



BOĞAZİÇİMUN ADVANCED

2025
the Legacy

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

STUDY GUIDE

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Academic Assistants: Nisa İltekin, Çağla Alkan

#BridgingTheGap

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Letter from the Secretary-General

Meritorious participants of BoğaziçiMUN Advanced 2025,

It is with warm hugs, sincerity and utmost privilege to welcome you all to this edition of BoğaziçiMUNAdvanced. I'm Selin Ayaz, a senior Double Major of Political Science & International Relations and Sociology at Boğaziçi University. Having four years of university Model UN experience (alongside 5 years prior) under my belt, I will be serving as your Secretary-General.

For this version of BoğaziçiMUN, both of our teams have worked from day to night to give you the best experience ever. I would first like to thank my amazing Deputy-Secretaries-General, Maya Gençdiş and Emir Elhatip, for their continuous effort and clever wit. Another person that I'm thankful for is our esteemed Director-General, Irem Ayber. She and our Deputy-Director-General Azra Çökük are some of the most hardworking people I've known, they are tireless in their work and you will get to experience the fruits of their labour when we meet in September.

We've prepared 9 different committees covering a wide range of topics. European Parliament is a one them, a one of a kind committee, with the important agenda item of "Evaluating the Causes of Migration and Strengthening the Integration Policies to Enhance Socioeconomic Inclusion". As by the theme of our conference, this committee honors the legacy of Egemen Büyükkaya, one of our founding members as well as the former Secretary-General of BoğaziçiMUN 2020. I would like to thank the hardworking Under-Secretaries-General Ezgi Batmaz and Barış Yavaş as well as their Academic Assistants Nisa İltekin and Çağla Alkan for their efforts in making this committee come to life.

We've always used the phrase "Bridging the Gap" as our motto. This year, we are combining this with the legacy. Each edition of BoğaziçiMUN has been about providing our participants with the best experience they've ever had so far. Each time, we try to outdo ourselves and become the best version so far. This edition has been no different as all of us have vigorously and tirelessly worked so far. Now the ball is in your court. I invite you all to take a step forward and feel the legacy.

Warmest regards,

Selin Ayaz

Secretary-General of BoğaziçiMUN Advanced 2025



Letter From the Under Secretaries-General

Esteemed Delegates,

It is with honor and excitement that we welcome you to the European Parliament. We are Zeynep Ezgi Batmaz and Barış Yavaş, privileged to serve as your Under Secretaries-General. Our agenda item addresses a long-standing issue that requires carefully considered solutions. Understanding the causes of migration is essential to safeguard the well-being of both migrant populations and host societies, and to ensure that the necessary resources are in place for those arriving as well as those already residing in host countries. Preparedness for potential crises and the capacity to respond swiftly are equally vital. Enhancing the socioeconomic inclusion of migrants is another key priority, as the welfare of both migrants and host communities depends on the success of integration efforts. We are confident that this committee will equip every delegate with the knowledge needed and inspire innovative solutions to these pressing challenges.

Before wrapping up, we want to thank our honorable Secretary-General Ms. Selin Ayaz for giving us the opportunity to create this committee and our Director-General Ms. İrem Ayber for their ever-lasting support.. We also want to thank our wonderful academic assistants Nisa İltekin and Çağla Alkan for their valuable contributions.

We hope this committee will be a platform for thoughtful dialogue and meaningful collaboration.

Best,

Zeynep Ezgi Batmaz & Barış Yavaş - Under Secretaries-General

Çağla Alkan & Nisa İltekin - Academic Assistants



I. Introduction to the Committee: European Parliament

The European Union's institutional set-up is unique, and its decision-making system is constantly evolving. The 7 European institutions, 9 EU bodies, and over 30 decentralised agencies are spread across the EU. They work together to address the common interests of the EU and European people. (*Types of Institutions, Bodies and Agencies* | *European Union*, n.d.) According to Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union, four of the seven main EU institutions are the main decision-making bodies, which lead the administration of the Union. These institutions collectively provide the EU with policy direction and play different roles in the law-making process: the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and lastly, the European Parliament. Their work is complemented by other institutions and bodies, which include the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors.




Figure 1. Relationships between the institutions of the European Union. Source: *Structure Of European Union Diagram*, n.d., [URL]



The European Parliament (EP) is one of the seven fundamental institutions of the European Union and the only body at the Union level that is directly elected by EU citizens. In the last elections held on June 6-9, 2024, the EP now has a total of 720 MEPs (Members of European Parliament) from 27 member states. The EP represents nearly 450 million citizens. Furthermore, as one of the two bodies with legislative power within the European Union (those being European Parliament and the Council of the EU), the EP jointly* approves legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission. In this respect, it is part of the EU's de facto bicameral legislative structure, as the entry into force of EU legislation generally requires the approval of both the EP and the Council. This co-legislation process is called by the “Ordinary Legislative Procedure” (Dionigi, M. K., & Rasmussen, A., 2019).

**Council of the EU*

The Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) is the most common method for law-making in the European Union, granting equal authority to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (European Union, 2012, Art. 294 TFEU). The process begins with the European Commission presenting a legislative proposal; it is first debated in Parliament and then in the Council at a "first reading." If both institutions agree on the same text, the law enters into force; however, if changes are made, it proceeds to a "second reading." If agreement cannot be reached at the second reading, a Conciliation Committee (which is composed of members of Parliament and the Council) attempts to agree on a common text; this text is then voted on in both institutions at a "third reading." If accepted, it enters into force. If rejected, it ceases to exist. This procedure combines the Commission's monopoly on proposing, the Parliament's democratic representation, and the Council's commitment to member state interests, ensuring the adoption of EU law with a high degree of legitimacy. (EU, 2012, Art. 294 TFEU)

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been directly elected every five years since 1979 by universal, free, and secret ballot. The Parliament is a body representing the democratic interests and political views of European citizens; in this case, MEPs represent the political affiliations of their constituents at the European level, not their national identity. Therefore, MEPs sit in Parliament in groups based on their political views, not their national origins. With their powers, the MEPs play a critical role that strengthens democratic legitimacy in EU decision-making.



