



BOĞAZİÇİMUN ADVANCED

2025
the Legacy

UN Peacebuilding Commission

STUDY GUIDE

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#BridgingTheGap

Letters	3
I. Introduction to the Committee: UN Peacebuilding Commission	5
A. Reminders Regarding The Issue	5
B. UN Peacebuilding Commission Methodology	5
1. Mandate & Role	5
2. Working Methods	6
3. Financing Linkages	6
C. Negotiation Toolkit	7
D. Financing the Recovery	8
II. Agenda Item: Preparing for Peace: Frameworks for Sustainable Recovery in Ukraine After the Conflict	9
A. Key Parties Involved in the Conflict	9
1. United States of America	9
2. Iran	9
3. India	9
4. Democratic People's Republic of Korea	10
5. Bulgaria	11
6. Belarus	11
7. Türkiye	11
8. France	12
B. Background Information of the Conflict	13
1. Historical Context	13
2. Escalation of Tensions	14
a. <i>The 2013–2014 Euromaidan Movement</i>	14
b. <i>Crimea and Donbas</i>	14
3. The 2022 Full-Scale Invasion	15
4. Humanitarian Consequences	15
a. <i>Civilian Casualties and Displacement</i>	15
b. <i>Gendered and Youth Impacts</i>	16
5. Internationalization of the Conflict	16
a. <i>Proxy Dimensions</i>	16
b. <i>Global Ripple Effects</i>	16
6. Stalemates and Escalation Risks	16
7. Social, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions	17
8. Environmental Damage	17
9. Implications for Peacebuilding	17
III. Deliverables	18
IV. Useful Sources	19



Letter From The Secretary-General

Meritorious participants of BoğaziçiMUN Advanced 2025,

It is with warm hugs, sincerity and utmost privilege to welcome you all to this edition of BoğaziçiMUNAdvanced. I'm Selin Ayaz, a senior Double Major of Political Science & International Relations and Sociology at Boğaziçi University. Having four years of university Model UN experience (alongside 5 years prior) under my belt, I will be serving as your Secretary-General.

For this version of BoğaziçiMUN, both of our teams have worked from day to night to give you the best experience ever. I would first like to thank my amazing Deputy-Secretaries-General, Maya Gençdiş and Emir Elhatip, for their continuous effort and clever wit. Another person that I'm thankful for is our esteemed Director-General, Irem Ayber. She and our Deputy-Director-General Azra Çökük are some of the most hardworking people I've known, they are tireless in their work and you will get to experience the fruits of their labour when we meet in September.

We've prepared 9 different committees covering a wide range of topics. UN PBC is a one them, a one of a kind committee, with the important agenda item of "Preparing for Peace: Frameworks for Sustainable Recovery in Ukraine After the Conflict". As by the theme of our conference, this committee honors the legacy of Recep Eren Durgut, our previous club coordinator as well as the former Secretary-General of BoğaziçiMUN 2024. I would like to thank the hardworking Under-Secretaries-General Recep Eren Durgut himself and İslam Ossama as well as their Academic Assistant Lara Karakaya for their efforts in making this committee come to life.

We've always used the phrase "Bridging the Gap" as our motto. This year, we are combining this with the legacy. Each edition of BoğaziçiMUN has been about providing our participants with the best experience they've ever had so far. Each time, we try to outdo ourselves and become the best version so far. This edition has been no different as all of us have vigorously and tirelessly worked so far. Now the ball is in your court. I invite you all to take a step forward and feel the legacy.

Warmest regards,

Selin Ayaz

Secretary-General of BoğaziçiMUN Advanced 2025



Letters From the Under-Secretaries-General

Dear Delegates,

It is our honor to welcome you on our behalf from the Secretariat to this year's session of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission at BogaziciMUN Advanced. We, Recep Eren Durgut and İslam Yıldırım, are honored to serve as your Under-Secretaries-General, and we would like to give you our warmest welcome.

