-term reform that gave way to control-oriented governance that relies on external confrontation as a stabilizing mechanism.

3.4.3. Three Nations Seeking to Stabilize Eurasia

By the end of 2033, the PRC-Russia-DPRK triad found themselves shifting from situational coordination to perpetual alignment. From this point onward, their military doctrines were cross-referenced and adjusted to complement each other's strengths: Chinese technological might and influential reach, Russian escalation management and long-range strikes, and North Korean forward positioning and expandable capacity. The three synchronized their land corridors, fuel routes, munitions production, and maintenance pipelines through logistics planning. Expanded ISR sharing to comprise threat assessments, escalation thresholds, and contingency assumptions. Conducted exercises that gradually reflected joint scenarios with inter-participant planning documents and timelines rather than parallel national ones. As shared escalation environments became the norm, the three could only plan together.

3.4.4. A Warsaw Pact Duplicate.

As calendars marked 2034, coordination among the PRC, Russia, and DPRK had advanced to the point where denial and lack of a standing framework became counterproductive. Informal mechanisms were unable to accommodate escalation risks, logistical integration, and regime security commitments. In response, the three governments concluded a formal multilateral agreement that established the ESC as a standing security organization. Although many of its provisions were in effect, the agreement legalized these into binding commitments and transformed the alignment into institutionalized bloc behavior.

The Eurasian Security Treaty committed members to mutual consultation and response in the event of threats to regime stability, territorial integrity, or alliance-critical infrastructure by establishing a multinational council, integrating operations, establishing joint command nodes, and coordinating ISR. Although there were no explicit war clauses, the treaty bound its members to such commitments through collective escalation control measures. Exercises, procurement planning, and force postures were henceforth conducted under ESC structures. Finally, ESC became a formal security bloc governed by treaty obligations and shared war planning assumptions that has shifted from practice to law.

3.4.5. A NATO Duplicate.

Shortly after the ESC's formalization, the U.S., Japan, and ROK acknowledged that their coordination had advanced so much that perpetual informality would be both politically misleading and weakening against the ESC. The three governments decided to transition from partitioned bilateral treaties to the Asia-Pacific Treaty and formally established the PDP as a standing security alliance orientated around integrated deterrence. Unlike continental security blocs, the PDP was built around functional integration rather than centralized command. The PDP was formed around the core purpose of guaranteeing uninterrupted joint operations across air, sea, missile defense, cyber and space domains in the Pacific theater. They achieved these through creating a deterrence council for coordination, a combined A2/AD structure, an access and sustainment regime, and a planning command.

Although the treaty did not create an automatic war obligation, it legally bound members to maintain continuous coordination; which created an indirect automatic war obligation. The U.S. seized alliance-wide operational independence while allowing Japan and Korea to preserve their national command authority. While this was the case, all had to agree; the U.S. adopted the pact through executive agreement and congressional authorization, Japan implemented it through cabinet reinterpretation and suspending Article 9, and the ROK ratified it through parliament approval. Conclusively, the PDP became a formal alliance shaped by integrated deterrence and guaranteed access. Today, cohesion derives from systemic necessity rather than legal obligation, as any member's failure to act degrades collective defense; thus, forcing response without actually forcing.

At last, global institutions became no different than rapporteurs. Neither the ESC nor the PDP sought to dismantle them. Instead, they rerouted substantive decisions around these bodies. Both blocs created, developed, and concluded crisis management, military signalling, sanctions enforcement, and economic collaboration within themselves at first. Formal institutions could only engage afterward to deal with legality and the management of pre-determined outcomes.

3.5. Flashpoint: The Korean Peninsula (2034-2036)

3.5.1. Theater of Controlled Escalation

By 2034, ESC strategic command began perceiving escalation as a utility of gathering attention and puppeteering the PDP. Their internal assessments compared Taiwan S.A.R., the South China Sea, and Korea as three possible pressure points. They selected Korea due to its

dense concentration of high-value military and civilian targets in a very confined space. They assessed that the Seoul-Incheon metropolitan area, fixed U.S.-ROK airbases south of the DMZ, and major Yellow Sea ports were all within artillery and short-range missile reach.