A. Duties & Responsibilities of the European Parliament

The European Parliament plays a critical role in shaping EU policies and legislation. As the only body in the EU that EU citizens directly elect, the European Parliament represents the pure democratic will of EU citizens within the Union. It also shares legislative power with the European Council, approves the EU budget, and ensures the protection of fundamental rights and values within the Union by supervising democracy across all other EU institutions. Its responsibilities include ratifying international agreements submitted to Parliament, appointing key EU officials, and communicating directly with citizens through petitions and inquiries. More specifically, the European Parliament has three main roles within the EU: legislative, supervisory, and budgetary.

First, the European Parliament's legislative role encompasses the power to enact legislation jointly with the EU Council based on proposals submitted by the European Commission (EU, 2012, Art. 294 TFEU). In this process, the Parliament debates, amends, and adopts a wide range of legislation, from environmental protection standards to digital market regulations. It also has the authority to decide on international agreements, which means determining whether the EU will become a party to trade agreements or global agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement. The Parliament also approves the accession of new member states, ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the enlargement process, as was the case, for example, with Croatia's accession in 2013. Finally, it examines the Commission's annual work program and, when deemed necessary, calls on the Commission to propose new legislation; this mechanism ensures that the Parliament not only approves but also shapes the agenda.

Secondly, the European Parliament has democratic supervision over all EU institutions. Within this framework, it elects the President of the European Commission and approves the entire Commission; it can also force the Commission's resignation through a vote of no confidence. Parliament guarantees fiscal transparency by exercising its "discharge" power, which means approving how EU budgets are spent. It can examine citizen petitions and initiate investigations into issues arising from these petitions, thus ensuring that EU policies remain responsive to the public's needs. It consults with the European Central Bank on monetary policy and raises the accountability of executive bodies by submitting written or oral questions to Commission and Council members. It also promotes the proper conduct of



democratic processes both within the EU and in its external relations by conducting election observations.

Thirdly and finally, the European Parliament shares equal authority with the Council in establishing the EU budget and can thus directly shape the Union's spending priorities. It examines the draft budget before approving the annual budget that is proposed by the Council of the European Union (to clarify the process, the draft budget is first prepared by the EU Commission, then submitted to the EU Council, and finally, the Council's position is forwarded to the European Parliament). The EU Parliament has the right to make amendments to the proposal and contribute to consensus-building between the Commission and the Council. Parliament also approves the Multiannual Financial Framework, which sets out the EU's seven-year long-term financial plan. This document defines the upper limits and priorities for all spending categories, forming the financial basis for the Union's long-term policies. Through these processes, Parliament ensures democratic legitimacy in both short-term budget decisions and long-term fiscal planning within the EU.

B. Political Groups




Figure 2. Seat distribution of the new Parliament as of 16 July 2024. Source: European Parliament, n.d.

Every political group starts with the national level. Each of the 27 member states holds its own elections to decide which national parties will represent them in the European Parliament. Every party puts forward its candidate lists, and voters cast their ballots for their preferred party. The seat distribution at the European Parliament is based on the proportion of votes each party receives. That may raise a question: Which parties currently seat in the EP? In fact, the European Parliament contains more than hundreds of political parties. However, the

political organization of the Parliament creates a meaningful structure in reality. National parties unite with other parties through European political groups, which function as larger coalitions. The center-left Partito Democratico (PD) serves as an example from Italy. They are a social democratic party in Italy, which has a significant presence at least in Italy, but



outside of their home country, their reach is limited. So to amplify their influence across Europe, they join forces with other center-left parties across the continent. These include Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) from Germany, Parti socialiste (PS) from France, and many more from most other EU countries. Together, they form the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, which is the second-largest political group in the European Parliament according to the 2024 election results. There are eight of these groups, and they are made up of like-minded parties from different countries, all working together to influence EU legislation.

European People's Party Group (EPP Group) is currently the largest political group in the EP with 188 seats out of 720, which is 26 % by share of the total number of Members of the European Parliament. It includes member parties such as the European People's Party (EPP) and the European Christian Political Party (ECPP). The two biggest parties in this group are Germany's CDU/CSU and Poland's Civic Platform. The current president, Manfred Weber, hails from Germany's CSU party. Additionally, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, comes from the CDU party, also from Germany. The EPP group is generally positioned in the right-center quadrant of the political compass, and near the upper middle on the libertarian-authoritarian axis. The EPP's center-right ideology supports a free market economy and private enterprise, while also advocating for limited state intervention to protect social welfare. For example, the group supports green transformation investments across the EU through tax incentives to stimulate private sector investment. The party bases its cultural values on Christian democracy, upholding traditional family and community structures and religious freedom, while strongly supporting EU integration and the rule of law.

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) follows with around 136 seats (19%) and unites social democratic parties across Europe, emphasising social justice, workers' rights, and inclusive welfare policies. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) is generally positioned in the center-left and moderately libertarian zone of the political compass. The economic approach of S&D combines market economy principles with social democratic policies to achieve social welfare and income equality. The cultural approach of S&D focuses on libertarian values, which include democracy and human rights and immigrant rights, and social diversity. The position of S&D is demonstrated through



policies that enhance labor rights and use public funds to support green transformation investments.

Patriots for Europe (PfE) is a newly formed consolidation of far-right and sovereigntist parties, winning 84 seats (12%) by combining former members of Identity and Democracy (ID) under nationalist and Eurosceptic themes. Patriots for Europe (PfE) is generally positioned within the right-wing/far-right (right-wing to far-right) and authoritarian zones of the political compass. Their economic approach embraces protectionist and nationalist policies, while their cultural approach embraces opposition to immigration, the preservation of traditional values, and the limitation of the EU's powers. For example, their stated goal of increasing nation-state sovereignty over the EU and severely restricting immigration demonstrates this position.