This year's agenda revolves around one of the globe's most pressing issues: the crisis in Ukraine. The war did not just redefine European security architecture but has significantly affected world peace, stability, and humanitarian existence. It shall be your responsibility, members of the Peacebuilding Commission, to reflect on measures that transcend ceasefires and stopgap measures, to lasting peace, reconstruction, and reconciliation.

The work given to this committee is a daunting one. Peacebuilding is not merely halting war; it is rebuilding institutions, healing economic and social divides, protecting human rights, and staving off the seeds of war from sprouting anew. Your considerations will require to be innovative and practical, with the ability to balance national interests and shared responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

We encourage you to approach the sessions with determination, open minds, and respect for differing opinions. Remember, diplomacy is not the winning of an argument in favor of a particular side but the building of a mutually positive consensus that ensures a better future for all parties. While preparing, we urge you to carefully analyze not only your assigned country's stance but also the overall dynamics of peacebuilding, as lessons from past and present efforts across the world.

We are truly looking forward to viewing your works and the innovative solutions you will bring. Collectively, we have confidence that you can create a fruitful discussion that addresses the complex aspects and hopes related to Ukraine's future and international peace.

We are looking forward to greeting all of you and wishing you good luck throughout the conference.

Warm regards,

Recep Eren Durgut

İslam Yıldırım



I. Introduction to the Committee: UN Peacebuilding Commission

A. Reminders Regarding The Issue

Dear delegates, as this conference holds an advanced status, this study guide has been prepared not to provide a deep dive into background information, but rather to outline the functioning of the committee and our mandates. In addition to the sources listed in the "Useful Sources" section, it is important that you conduct further research on areas such as your country's policies, as well as the stances and past experiences of the unions, commissions, or bodies to which your country contributes.



B. UN Peacebuilding Commission Methodology

1. Mandate & Role

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is an intergovernmental advisory body helping peacebuilding and proposing integrated strategies for

What is a Mandate?


Mandate is the authority that voters give to a party or a candidate to act on their behalf.

post-conflict reconstruction. Established in 2005 through concurrent decisions of the General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) and the Security Council (S/RES/1645), the PBC brings together Member States, the UN system—DPPA/PBSO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNMAS, UNEP and others—the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, the regional organizations such as the EU and OSCE, civil society and the private sector. Its function is to draw on resources and political support collectively. Importantly, the PBC does not need peace missions but serves as an advisory organ to the General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the national government. It can deliver written advice, conclusions, and chair summaries to guide recovery frameworks.



2. Working Methods

The PBC operates through its Organizational Committee and thematic or country-focused configurations, drawing in part on informal interactive dialogues (IIDs) to facilitate open exchange. In practice, this means that the Commission produces a variety of outputs, e.g., Chair's Summaries or Conclusions, recommendations to the Security Council, funding mobilization recommendations using instruments like the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) or specialized trust funds, and partnership compact-style arrangements with agreed milestones. In all of its activities, the PBC emphasizes national leadership of peace efforts, youth and women's participation, and sensitivity to potential conflict causes, as well as HDP nexus coherence.



3. Financing Linkages

Another critical financial instrument of the PBC's activities is the Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), which is the UN's catalytic tool for peacebuilding. The PBF is managed by the Peacebuilding Support Office in DPPA and is run through UNDP's Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office. It is meant to seed national- and local-level projects and de-risk or prepare the ground for larger investments. Beyond the UN system, Ukraine's final recovery will also depend heavily on external partners such as the World Bank, the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Institutions such as the EU Ukraine Facility (2024–2027), along with domestic public finance and private capital. The PBC can contribute by seeing that these flows of finance are directed towards overall peacebuilding agendas.



C. Negotiation Toolkit

In preparing for negotiations under the Peacebuilding Commission, it is useful to identify the wide range of stakeholders. These include the Ukrainian government at national, municipal levels, the Parliament, independent oversight mechanisms, and the judiciary. Civil society elements like veterans' and survivors' organizations, women's and youth councils, trade unions, faith and culture groups, and NGOs and academia all play their part. On the outside, stakeholders are represented by global financial institutions (the World Bank, IMF, etc.), United Nations agencies, regional institutions, and the diaspora. Each of these actors has its own particular perspectives, interests, and forms of leverage, and successful negotiation involves reconciliation of these voices.