The Peninsula permits intense but geographically bounded conflict. They measured missile and artillery flight times in minutes, identified limited maneuver corridors, and discovered that existing boundaries -the DMZ and Northern Limit Line- provide predefined escalation thresholds that allow force to be applied without immediately extending strikes to mainland China or the continental U.S. Thus, Korea was designated as the ESC's main focus; with planning, force allocation, and munitions stockpiles reoriented toward unique Peninsula requirements.

3.5.2. Feed the Baby

Following Korea's recent designation, ESC planning assumed that direct PRC-U.S. war is likely if conflict sparks over the liberty of Taiwan or involves Japan directly. Fully aware, ESC used Korea as a buffer theater: the DPRK conducted visible first phase actions including artillery fire, short-range missile launched, and localized ground pressure while China remained in depth and just fed the Juche system. In the early phases, China effectively externalized the DPRK's wartime economy. Food, fuel, electricity, industrial inputs, spare parts, and medical supplies flowed non-stop across the Yalu and Tumen via rail, pipeline, and truck corridors.

Chinese facilities handled fuel refining, power generation backfill, vehicle and artillery maintenance, munitions finishing and communications support; which enabled the DPRK to mobilize forces without collapsing civilian supply or internal control. The PLA deployed troops north of the border to secure logistics hubs and transport routes under the guise of "stabilization," while overt Chinese combat contingencies remained physically separated. It was clear, but also deniable, that ESC adopted a phased escalation model in which the DPRK fights forward while China sustains a full shadow system. Thus, delaying direct China-U.S. military confrontation while enabling prolonged DPRK war readiness.

3.5.3. Moscow Can Also Participate Meaningfully

While Russia did not own an aircraft carrier in the Pacific to project power, it possessed long-range fires, air defense, and Far East basing. The Korean Peninsula enables Russia to apply these capabilities directly. Missile and air units stationed in the Russian Far East were deployed against reinforcement routes and logistics hubs that supported the

U.S.-ROK forces. Russian advisors were also dispatched to integrate DPRK air defenses and long-range fires. Sustainment planning relied on real and overland fuel corridors that connected the Russian Far East to Korea to avoid dependence on maritime routes. Eventually, Russia contributed to ESC planning with defined strike, air defense, and sustainment tasks.

3.5.4. Busy Days in Pyongyang

The DPRK's regime narrative is ideologically suited for such a theater. The DMZ, history of war, and constant readiness posture allowed the DPRK to leverage artificial escalation as defensive inevitability. The regime could finally justify mobilization, repression, and economic reallocation. Due to the high militarization of the armistice, the DPRK introduced rotation reinterpretations, artillery redeployments, and new "defensive" fortifications without a need to justify a single molecule of each. Therefore, DPRK gained the political permission internally to intensify posture without an explicit war declaration.

3.5.5. Containment Appears to be Managable…Nevermind

In response to amassing signals, DPRK posture shifts, missile tests, cyber attacks, increased ESC coordination etc.- the PDP increased their joint exercises and readiness measures. Air and missile defense drills deployed live interceptors across Korea and Japan, logistics exercises stress-tested sealifts through Busan and Japan, drills rehearsed airlifts, and ISR exercises synchronized real-time feed. Although these were just projections of power, Pyongyang interpreted them as rehearsal. ESC intelligence and propaganda portrayed the scale and realism of exercises as evidence that allied forces were practicing opening phases; which only reinforced the belief that waiting narrowed DPRK's time.

3.5.6. Point of No Return

By 2036, the Peninsula was an arena where both blocs tested credibility without immediately committing to war. Incidents multiplied and normalized: naval confrontations and radar locks in the Yellow Sea, repeated cyber interference with military systems, sudden DMZ artillery redeployments, airspace violations, and frequent missile launches. The armistice was legally in effect, but the Peninsula was in a near-continious pre-crisis state. Therefore, Korea became the system's escalation valve. When global tensions increased, Korean pressure was applied incrementally and ultimately discharged when restraint failed.