European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) occupy 11% of the parliament with 78 seats, standing for both national sovereignty and gradual European Union integration. The European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) places itself in the right wing and center-right area of the political compass, yet leans toward authoritarianism on the cultural axis. Free markets and fiscal discipline support the group's economic stance, yet its position regarding EU integration remains distinct from the EPP's perspective. Traditional values receive the group's highest cultural priority while they fight to restrict immigration and defend state powers. The party demonstrates this stance by demanding more authority in EU decision-making processes.

The centrist liberal group Renew Europe holds 75 seats (10% of the total) while advocating for digital innovation together with reform and individual freedoms. The Renew Europe (RE) bloc occupies space between center-right and center-left positions on the political compass with liberal economic views but libertarian social orientations. The group stands for free trade and innovation and green transformation investments, but takes progressive stances on individual freedoms and LGBT+ rights and immigrant integration, and EU integration strengthening. The group demonstrates its position through efforts to establish EU-wide digital market liberalization and mandatory climate policy targets.

The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) occupies approximately 53 seats (7%) and dedicates its efforts to environmental protection alongside climate initiatives and regional



self-governance. The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) occupies a position between left and libertarian on the political compass because it maintains economic progressiveness while being socially libertarian. The group supports environmental protection through public investment and income inequality reduction, and green economy development, while maintaining its libertarian stance on human rights and minority rights and local autonomy, and participatory democracy. The EU should eliminate fossil fuel subsidies throughout the entire territory and establish mandatory language protection laws for minorities, according to this position.

The Left (GUE/NGL) uses its 46 seats (6%) to advance socialist and anti-neoliberal policies while fighting for social equality. The Left in the European Parliament – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) maintains a far left economic stance and libertarian social positions on the political compass. Radical left economic policies include nationalizing strategic sectors and strengthening public ownership and implementing a wealth tax, and raising taxes on high-income earners. The party strongly supports immigrant rights and LGBTQ+ rights and women's rights, and direct democracy within its libertarian social framework. The political positions of this group become evident through their support for terminating EU trade agreements that do not protect human rights and the environment, and their backing for full national control of the energy sector.

Finally, the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group emerged in this legislative period to represent 25 seats (4%) through its alliance of hard-right and sovereigntist parties, including Germany's AfD and Poland's Confederation that advocate nationalist and anti-integration views. The group fights to defend state sovereignty from EU overreach and supports tight immigration controls and cultural traditionalism while working for a reduced EU role that amounts to a states-only association. The ESN stands at the far-right position on the political compass and leans toward authoritarian tendencies on the libertarian–authoritarian axis.

Although, after all these explanations, it may seem that the entire European Parliament consists of 8 political groups, this is not entirely true. There are still 33 seats in the non-aligned stack, representing parties from 8 different countries. This includes Germany's BSW and Slovakia's SMER party, among others. These non-aligned members don't belong to any of the major political groups, which comes with significant drawbacks. Non-aligned members have less influence on legislation, fewer speaking opportunities, and reduced access



to key committee roles. They also receive less funding and resources, making it harder to operate effectively.

Although, after all these explanations, it may seem that the entire European Parliament consists of 8 political groups, this is not entirely true. The non-aligned stack still holds 32 seats representing parties from eight different countries. This includes Germany's BSW and Slovakia's SMER party, among others. These non-aligned members are not appertained by any of the major political groups, which poses significant disadvantages to them. They have less influence on legislation, fewer speaking opportunities, and less access to key committee roles. They also receive less funding and resources, making it harder for them to operate effectively.

II. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Evaluating the Causes of Migration and Strengthening the Integration Policies to Enhance Socioeconomic Inclusion

Migration remains one of the most relevant and complex issues in international relations, with millions of people moving across borders or within their countries each year. In recent decades, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by a mix of political, economic, social, and environmental factors. While migration can benefit both migrants and host communities through cultural diversity and economic growth, it also poses considerable challenges, especially when integration policies are lacking or ineffective. This agenda encourages delegates to explore the fundamental causes of migration and propose effective integration policies that improve socioeconomic inclusion for everyone.

Globally, over 281 million people, that's about 3.6% of the world's population, are international migrants, according to the "International Organization for Migration" (2020). The reasons for migration can generally be categorized into "push factors," which are the conditions that drive people to leave their home countries, and "pull factors," which are the conditions that attract them to new destinations. Common push factors include:

- Armed conflicts and political instability
- Economic hardship and unemployment
- Human rights abuses and persecution
- Climate change and environmental degradation.



Pull factors often consist of better economic opportunities, political stability, family reunification, and a higher quality of life in host countries. In reality, migration is often the result of a mix of both push and pull factors.

Integration is critical in ensuring the migrants' positive contribution to their host country. Integration policies differ widely among nations, from comprehensive programs that support education, employment, and civic engagement to limited frameworks that risk marginalizing migrant populations. Economic integration policies focus on job placement services, recognition of foreign qualifications, and workplace anti-discrimination measures. Social and cultural integration can be fostered through language training, cultural orientation, and community engagement projects. Access to education, healthcare, and political participation also play a crucial role in socioeconomic inclusion. Some countries offer pathways to citizenship or local voting rights, while others limit participation to permanent residents. Nonetheless, successful integration is vital not only for the well-being of migrants but also for social cohesion and economic stability in host countries. However, integration faces several obstacles. Public opinion and xenophobia can undermine social cohesion, while legal barriers like the lack of residency rights can prevent migrants from fully participating in society. Economic disparities frequently compel migrants to take low-wage or informal employment, while overloaded public services may find it difficult to cater to the demands of both migrants and resident communities. Although security concerns are often exaggerated, they can also influence public and political attitudes.