Members must also keep in mind potential fault lines likely to emerge during negotiations. Central and local authorities may be in conflict concerning power sharing and budget control, or concerning the pace of anti-corruption reform. Sequencing priorities, such as mine action versus reopening, may hinge along lines of disagreement, as may environmental protection versus urgency of reconstruction. Other controversial topics could be who is entitled to compensation, how returnees are incorporated, and how procurement transparency and conflict-of-interest threats are managed. Identifying these areas of contention in advance can assist members in being able to anticipate and deal with disputes.


Finally, debates should be grounded in concrete measures by which success can be measured. Examples include the amount of territory cleared of explosive ordnance, the scope of risk education campaigns, the percentage of schools and clinics opened, the number of days of continuous district heating, and the megawatts of renewable energy installed or rehabilitated. Social indicators such as the number of rehousing for households, funded small and medium enterprises, and the number of jobs created particularly among women and youths are equally as important. Governance indicators can be the percentage of contracts agreed to under open contracting, the percentage of resolving corruption complaints, and environmental metric achievements such as clean air and water in the impacted areas. The use of measurable benchmarks can help ensure that recovery is made increasingly transparent, accountable, and results-based.



D. Financing the Recovery

At the United Nations, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) remains the focal catalytic instrument for financing conflict-sensitive priorities. It provides funds to projects on community security, dialogue, reintegration, and local governance. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can assist through recommendations regarding how PBF funding windows can be aligned with Ukraine's national priorities. Along the way, it can also lead donor countries to contribute additional resources aimed at specific peacebuilding impacts, hence augmenting the scope of influence.

Aside from the UN, recovery funding centers on international financial institutions and partners. Joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA) by the World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union, and United Nations provide key data to quantify needs and prioritize investment by sector. The EU Ukraine Facility (2024–2027) is especially important, delivering stable funding streams and investment guarantees. The PBC can help ensure that such mechanisms get adopted with inclusivity and anti-corruption safeguards, as well as ensure that their impacts reach local communities. In addition, instruments of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) can be applied to mobilize private capital, as well as donor-backed risk-sharing facilities that can boost housing and small or medium enterprise lending.



Innovation and home funding will also be crucial to the long-term rehabilitation of Ukraine. This may include rechanneling the state budget, the issue of recovery-linked municipal bonds secured by the state, and the issuance of diaspora or green reconstruction bonds to attract patriot and climate-conscious investors. Pay-for-results-type financing instruments (*represents a shift from paying for activities and inputs to paying only when measurable, policy-relevant outcomes are achieved*) apprenticeships or energy savings may provide additional flexibility.




II. Agenda Item: Preparing for Peace: Frameworks for Sustainable Recovery in Ukraine After the Conflict

A. Key Parties Involved in the Conflict

1. United States of America

The United States of America is the country that has provided the largest amount of military assistance to Ukraine, mainly from its own old weaponry and equipment from reserve stockpiles. Alongside the military aid it has provided, the United States has also set aside a budget of \$175 billion to help the country.



2. Iran

According to sources from Ukraine and the United States of America, it was detected that Iran was supplying Shahed combat drones as well as production materials to develop a drone manufactory to Russia. A 2024 Reuters report also showed that Iran had provided ballistic missiles to the Russian military.

Alongside these weaponry aids, it was also found that Iranian troops were stationed in Crimea to assist Russia in its drone attacks against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. These troops were most likely Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or IRGC-affiliated personnel, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Despite these accusations, Iran has persistently denied having sent any arms to Russia to be used against Ukraine.