3.6. A Remilitarized Peninsula that Traps Alliances (2036-2037)

3.6.1. Welcome Back Uncle Sam

By 2036, Washington treated deterrence as a production problem. The U.S. shifted procurement from small-batch modernization to volume and surge: interceptor and long-range missile lines ran continuously, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) output scaled, and shipyards and aircraft depots prioritized repair tempo and hull availability over peacetime efficiency. The Department of Commerce moved industrial policy directly into defense production. Supply chains were audited to component level, stockpiles of propellants and electronics were rebuilt, multi-year contracts bound factories into steady output, and training and reserve systems were readjusted to move units and equipment faster. The U.S. now measured war readiness in monthly output, repair throughoutğ, and deployable units on fixed timelines.

3.6.2. China's Pacific A2/AD

The PRC, instead of copying U.S. global reach -surprisingly- decided to dominate regional battlespace through denial. By the end of 2036, China fielded dense A2/AD layers: coastal anti-ship missile brigades covered critical straits, long-range surface to air missile (SAM) belts protected coastal assets, persistent maritime sensors continuously scanned the seas, and precision missile stocks were readied. They paired tangible measures with cyber and counter-space actions that disrupted satellite feeds, communications, and tracking. The PRC reinforced hardened coastal bases, dispersed airfields inland, and redundant command nodes, enabling missile forces to absorb initial strikes while preserving high-volume launches. They were intending to slow PDP reinforcement and raise attrition costs. While the Pacific became a denial environment, the PDP was not empty-handed.

3.6.3. The Bear in the Far East

Russia knew it could not match Japan ship-for-ship, but also knew it did not need to. Instead, Moscow constructed a regional threat profile through Far Eastern basing, long-range strike systems, layered air defenses, and visible force movements. They expanded rotational deployments across the Russian Far East, positioned missile units within range of Japan's main islands, cycled aircraft detachments through forward airfields, and established logistics hubs to support sustained operations. Rather than direct engagement, Russia focused on capabilities that threatened fixed infrastructure. Through their strike planning centers on

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critical infrastructure, they created continuous rear area vulnerability without operating a single ship. Thus, forcing Japan to account for homeland exposure and rear area strike risks.

3.6.4. Beijing's Red Lines in Gray Zones

As the Chinese denial posture matured, Beijing began enforcing red lines operationally. The PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard vessels increased close-in interceptions, shadowed allied ships, conducted low-altitude air passes near patrol aircraft, and repeated drone and maritime militia incursions along contested routes. The Philippines and Vietnam were among the most-affected. More advanced nations were subjected to cyber instructions and electronic warfare concentrated around their ports, airbases, and command networks. The Chinese had struck a delicate balance: actions were frequent enough to establish physical presence but restrained to avoid a single obscure trigger. Over time, the PRC had succeeded in resetting expectations about what levels of pressure was "normal." Therefore, redefining risk as a continuous phenomena and forcing regional forces to operate under constant pressure, which increases fatigue and errors.

3.6.5. Washington to the Rescue

In response, the U.S. deployed additional forces, upgraded regional bases, and built infrastructure. They forwarded munitions and fuel stocks, lengthened and resurfaced runways, hardened aircraft shelters, and expanded ammunition bunkers. Additionally, dispersed operating sites were activated across allied territory to reduce off-guard strikes. The PDP began conducting logistics operations under harsh conditions such as destroyed ports and contested airspace airlifts. The U.S. drew its allies deeper into forward defense by physically embedding an increasing amount of assets on allied soil. Thereafter, the PDP boasted a credibility tied to its posture; forward defense was materially entrenched and de-escalation risked alliance credibility.