Addressing the root causes of migration calls for a multifaceted approach, including conflict resolution, sustainable development, climate resilience, and fair economic opportunities in countries of origin. At the same time, enhancing integration policies in receiving countries is crucial to ensure migrants have access to education, healthcare, employment, and civic participation, thereby promoting social cohesion and long-term prosperity.

This agenda urges the international community to work together to understand the underlying drivers of migration, develop fair and effective policies, and adopt inclusive strategies that respect human rights while fostering the socioeconomic integration of migrants into host societies.



A. Key Words

1. Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) - EU's primary law-making process giving Parliament and Council equal roles; up to three readings with possible conciliation.
2. Article 294 TFEU - Treaty provision setting the stages and co-decision rules for the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.
3. New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2024) - Legislative package restructuring EU asylum, borders, solidarity, and returns; in force since 11 June 2024.
4. Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) -Solidarity mechanism updating responsibility for asylum claims; replaces Dublin rules within the Pact.
5. Eurodac - Upgraded asylum and migration database expanding biometrics and categories to identify applicants and irregular entrants.
6. Border procedure and returns - Compulsory border processing for likely ineligible claims, linking swift decisions with expedited returns and reintegration support.
7. Crisis Regulation / instrumentalisation - Rapid response protocols and funding to manage emergencies and instrumentalisation episodes.
8. Non-refoulement - Ban on returning people to persecution, torture, or serious harm; reaffirmed in Pact implementation.
9. Temporary protection - Time-limited status granting swift safety and basic rights during mass arrivals.
10. Durable solutions - Voluntary return when safe, local integration, or third-country resettlement for refugees after protection is granted.
11. Family reunification - Admission rules enabling families to live together; depends on sponsor's status, national law, and documentation.
12. Labour migration - Cross-border movement to meet labour demand; outcomes shaped by recognition, contracts, portability, and pathways from temporary to longer-term status.
13. Undocumented (irregular) migrants - People without current authorisation due to entry, overstay, or status loss; responses range from enforcement to regularisation.
14. Stateless persons - Individuals not recognised as nationals by any state; face barriers to rights and documentation.
15. Frontex - EU border and coast guard agency supporting operations, returns, and Pact implementation monitoring with member states and EU bodies.



16. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) - Agency providing operational support and monitoring for asylum systems and Pact implementation.
17. Return Coordinator - Commission-appointed role coordinating return policy and chairing a High-Level Network for Return.
18. Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) - Main EU funding instrument (2021–2027) for asylum, integration, and return systems, supporting Pact implementation.
19. Screening - Pre-entry registration with identity, security, and health checks for people not meeting entry conditions.
20. Legal Migration Pathways - Complementary routes (study, work, talent schemes) that expand safe, regular entry options alongside protection channels.

B. History of Global Migration in the World for the Last 100 Years

In the last hundred years, populations have crossed borders mostly for four reasons: to get out of danger-zones such as war or conflict areas, to find work, to be with family, and to have a legal home. The early decades of the 20th century had no mercy for the ones who had to immigrate. In 1923, Greece and Turkey swapped populations after the war of Turkish Independence, pushing more than a million people across the Aegean. After World War II, Europe had millions of “displaced persons” caused by the destructive war; trains, reception centers, and new papers became part of their daily life. In 1947, the partition of India and Pakistan after the British left, moved roughly 14–15 million people in a matter of months. Those shocks didn’t just move people; they pushed local governments and organizations to set up rules—the Refugee Convention and later the Protocol—that tried to put “never again” into actual procedures: who gets protection, who cannot be sent back, who counts as stateless and so on.

After WW2, Western Europe recruited so-called guest workers from Italy, Spain, Turkey, North Africa, which were supposed to be temporary, though many stayed and built families. The United States ran the Bracero program during and after the war, then in 1965 shifted its immigration system toward family ties and skills. The Gulf states poured oil money into cities and infrastructure using sponsored migrant labor fast growth, but legal stay tied to employers. Even in this “economic” phase, protection kept returning: the Indochinese “boat



people” after 1975 and Cuba’s Mariel boatlift in 1980 forced big, fast reception and resettlement efforts, and taught officials that emergencies move quicker than ministries.

In the 90’s, borders and regimes changed once more. The wars in former Yugoslavia produced huge refugee flows inside and beyond Europe. In the 2010s, Syria’s war displaced over half the country; Myanmar’s Rohingya fled in the hundreds of thousands; Venezuela’s collapse sent millions across South America. In 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered the EU’s rapid “temporary protection” plan for residence, work, and school access within days, not years. Meanwhile, the steady reasons never stopped: aging societies needed carers, farms and construction needed hands, and families tried to reunite. In today’s Europe, net migration is the main source of population growth, which helps with aging but keeps politics focused on control and integration. If you strip the story down, the pattern is simple: flight, work, family, legal personhood. When policy lines up with those motives, fair screening, real labor channels, sensible family rules, and laws that prevent people falling into irregularity or statelessness, mobility is governable and rights feel real. When it doesn’t, today’s stopgap becomes tomorrow’s crisis.

1. Typology of Those Migrations

a. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Humanitarian Protection

Asylum seekers request international protection and await adjudication; refugees are those recognized under international law as having a well founded fear of persecution on specific grounds, with the principle of non-refoulement prohibiting return to danger. These concepts, consolidated after the failures of the interwar period and the devastations of the Second World War and later broadened beyond Europe, proved adaptable to historical waves from Hungary (1956) and Indochina (post-1975) to the Balkans (1990s) and Syria (from 2011). Contemporary practice supplements Convention status with complementary or subsidiary protection to address indiscriminate violence, and in mass reports some regions employ temporary protection to operationalize admission and rights at scale.