3. India



India has claimed to have a neutral stance regarding the invasion of Ukraine, but despite these claims, some reports show that artillery shells made by Indian manufacturers were sold to European countries and then diverted to Ukraine. In contrast to this, the economic and diplomatic ties between Russia and India have shown to grow significantly, with India's circumvention of Western sanctions by buying oil and fertilizer from Russia with heavy discounts. India has also supplied dual-use technologies to Russia and persistently abstained from condemning the invasion, all of which have negatively impacted its ties with Ukraine. This situation has also complicated Western democratic interactions with India.

On 19 September 2024, the Indian government announced their plans to jointly modernize and export its fleet of T-72 tanks, which numbered about 2,500 vehicles, with Russia. The modernization of the vehicles would involve joint efforts by Indian defense manufacturers and Russian technology suppliers.

4. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

According to US authorities, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, more commonly known as North Korea, has provided ballistic missiles and launchers to Russia, though their specific models have not been specified. Following the attacks of December 2023, remains of parts belonging to Hwasong-11A (KN-23),



Hwasong-11B (KN-24) and KN-25 missiles, which belong to the North Korean military, were found among the debris. Ukraine and South Korea claim that these missiles were launched with the help of North Korean engineers that were sent to the battlefield.

In October 2024, a US White House spokesperson expressed their concerns regarding the possibility of North Korean troops fighting on the side of the Russian military. These beliefs were further supported by Zelensky declaring that there were 10,000 North Korean troops preparing to join Russian forces according to reports from Ukrainian intelligence. Later on, the United States of America stated that there was evidence of North Korean



5. Bulgaria

Bulgaria has supported Ukraine in the early phases of the Russian invasion by supplying over a third of the ammunition needed, as well as providing fuel.

6. Belarus

Being one of the few countries that have supported Russia in terms of military aid and weaponry, Belarus has permitted Russian forces to deploy in their territories to stage its invasion of Ukraine. It has also granted airspace access to Russia for radar early warning and control missions, although this access lasted only until 2023 and was revoked after a Russian Beriev A-50 surveillance plane was damaged by drones.

The country has also provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and later, according to the 2024 issue of "Armed Conflict Survey", Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

Belarus is considered a co-belligerent state in the invasion of Ukraine due to its contributions and active involvement in the conflict. Some political scientists also believe that Belarus would be better classified as a co-combatant, supporting their claim with Lukashenko's repeated remarks expressing his support for Putin's military actions.

7. Türkiye

On 28 February 2022, Türkiye sealed off the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits to the passage of Russian warships that were not registered to Black Sea home bases and were returning to their ports of origin. It specifically denied passage through the Turkish Straits to four Russian naval vessels.



After a Russian missile strike on 23 July 2023, Türkiye signed on a Turkish-brokered deal to secure a sea corridor for exports of grains and other foodstuffs.

Although its previous actions seemed to be in favour of Ukraine, it was also reported by Politico in March 2023 that Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer Norinco shipped assault rifles, drone parts, and body armor to Russia between June and December 2022, with some shipments via third countries, including Türkiye. Additionally, while the average annual trade between Russia and Türkiye in 45 military-linked materials was \$28 million from 2015 to 2021, it had increased to \$158 million from January to October 2023.

8. France

France has been playing an active role in supporting Ukraine during the Russian–Ukrainian conflict since its very beginning. According to a list published by the French Ministry of Defense regarding their contributions to Ukraine, the military assistance provided is estimated to be €2.615 billion, along with €1.2 billion



donated to the European Peace Facility (EFF). The report states that these supplies meet three main support criteria, those being ammunition, training, and maintenance of equipment.

The French authorities have also greatly aided Ukraine in terms of artillery; they had handed over 30 Caesar self-propelled artillery systems, 6 decommissioned TRF1 howitzers, 4 multiple-launch rocket systems and 10 120-mm mortars to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the end of 2023. The howitzers were also supplied with 30,000 rounds of ammunition and the anti-tank systems include 1,002 AT4 grenade launchers as well as three Milan anti-tank guided missile systems. By the end of the same time period, France had also delivered 38 AMX10 RC light wheeled tanks and 250 armoured vehicles with weapons or in ambulance



configuration, as well as 120 off-road vehicles and 6 lorries, which were supplied with 9,000 rounds of ammunition for the main gun.