3.6.6. ESC Has Different Priorities

By 2037, ESC strategic procurement converged on denial by mass. DPRK expanded coastal artillery and missile units, layered short and medium-range air defenses around its cities, and thickened coastal anti-ship coverage on potential enemy landing sites. The Yellow Sea was littered by naval mines, armed drones, and fast attack craft commanded from hardened coastal sites and concealed inlets. Their objective was to create a dense engagement zone where inbound forces faced immediate saturation -missiles, artillery, mines, and drones-

before establishing air or maritime control. Thus, the theater became hostile by default; necessitating reinforcement to be prepared to penetrate a denial zone under fire.

3.6.7. PDP Has Different Responses

Meanwhile, PDP procurement and doctrine prioritized striking from depth and surviving saturation. Inventories of long-range stand-off weapons -cruise missiles, hypersonic systems etc.- expanded, while large numbers of air and maritime UAVs were fielded for ISR, decoying and attrition. Important bases received counter-drone and missile defenses that combine electronic warfare, improved interceptors, and early point-defense systems. The PDP also decreased overreliance by dispersion: aircraft and ships rotated across multiple airfields and ports, units rehearsed rapid relocation, and strike packages were designed to operate with intermittent communications and degraded sensor coverage. The PDP sought to offset denial with range, dispersion, and autonomous systems.

3.7. Collapse of the Armistice System (2037-2038)

3.7.1. DPRK: The Cheeky Trickster

Beginning in early 2037, the DPRK stopped breaking the armistice outright and began exploiting its language. Rotation ceilings were satisfied on paper while actual force levels climbed: combat units cycled through recently defined rotation categories, rear area troops were reclassified as engineering or law enforcement elements, and weapon replacements were logged as "like-for-like" despite longer ranges or higher rates of fire. New hardened gun pits, tunnel extensions, and concealed firing positions appeared just outside restricted lines while being documented as routine maintenance and repair. Simultaneously, the tempo of DMZ "training" increased. Artillery and rocket units moved into dispersal sites during readiness drills and remained forward longer each cycle. However, nothing crossed a single red line. Therefore, turning the armistice into a rules-lawyering contest that raised force density without any violations.

3.7.2. Verification Non-Functional: Trust Has Collapsed

As DPRK reinterpretations accumulated, verification mechanisms gradually began collapsing. Inspections teams faced delayed clearances, last-minute route changes, blocked corridors, and "security incidents" that suspended access entirely. When inspections proceeded, movement was basically scripted. Independent intelligence assessments continuously contradicted official findings, and verification reports arrived weeks after force

movements had already happened. Although hotlines existed, they were no different than two arguing friends who perpetually sent messages that reinforced their position without listening to one another. In the end, the armistice began losing its enforceability due to verification timeliness and credibility erosion, which redefined compliance as whatever could be asserted faster and defended politically.

3.7.3. DMZ ~~Buffer~~ Kill Zone

By late 2037, the DMZ was converted into an engagement zone. Counter-battery radars, ground sensors, persistent drones, and electronic warfare coverage blanketed the border area. Both parties maintained artillery and rocket units on both sides in hardened positions with pre-designated target grids and automated fire control systems. The little spaces between fixed positions were riddled with minefields, concrete barriers, and short-range anti-drone systems. Thereafter, completely eradicating the DMZ's buffer function and converting it into a kill zone designed to trigger rapid and automated escalation upon any incident.

3.7.4. Yellow Sea Turning Red (Because hot things turn red, get it? haha)

Concurrently, naval tension in the Yellow Sea rapidly increased as both sides enforced incompatible maritime baselines. DPRK patrol vessels, coastal artillery units, and fast attack craft sortied aggressively near contested lines with Chinese shore-based radars and missiles. The ROK retaliated with denser escort formations, occasional interception patrols, and perpetual maritime surveillance by surface ships, aircraft, and drones. Close-contact incidents have become the norm: warning shots at close range, fire-control radar locks, UAV flyovers, aggressive maneuvering, and many boarding attempts. Consequently, both sides constrained their rules of engagement incrementally with new restrictions and authorizations; each treated as preparation for escalation that produced a cycle of mutual hardening. The state of the Yellow Sea is worse than imaginable: the slightest navigation error carries the potential to spark war.