The policy core, however, remains steady across cases: individualized or group-based procedures that safeguard against refoulement, access to basic services during processing, and pursuit of durable solutions voluntary return where safe, local integration where politics



and law allow it, or third-country resettlement. This is not merely legal architecture; it is a social timetable for rebuilding lives.

b. Labor Migrants: Skilled and Low-Skilled Workers

Labour migration is the pivot between demographic arithmetic and economic structure. Post-war Western Europe recruited "guests" for factories and transit systems; many stayed on, demonstrating how "temporary" plans persist when demand endures. The Gulf's sponsorship regimes industrialized temporary migration on a large scale, while nations like Canada and Australia shifted toward points-based selection to target human capital. Across the spectrum, essential policy levers recur: ethical recruitment and protection from wage theft, recognition of qualifications, portability of social security, and where needs are structural transparent transitions from temporary status to longer-term residence.

International organizations frame this space in terms of maximizing development synergies (e.g., remittances and skills "circulation") while assuring humane governance and safe, legal channels; World Migration Report era guidance and IOM labour-migration briefs have consistently highlighted these priorities. A brief contemporary snapshot: employers demand care-work, logistics, agriculture, and construction labor; governments seek to calibrate entries to shortages; and households use migration strategically to hedge local risk patterns that recur in every downturn and recovery cycle.

c. Family Reunification and Dependent Migration

Family reunification translates the right to family life into admission rules that, in practice, depend on the sponsor's legal status, national law, and documentation thresholds. Historically, these routes have stabilized communities created by earlier labor or protection channels from Europe's post-1973 settlement of "guest worker" households to refugee-origin families joining recognized sponsors after displacement. In contemporary guidance, UNHCR emphasizes that reunification is managed by the destination state and that eligibility (who counts as "close family," what proofs are required, how long one must have held status) varies by jurisdiction; timelines and standards matter profoundly for educational continuity, labor-market entry of spouses, and the psychosocial health of separated children. In short, family provisions do not merely add numbers; they convert temporary presence into lawful,



intergenerational belonging, which is exactly why they are politically debated and administratively exacting.

d. Undocumented Migrants and Stateless Persons

Persons Undocumented (or irregular) migrants are people present without current authorization because they entered without inspection, overstayed a visa, or fell out of status when an employer-tied or asylum-linked permit lapsed. Community organizations and research syntheses typically define the term broadly to encompass these pathways into irregularity, a reminder that “undocumented” names a legal condition rather than a moral category. Policy responses oscillate between enforcement and normalization: employer sanctions and removals on one side; regularization or case by case status for long-term residents and key-sector workers on the other. Practical experience suggests that firewalling access to essential services and labor-rights enforcement from immigration control reduces exploitation and protects public health while not precluding status decisions. Stateless persons occupy a different, often more precarious, legal terrain: they are not considered nationals by any state under the operation of its law, which can result from discriminatory nationality rules (including gender-based transmission), gaps or conflicts in nationality codes, state succession, or lack of civil registration. UNHCR estimates at least 10 million people are stateless worldwide and documents the consequences such as barriers to education, health care, formal work, documentation, freedom from arbitrary detention, and political participation alongside a prevention and protection framework grounded in the 1954 and 1961 Conventions and a ten-point action plan to end statelessness. Civil-society explainers amplify these points with accessible case examples and emphasize the social and economic costs of inherited legal invisibility.

C. EU Migration and Integration Policy Bodies and Instruments

1. The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon originated as a revival of the failed attempt to adopt a European Union constitution. Initially launched through the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the process produced a draft Constitutional Treaty in 2002–2003. However, its ratification collapsed in 2005 when France and the Netherlands rejected it in referendums. After a two-year pause for reflection,



the project was revived in 2007 through the Berlin Declaration. Negotiations were held during Portugal's EU presidency, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007, later ratified by all EU member states.

The treaty restructured the EU's legal foundation by renaming the Treaty establishing the European Community as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and formally replacing the "European Community" with the "European Union." While it did not grant new exclusive competences, it clarified the division of powers: exclusive competences reserved for the EU, shared competences where member states may legislate if the EU has not acted, and supporting competences where the EU complements national policies. It also confirmed that competences can be returned to member states through treaty revision. Importantly, the EU gained full legal personality, enabling it to sign treaties, join international organisations in its areas of competence, and require that member states' agreements comply with EU law (European Parliament, n.d.).

Although the Treaty of Lisbon did not include a direct supremacy clause, Declaration 17 reaffirmed the established case law of the Court of Justice of the EU that EU law takes precedence over national law (European Parliament, n.d.). The treaty also introduced new mechanisms: a formal withdrawal process under Article 50 TEU, the integration of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters into the EU's main legal framework, and expanded procedures for amending treaties. The Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding, and provisions were included for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, though this process has faced legal and political delays.

Institutionally, the treaty strengthened democratic legitimacy. It recognised the European Council as a formal EU institution responsible for defining general political directions. The political legitimacy of the European Commission increased as the Commission President's election began taking into account the results of European Parliament (EP) elections. The EP's powers grew substantially: the ordinary legislative procedure (formerly co-decision) was extended to 85 policy areas, the Parliament gained equal authority with the Council over the annual budget and the multiannual financial framework, and it now elects the Commission President by majority vote. MEPs were defined as representatives of EU citizens rather than the peoples of member states, and their number was capped at 751, later reduced to 705 after



Brexit and increased to 720 for the 2024–2029 term to account for demographic changes (European Parliament, n.d.).

2. The European Pact on Migration and Asylum 2020-2023

The 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum set out a comprehensive restructuring of EU migration and asylum policy. Its goal was to respond to the challenges of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. The Pact aimed to balance responsibility and solidarity among member states, strengthen external borders, and ensure humane and effective migration management.