Another thing to note is that France had previously stated their willingness to expand their collaboration with Ukraine in the field of unmanned vehicles and machinery, which can be shown by the 160 reconnaissance drones and 10 drone detection devices they have provided to Ukraine, although it is unspecified what kind of drones those were.

B. Background Information of the Conflict

The ongoing war in Ukraine is rooted in a long trajectory of contested identities, geopolitical rivalries, and security dilemmas that intensified following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For the purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission, the conflict must be understood not only as a war between Russia and Ukraine, but also as a confrontation of competing international visions: one centered on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic integration; the other grounded in spheres of influence, security buffer zones, and resistance to perceived Western encroachment. This background section will outline the historical, political, and social dimensions of the conflict, highlighting how these legacies complicate post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

1. Historical Context

Post-Soviet Transition and Ukraine's Independence

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine emerged as an independent state with internationally recognized borders, including Crimea and the Donbas region. Despite economic hardship, Ukraine developed pluralistic institutions and pursued varying balances between relations with Russia and with the European Union (EU). Russian elites, however, never fully reconciled with the loss of Ukraine,

Ukraine's public opinion about EU integration and alternatives

Nationwide polls (N=2000 respondents). In 2022 poll conducted on 1-12 February.




Chart: DIF - Source: Iiko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation - Created with Datawrapper



particularly due to its symbolic role as the birthplace of the medieval Kyivan Rus', its industrial and agricultural resources, and its geostrategic location along the Black Sea.

From the mid-1990s onward, NATO and the EU expanded eastward. While this provided security and prosperity to Central and Eastern European states, it generated profound insecurity within Russia's strategic culture. Ukraine's growing interest in EU Association Agreements and NATO cooperation intensified these tensions. Moscow consistently portrayed such moves as existential threats, while many Ukrainians increasingly saw Euro-Atlantic alignment as the path toward democratic consolidation and economic modernization.

2. Escalation of Tensions

a. The 2013–2014 Euromaidan Movement

The immediate trigger of the conflict lies in Ukraine's 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests. When then-President Viktor Yanukovich suspended the signing of an EU Association Agreement under Russian pressure, large-scale demonstrations erupted in Kyiv and across Ukraine. These protests, demanding closer ties with Europe and rejecting corruption, culminated in Yanukovich's flight in February 2014. Moscow labeled this a Western-orchestrated coup, while many Ukrainians considered it a revolution for dignity and independence.



b. Crimea and Donbas

Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, citing the need to protect ethnic Russians and strategic interests around the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. This annexation was declared illegal by the UN General Assembly but consolidated under Russian administration. Simultaneously, armed insurgencies, supported by Russian personnel and equipment, broke out in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (collectively known as the Donbas). The ensuing fighting created the first major displacement crisis, with thousands killed and over a million



internally displaced. The Minsk I and II Agreements (2014, 2015) sought to halt hostilities but produced only partial and fragile ceasefires, never resolving the political status of Donbas.

3. The 2022 Full-Scale Invasion

February 2022 Offensive

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, escalating the localized Donbas war into Europe's largest conflict since World War II. Initial offensives targeted Kyiv, Kharkiv, and southern regions. Ukrainian resistance, bolstered by Western arms and intelligence, prevented the fall of Kyiv. The conflict quickly entrenched into a war of attrition, with frontlines shifting across multiple axes.

For Ukraine, the war is a struggle for sovereignty, democratic survival, and territorial integrity. For Russia, official narratives frame the war as a “special military operation” to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine and resist NATO expansion. The Russian government has employed historical revisionism, portraying Ukraine as an artificial state, thereby denying its legitimacy. These conflicting narratives deepen polarization, making reconciliation more difficult.