3.7.5. ROK Will Not Stand and Watch

In the face of additional DPRK pressure, the ROK deployed additional missile defense batteries and counter-artillery systems near the DMZ and urban areas of importance. They went as far as connecting counter-battery radars directly with fire-control networks to enable the military to receive targets within minutes. Their missile defense evolved into a state-of-the-art masterpiece: PDP sensors feed for early warning, civil defense quietly scaled

up, conducted shelter readiness checks, planned transport routes, and limited relocation planning in high-risk areas. Although these measures increased survivability, they reduced negotiation time; automatic agent systems left politicians with less time to interact. Therefore, granting the ROK an automated response system that decreases decision windows with each improvement.

3.8. The Ant Fed by Elephants (2038-2039)

3.8.1. People's Republic Forces Korea (PRFA)

As the armistice system became obsolete and unenforceable, China transitioned from indirect support to physical presence without declaring intervention. A PLA "Korea Corps" deployed into the northern DPRK under border security, refugee control, and humanitarian assistance mandates. ~45,000 units were positioned along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers to secure crossings, railways, fuel depots, and logistics hubs. The PRFA's engineering and security elements also established control over transport corridors. In practice, Chinese forces oversaw rail and fuel flows, protected select air defense and radar sites, and installed liaison teams within DPRK command structures to coordinate implementation. The PRFA positioned its troops to the north of the DMZ, to simultaneously maintain deniability and exercise influence over rear area security sustainment. Thereafter, granting China direct leverage over logistics, forces, and unit pacing over DPRK frontline involvement.

3.8.2. A Generous Donation from China

The PRC expanded its support beyond keeping the DPRK afloat into direct readiness enhancement. PLA military donations included short and medium-range air defense units, counter-drone equipment, hardened field communications, targeting data feeds, and battlefield surveillance sensors. Economic support was expanded to sustainment inputs: fuel flow stabilization, grain and ration buffers, spare parts for power generation, rail repair kits, tunnel reinforcement materials, and backup transformers (not robots in disguise) for critical nodes. Additionally, the PLA provided technological assistance in control and resistance. They donated encrypted command networks, cyber tools, electronic warfare support, and information control systems to secure mobilization and suppress internal disruptions. All transfers moved through managed logistics channels and rail under technical cooperation agreements. Thus, the PRC achieved its goal in rendering the PRK harder to disrupt and isolate and sustaining higher readiness for longer periods supported by external and protected networks.

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3.8.3. Russia Contributes Intellectually and Logistically

Moscow further entrenched its presence in Pyongyang as a doctrinal advisor. Russian advisory teams expanded around artillery employment tables, long-range fires timing, air defense systems, and deception measures connected to salvo sequencing and decoy use. The Russians provided logistical aid through defined spare parts pipelines, fuel deliveries, rail lift via Russian Far East routes, and wartime sustainment pathways designed to bypass maritime blockades. In addition, the Russian Armed Forces assumed coachship of DPRK contingents against shared fire plans and standardized target sets to replace purely national drills with ESC-aligned scenarios. Thus, the Russians standardized DPRK planning to ESC doctrines and shaped how they used fires, defenses, and deceptions.

3.8.4. DPRK: From a Country with an Army to an Army with a Country

As military readiness became permanent and external support expanded, DPRK internal power tilted from the Workers' Party of Korea to the Korean People's Army (KPA). Military commands assumed direct control over fuel allocation, transport priorities, factory labor assignments, and regional security enforcement. Civilian ministries were stripped off their policymaking duties and tasked with execution. Concurrently, internal security services integrated surveillance, movement permits, and communications directly into mobilization planning. Governance took on a standing wartime posture, standardized rationing schedules, reassigned production quotas to military demand, and redirected reserve labor. The KPA further reinforced its efforts through tightening ideological enforcement to maintain discipline and compliance. Therefore, militarizing the DPRK governance structure.