The Pact adopted a comprehensive migration management strategy where migration, integration, and border management policies were linked. It also strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries to tackle root causes, manage returns, combat smuggling, and create legal migration pathways. It adopted crisis preparedness strategies to anticipate, monitor, and respond rapidly with temporary measures and immediate protection status for certain groups. Under border and asylum policies, pre-entry screening and fast-track border procedures are designed to speed up processing. The main goal is to ensure that asylum decisions and returns happen closer together in time, reducing the incentive for people to remain in the country irregularly (European Commission, 2020).


International partnerships with countries of origin and transit are essential for effective migration management. The Pact calls for tailor-made cooperation strategies to strengthen collaboration with these countries. Alongside these strategies, it emphasises tackling the root causes of migration (through development aid, investment, education, and governance support) as a preventive measure.

The Pact also promotes expanding resettlement and humanitarian admission schemes, as well as creating complementary legal pathways, such as opportunities for study and work.

To ensure compliance and solidarity among member states, stronger monitoring mechanisms have been introduced. These include enhanced operational roles for EU agencies such as Frontex and the EU Asylum Agency, clear implementation timelines, and the appointment of a Return Coordinator, supported by the creation of a High-Level Network for Return (European Commission, 2020).



3. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum (Post-2024 Goals)



The Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force on 11 June 2024 and will enter into application after two years. The Pact builds on and amends previous proposals in the area of migration. It responds to long-standing challenges in balancing solidarity, responsibility, and border protection while respecting human rights and international obligations.

The European Commission identifies the four pillars of the new migration and asylum policy as:


- Robust Screening: Individuals who do not meet the conditions for entering the EU will be registered and undergo identification, security, and health checks.
- Eurodac asylum and migration database: The Eurodac Regulation transforms the current database into a comprehensive asylum and migration system, enabling the clear identification of all individuals entering the EU as asylum seekers or irregular migrants. The current EU asylum fingerprint database is expanded to include more biometric data and broader categories for migrants.
- Border procedure and returns: A compulsory border procedure will be applied to asylum seekers who are unlikely to qualify for protection, provide false information to



authorities, or pose a security threat. Those found ineligible for international protection will face expedited returns with reintegration support.

- Crisis protocols and action against instrumentalisation: The Crisis Regulation establishes rapid response protocols, offering operational assistance and funding during emergencies.

The Pact introduced a new solidarity mechanism called the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) to update the rules on which Member state is responsible for examining an asylum claim (replacing the Dublin Regulation) (European Commission, 2024).



To implement these new and expanded procedures, Member States must prepare plans outlining how they will adapt laws, procedures, staffing, and infrastructure. Moreover, the Commission, EU agencies (Frontex, EUAA, Europol), and Member States will jointly monitor progress, and regular Pact Implementation Reports will be issued. To assist this transition, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and other EU funding sources will be used for financing infrastructure, IT systems, and staff training (European Commission, 2024).

The Pact builds on previous asylum and migration agreements by maintaining partnership strategies with non-EU countries. It aims to strengthen cooperation with countries of origin and transit, expand legal migration routes, improve return and reintegration policies, and combat migrant smuggling through enhanced cooperation and intelligence sharing.

To ensure humane and lawful migration management, the Pact reaffirms the principle of non-refoulement, which is the prohibition on returning individuals to countries where they



face persecution, torture, or other serious harm. It also provides special protections for vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking, and ensures that compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will be monitored (European Commission, 2024).



The comprehensive and integrated approach proposed by this Pact is expected to create more predictable, fair, and humane management of migration flows. The clear timelines and

“building-blocks” suggested by the Pact aim to ensure proper implementation. However, the pact requires extensive legal changes, new infrastructure, IT systems, and significant recruitment/training, which some Member States may face capacity gaps and funding constraints. The Pact also risks over-reliance on detention and border procedures since the mandatory border procedures set out in the Pact may lead to longer stays in closed or semi-closed facilities.

Moreover, the solidarity mechanism’s flexibility could reduce relocations due to the possibility of some states choosing financial or operational contributions instead of relocations, causing the actual relocation numbers may be lower than the set minimums. This would cause frontline states to still carry disproportionate responsibility.

Safeguards exist on paper, but practical rights protection (e.g., for children, vulnerable applicants) relies on national compliance and monitoring by EU bodies. In crisis or high-pressure situations, this can lead to shortcuts instead of full compliance.

External partnerships, although necessary, can face political and ethical challenges. Reliance on third countries for returns, readmission, or migration control can be politically unstable and may raise human rights concerns.



Finally, due to the required coordination between multiple EU agencies (Frontex, EUAA, Europol) and national authorities, the Pact risks running into bureaucratic delays and conflicting priorities.

4. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)

The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) is the EU's main financial instrument for migration and asylum policy in 2021–2027 with a budget of €9.882 billion (European Commission, 2025). It aims to strengthen the Common European Asylum System by improving reception conditions, procedures, and resettlement. It supports legal migration and integration through skills attraction, early integration measures, and community participation, and enhances return and readmission systems with dignified, sustainable returns and reintegration support in cooperation with non-EU countries. The fund also promotes solidarity by assisting Member States under migratory pressure and ensuring fair responsibility-sharing with flexible resources for crises. Funding is split between national programmes and thematic facilities, emergencies, and EU priorities (European Commission, 2025).

The fund is jointly managed by the European Commission and Member States with strict monitoring for efficiency, compliance, and rights protection. Fully aligned with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, AMIF upholds non-discrimination, gender equality, child protection, and targeted support for vulnerable groups, working in synergy with the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and other EU instruments to create a coherent, fair, and rights-based migration system.


D. The Eurostat EMN Asylum and Migration Overview 2024

The Eurostat EMN Asylum and Migration Overview 2024 provides an extensive statistical picture of migration trends across the EU, highlighting both persistent challenges and shifting patterns.