3.8.5. Update: The Fatty is Dead!

In late 2038, a leadership crisis occurred when Kim Jong Un died due to a sudden heart attack caused by his abnormal weight. China and Russia, having sensed the political conflict between the Workers' Party and the KPA, moved immediately to stabilize succession. They endorsed sealing the borders and restricting internal communications, and deployed security units in Pyongyang and other command sites. Kim's sister, Kim Yo-jong, assumed power rapidly with external backing: she synchronized recognition statements, security guarantees, and coordinated ISR support to neutralize elite uncertainty. Foreign support was distinguished. Chinese and Russian liaison teams strengthened protection of transport routes, fuel depots, and command facilities, while internal security services detained or sidelined

emerging figures. In the end, succession produced consolidation rather than instability; thus, deeming DPRK leadership dependent on ESC guarantees for regime continuity.

3.8.6. Now or Never

The new DPRK leadership reviewed trend lines and reached a conclusion: delay meant decline. Each year, PDP defenses thickened: interceptor coverage expanded, autonomous units improved, precision-strike ranges lengthened, and warning times shortened. Simultaneously, waiting increased DPRK exposure to preemption, decapitation, and infrastructure collapse in an event of war. This produced a shift from deterrence by survival to deterrence by action: the belief that only decisive action can reset the balance before the gap becomes impossible to catch.

3.8.7. ESC Frees the DPRK

Historically, the DPRK was restrained by two fears: regime-ending retaliation and war exhaustion-induced collapse. The ESC removed both in early 2039. Russia and China guaranteed the regime's survival through standing wartime resupply plans -food, fuel, spare parts- and predefined reconstruction packages regarding power grids, rail repair, port clearance, and internal security restoration. With survival and recovery no longer uncertain, the DPRK began perceiving war as an ESC-managed group project with profitable outcomes. These guarantees single-handedly converted the DPRK into a usable forward actor for the ESC. Therefore, enabling it to conflict over Korea without directly triggering a PRC-USA war.

3.9. The Point of No Return (2039-2040)

3.9.1. U.S. Self-Sufficiency vs. China's Internal Pressure

By 2039, the U.S. had restructured the North American Stabilization Compact supply chains around national defense. Domestic and trusted-partner production expanded for missile components, microelectronics, fuel processing, and rare earth metals. Long-term procurement contracts chained factory output, emergency redundancy was redirected into the defense sector, and physical munition stockpiles and spare parts increased resistance time windows. Meanwhile, the PRC accumulated internal strain. Growth decelerated, demographic decline reduced labor supply, and internal security spendings rose as many people grew tired of constant suppression. Technology disparities, capital screenings, and export controls forced workarounds that raised costs and delayed output.

Although Beijing implemented incremented digital audits, financial control, and capped repression capacity to reduce uncertainty, these measures only consumed more resources and shortened tolerance. In such a case, many countries facing internal strain would want to double it and give it to the next country; however, it is not that easy. Thereafter, the U.S. could endure sustained conflict while China became more vulnerable to instability; forcing it to deliver a decisive strike to win in an event of conflict.

3.9.2. DPRK in Permanent High Readiness

After succession and ESC guarantees, permanent high readiness had become the standard way of living in the DPRK. Mobilization became routine: artillery and rocket units cycled continuously through dispersal sites, reserve formations rotated through shortened training intervals, and fuel and ammunition were taken out of warehouses to be positioned forward. The state reorganized civil infrastructure to prioritize war: rail and road priorities were rescheduled, ration plans were in effect, and internal movement required a separate physical passport. Additionally, DPRK command and control were hardened against sabotage. Excessive communications were fielded, fallback command posts were activated, and pre-authorized response manuals were issued to eliminate field-Pyongyang-field relays. From this point onward, the DPRK lived as if it was waging war with all of its might.

3.9.3. ROK Retaliates in its Own Way

By late 2039, the ROK discreetly initiated limited evacuations and civil defense readjustments near high-risk DMZ-adjacent regions. The Ministry of Information and National Trust drew attention to disaster readiness and infrastructure work. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Industry, Infrastructure, and Finance reduced civilian density along likely strike corridors, cleared access roads, and aligned movement controls to prioritize military mobility. They hardened each critical facility, expanded shelter capacity, and perpetually tested emergency broadcast and command communications. They additionally constructed decoy housing units and industrial parks in hopes of deceiving enemy intelligence and targeting. Thus, deeming the crisis visible and sticky through civilian displacement; which was also an indicator that returning to "normal" was virtually impossible.

3.9.4. Diplomacy off the Table

Backchannel diplomacy persisted -intelligence contacts, third-party intermediaries, and quiet messages through neutral capitals- but failed. Many unknown parties intentionally delayed, filtered or selectively leaked messages. Simultaneously, both sides interpreted

pauses as hesitation and read proposed confidence steps as abandonment by allies. While talks were attempted, they advanced on intent but stalled on mechanics: sequencing first-move disputes and demands for proof that could not be delivered in time were the main culprits. Additionally, when verification turned unreliable and incidents occurred faster than messages could be relayed diplomacy stopped absorbing pressure. Thereby, becoming another contested domain where hesitation is punished that no state wished to entangle itself in.

3.9.5. Japan Draws the Line: PDP Guarantees Korea

Still enjoying the benefits of Article 9's suspension, Japan declared publicly that failure to defend Korea would invalidate the PDP. Tokyo began regarding the Peninsula as a credibility test, propelling its internal planning to assume that collapse of deterrence in Korea would expose Japan to further isolation and coercion under worse conditions. They later communicated this assessment to the PDP and reflected these assumptions in its future plans tangibly. The Japanese, being the committed people they are, backed their declaration by action. Tokyo expanded logistical support for peninsula operations, pre-approved transit and basing agreements, and deployed additional naval patrols. The U.S. eventually participated in the commitment and facilitated the PDP declaration that guaranteed the independence of ROK. Therefore, Japan guaranteed the ROK's independence assurance through individual action.

3.9.6. Did America Just Increase the Debt Ceiling Again?

Rather than "solving the debt crisis" that has been draining citizens' wealth for decades, Washington formulated an ingenious policy: stabilizing war financing through a combined fiscal-monetary setup! Emergency procurement authorities were maintained in an operating state, multi-year defense contracts were signed with corporations to bind them to the military-industrial complex, and Department of Treasury issuance was distributed equitably among domestic buyers to sustain borrowing capacity. In the end, the military-industrial complex had turned into a system that transferred capital back-and-forth to shift weight wherever needed. Additionally, defense spending was placed into baseline budgeting, and industrial mobilization was regarded as a standing economic policy. Political alignment tilted towards continuity and readiness funding was labeled as national survival, which separated defense appropriations from short-term enthusiasm. In the end, the U.S. had

evolved into a war machine that could remain politically and financially durable. However, this did not mean that they could wage war forever…

3.9.7. Ticking Bomb…

By 2040, force density was extremely high on both sides: hardened firing positions, saturated missile coverage, continuous ISR from drones and sensors, and automated response chains. Both PDP and ESC joint alliance planning assumed that withdrawal or any form of delay translated to alliance failure and losing the Peninsula. The degree of high-alertedness on each side caused routine movements -unit rotations, logistics convoys, redeployments…- to be perceived as signs of first strike. Thereafter, the armistice system lost elasticity; minor vibrations spiralled down directly into crises that could no longer be absorbed or elucidated.

By this stage, inaction is more than action. In Pyongyang, delay is interpreted as declining survivability. In Seoul, hesitation is perceived as openly inviting a first strike. In Tokyo, inaction is seen as an alliance collapse. In Washington, holding back is regarded as forfeiting credibility. But in Beijing and Moscow, tension escalation through the DPRK is judged safer than allowing pressure to build toward a direct, uncontrolled confrontation elsewhere. Every stakeholder believes waiting worsens its position. No one needs to want war. The dream of four MUNers from 2026 had become a system's default resolution mechanism; as the world braced for impact, the Second Korean War was inevitable.

If you came this far, we, the F-JCC Committee Secretariat, would like to congratulate you on your efforts. We hope the occasional hints planted across the World History document will guide you and your respective cabinet to victory.

:)

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