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Share of third-country nationals in the total population, EU and EFTA, 1 January 2024



The above map shows the percentage of third-country nationals residing in the EU and EFTA countries in the total population on 1 January 2024.

First residence permits issued, distribution by reason or type, EU and Norway, 2023




The stacked bar chart shows the types of first residence permits issued, by reason (work, family, education and other) in the EU and Norway in 2023. “Work” is the primary reason for acquiring a residence permit with 33.3%, followed by family with 26.7%. Within the “work” reason, it is observed that the majority of workers are categorized as “other work reasons (including seasonal workers)” with 88.8%. “Other” reasons include refugee and subsidiary protection status, humanitarian status, residence only, and others (unaccompanied minors,



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victims of trafficking in human beings, and not specified, in total making up the 25.7% of first residence permits issued.


Number of first-time asylum applicants, main citizenships by continent, EU and Norway, 2024



The map illustrates the number of first-time asylum applicants who are third-country nationals, per 1,000 inhabitants, in 2024. Within Europe, most first-time applicants are Turkish citizens. In Asia, Syrians represent

the largest group of applicants, followed by Afghans, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and Iraqis. From Africa, Egyptians and Moroccans make up the largest share, while Venezuelans are the leading group of first-time asylum applicants from the Americas.

Top 3 countries of citizenship – first-time asylum applicants, EU and Norway, 2021–2024
Absolute number (and the share in total number of first-time applicants)



Overall, the top 3 countries of citizenship of the first-time asylum applicants in 2024 are Syria, Venezuela, and Afghanistan.




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Integration indicators, EU, 2024


Education



Labour market, persons aged 20-64 years



Social inclusion

Housing, persons aged ≥ 18 yearsHealth, persons aged ≥ 16 years

Source: Eurostat (infat_Wt_89T1, emp_Wt_72, infat_Wt_01, fia_organ, fia_wagon, fia_organ, it_pops05, it_wht05, it_mdad15, it_apr15, it_who15, hhh_wt_24 and hhh_wt_30).

Integration indicators are listed in the report as:

- Education
- Tertiary education attainment – % of 25–34-year-olds with higher education
- Participation in education/training – % of 25–64-year-olds in learning past 4 weeks.
- Early leavers – % of 18–24-year-olds with only lower secondary education and no further training.

Labour Market (20–64 years)

- Employment rate – % of employed people in total population.
- Over-qualification – % of tertiary-educated people in low/medium-skilled jobs.
- Unemployment rate – % of the labour force without work.

Social Inclusion (18+ years)

- At risk of poverty or social exclusion – Poverty, deprivation, or low work intensity.
- Very low work intensity – Working-age household members working $\leq 20\%$ of potential time.



- Severe material & social deprivation – Unable to afford ≥ 7 of 13 basic items.

Housing (18+ years)

- Home ownership rate – % living in owned dwelling.
- Overcrowding rate – % living without enough rooms for household needs.

Health (16+ years)

- Good/very good self-perceived health – % rating their health positively.
- Unmet medical needs – % needing care but not receiving it.

E. Different Dimensions of Integration

1. Economic Dimension

Economic integration should be thought of as both a state and a trajectory: where migrants are in Europe's labour markets now, and how they progress over time. Entry often starts with an employment penalty, lower pay, more insecure contracts, and common "downgrading" into jobs below one's qualifications. This gap is not simply a function of individual effort; it is a reflection of institutional frictions like slow credential recognition, restricted access to language and vocational pathways, and sectoral segmentation that funnels newcomers into low-return niches (care, agriculture, hospitality, logistics). Legal status is as important as skills: temporary permits discourage employers and workers from investing in country-specific human capital, while murky recognition rules maroon trained professionals in survival jobs. Discrimination and the opacity of hiring also contribute; dense co-ethnic networks can accelerate first jobs but harden into ceilings if they replace bridges to mainstream training and employers.

Progress, where it occurs, comes from rights, institutions, and incentives in alignment. Early, affordable recognition of foreign diplomas; modular language training integrated into vocational study; apprenticeship and paid traineeship that credit earlier experience; and active labour-market policy that rewards changing jobs out of the first all increase the chances of "catch-up." Enforcement against wage theft and abuse of temporary contracts safeguards the floor, while portable social security and clear pathways from temporary to longer-term status make investment sense for workers and firms alike. Entrepreneurship merits a realistic interpretation: it can be a springboard for mobility, but without credit lines, procurement opportunities, and advisory services it risks entrenching low margin self-employment.



Gender-sensitive design is imperative, given the concentration of migrant women in undervalued care work and the childcare constraints on training uptake. Ultimately, an economic-integration strategy worthy of the name measures more than just employment rates: it monitors job skill match, contract quality, take up of adult education, time to first commensurate job, and transitions between sectors and statuses. In human terms, the aim is straightforward: to reduce the time in which a qualified nurse drives a taxi or a trained engineer cleans offices, and to construct institutions that make their next job not just their first count.

2. Social Dimension

Social integration was always a two sided process. Newcomers work to build a sense of belonging and the social capital needed to navigate schools, workplaces, clinics, unions, and local government; longtime residents decide how far recognition and acceptance will extend so that newcomers can participate as full members. This mutual accommodation shapes well being and social cohesion, but it also affects everyday cooperation, who feels welcome at the parent teacher meeting, who joins the sports club, who trusts the local authorities enough to use public services and so on are important points to be addressed.

Because belonging cannot be observed directly, researchers track a set of proxies. These include self identification: Do you feel part of this society, beliefs and preferences such as generalized trust or views on gender roles or religion, and markers of social participation like language use outside the home, friendships beyond one's own community, club membership, neighborhood mixing, and reported discrimination. Demographic behaviors such as intermarriage, fertility, and household structure offer another window, as do civic and political activities such as volunteering, contacting officials, or voting where eligible. Each indicator captures a different layer of incorporation; none is definitive on its own.

Even when controlling for age and educational attainment, on average, first generation immigrants differ from natives in many instances on many measures of success. Convergence is expectedly a time variable, but the speed is erratic and the experience of economic progression is often not appropriately mirrored in social economic indicators. This is partly a matter of structural constraints; meaning that early restrictions like language barriers, budget and time constraints, uncertainty about how long they will be living in the host community, or formal unavailability of certain civic behaviours can be facilitated by policy changes-



whereas fundamentally, habitually, and deeply held preferences and identities are often entrenched and don't lend themselves to easy repositioning in terms of community consensus. There is also the settlement option. Dispersed geographic or concentration settlement is known as a slippery slope for first generation immigrants where density can provide welcome early support establishment and employment (but regional migration conundrums can restrict effective investment in host country human capital); but density may be best suited when combined with paths into mainstream institutions to support (opening more) opportunities to cocreate the culture and economy of the host community. The always pressing policy concern is not simply how to open the first door, but keeping doors open over time. The current conversations and debates are on the connections between economic and social roles, and which bundles of measures can position outcomes like cross-group cooperation or generalized trust which can be the hardest to shift, vis-a-vis exit from access to employment, to an experience of enduring belonging in community.

3. Cultural Dimension

The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 frames cultural integration as a process of mutual engagement between migrants and host societies. Cultural inclusion involves creating spaces for interaction, like schools, workplaces, sports, clubs, cultural venues, etc, where migrants and local communities can meet. Promoting these avenues of intercultural and interreligious dialogue is described as essential for combating xenophobia and “us vs them” narratives and fostering mutual respect.

Community-based initiatives like grassroots activities in education, culture, and sport help build a sense of belonging. Examples include community sponsorship schemes for refugees, which connect newcomers to well-prepared local communities, and EU-supported projects such as the European Solidarity Corps for youth volunteering in cultural diversity and anti-prejudice projects.

Creating public awareness is also crucial for reducing prejudice. The Commission supports projects to raise awareness about migration realities and integration outcomes, targeting journalists, journalism schools, and the general public.



The cultural dimension is linked with broader equality agendas such as gender equality, LGBTQI+ rights, and anti-racism to ensure that cultural participation is inclusive and that migrant women, in particular, have equal opportunities for social engagement.

4. Political dimension

In the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027, the political dimension of migrant integration and inclusion is framed around participation in decision-making, representation, and civic engagement. It aims to build cohesive and democratic societies.

The plan emphasizes that migrants and EU citizens with a migrant background should be actively involved in consultative and decision-making processes at all levels to ensure that policies reflect actual needs and perspectives. For this reason, the European Commission has created an Expert Group on the views of migrants to integrate their input into policy design and implementation. However, without direct access to decision-making power through elections, participation risks becoming symbolic where migrants are heard but lack the structural means to influence outcomes. Even the Expert Group on the Views of Migrants, although valuable, is advisory and dependent on the political will to translate its input into policy.

Cultural and political dimensions of integration go hand in hand. Intercultural and interreligious dialogue between migrant and host communities are essential to address prejudice, extremism, and “us vs them” narratives.

Migrants are encouraged to be active in civic life. Community sponsorship schemes, volunteering, sports, youth projects, and cultural exchanges serve as informal political spaces where social cohesion is built.

Migrants and their representative organisations should be directly involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of integration and inclusion policies and programmes, including those funded by the EU. To achieve this, the plan calls on Member States to align national integration strategies with national action plans against racism and racial discrimination, ensuring political and civic equality for all groups.



The plan links political inclusion with anti-racism, gender equality, and LGBTQI+ equality frameworks to combat structural exclusion.

The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027 emphasizes the two-way process of integration, where migrants must actively integrate. This approach has the potential to be harmful since it places equal responsibility on migrants and host societies when there is, in fact, a power asymmetry between the two. In practice, host societies hold the institutional and legal power and structural barriers (residency requirements, discrimination, citizenship laws, etc.).

The Plan ties political and social inclusion to preventing extremism and radicalization. While this can have a positive impact since it would prevent hate and violence among both host societies and migrants, it also risks securitizing integration by framing migrant participation partly as a tool to maintain public order rather than as an inherent democratic right. This can create suspicion-based engagement, where migrant communities are included conditionally, based on perceived “security compliance”.

The plan aligns political participation with anti-racism and equality strategies but it does not propose binding enforcement against political exclusion or discrimination in public life. The emphasis is on awareness campaigns and voluntary commitments rather than systemic reform (e.g., anti-discrimination bodies with sanctioning power, monitoring of political party practices).

Much of the political engagement described in the Plan is localized (schools, sports clubs, volunteering), which can build trust but does not dismantle national-level exclusion (e.g., restrictive citizenship laws, long waiting times for naturalisation, exclusion from public office).

Overall, although the plan expands opportunities for integration and inclusion, without formal rights, legal guarantees, and accountability mechanisms, the political participation promoted in the plan risks being symbolic, conditional, and dependent on the goodwill of existing power structures.



III. Points to be Addressed

1. How can partnerships with countries of origin and transit be strengthened to address the root causes of migration, while ensuring a strong commitment to human rights?
2. In what ways can legal migration be expanded to reduce irregular migration?
3. How can equal access to education be promoted to support social and cultural integration?
4. How can the meaningful political participation of migrants be ensured?
5. What can be the potential policies to overcome prejudice, xenophobia, and “us vs them” narratives to create welcoming and diverse communities?
6. What fair pathways can help long-term residents move from irregular or temporary status to secure residence?
7. What measures can protect migrant workers from exploitation and ensure equal pay and safe conditions?
8. How can community policing build trust and prevent profiling or over-policing?
9. How can communities sponsor refugees directly, and what safeguards ensure accountability and equity?
10. How can diaspora networks be mobilized for jobs, investment, and mentoring across borders?

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