4. Humanitarian Consequences

a. Civilian Casualties and Displacement

The invasion has caused staggering humanitarian consequences. Millions have fled as refugees to neighboring EU countries, while millions more remain internally displaced within Ukraine. Civilian casualties, attacks on residential areas, hospitals, and schools, and widespread infrastructure destruction have created a protracted humanitarian emergency. The targeting of energy infrastructure has been used as a tactic of war, leaving millions without heat and electricity during winters.



b. Gendered and Youth Impacts

The war has disproportionately impacted women and youth. Women often carry the burden of caregiving amid displacement, while also being at risk of gender-based violence, trafficking, and economic marginalization. Youth, who represent Ukraine's future workforce and civic leadership, face disrupted education, psychological trauma, and emigration pressures. These groups are therefore central to any peacebuilding agenda.

5. Internationalization of the Conflict

a. Proxy Dimensions

The conflict has attracted extensive external involvement. Western states, led by the United States and European Union members, have supplied Ukraine with military aid, sanctions against Russia, and diplomatic support. Conversely, Russia has relied on arms and supplies from Iran and North Korea, as well as political cover from some Global South states. The war thus increasingly resembles a proxy confrontation between Western democracies and authoritarian alliances.

b. Global Ripple Effects

The war's consequences extend far beyond Ukraine's borders. Food insecurity has risen globally due to disruptions in grain exports, while energy markets have experienced volatility as Europe reduced dependence on Russian gas. The conflict has also influenced global alignments, with NATO enlarging to include Finland and Sweden, and the BRICS group expanding its outreach.

6. Stalemates and Escalation Risks

Despite multiple peace initiatives—from Turkey's mediation in 2022 to UN-brokered grain export deals—sustainable ceasefire arrangements have failed. Both sides remain committed to maximalist goals: Ukraine demands full territorial restoration, while Russia insists on recognition of annexed territories. This stalemate, combined with ongoing mobilization, arms deliveries, and nuclear rhetoric, makes the conflict highly volatile. For peacebuilders, this



underscores the difficulty of negotiating political solutions in an environment of mistrust, competing narratives, and ongoing violence.

7. Social, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions

Ukraine's economy has contracted significantly, with industrial zones destroyed, trade routes disrupted, and agricultural lands mined. Inflation and unemployment remain severe, while reconstruction needs already exceed hundreds of billions of dollars. Recovery efforts must navigate not only physical rebuilding but also anti-corruption reforms, investment security, and equitable regional development.



8. Environmental Damage

The war has unleashed large-scale ecological destruction, often referred to as “ecocide.” Explosions and shelling contaminate soil and water, while damaged chemical plants pose risks of toxic leaks. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023 led to catastrophic flooding, agricultural losses, and long-term environmental degradation. For the Peacebuilding Commission, integrating environmental recovery into post-conflict strategies is not optional but essential.



9. Implications for Peacebuilding

The background of this conflict shows that peacebuilding cannot be limited to ceasefire arrangements. The roots of the war—identity, sovereignty, governance, corruption, and geopolitical rivalry—must all be addressed. Furthermore, recovery frameworks must be inclusive of marginalized groups, resilient against corruption, and environmentally



sustainable. Regional actors, from the EU to Türkiye, play a critical role, but trust must also be rebuilt domestically among Ukraine's diverse communities.

III. Deliverables

During the sessions, members can choose to emulate one or several of the most significant products that the Peacebuilding Commission would feasibly create. One potential is to draft a Chair's Summary for a Ukraine Peacebuilding and Recovery Compact, a concise two or three page document. This would establish a shared vision of an inclusive, green, and corruption-free recovery rooted in Ukraine's own institutions. It could suggest the following governance arrangements such as a Joint Steering Committee jointly chaired by the UN and the government of Ukraine and including municipal, women's, youth organizations, private sector, and international financial institution representatives. The financing component could harmonize PBF allocations with EU and World Bank schemes, introduce a municipal-level window of finance, create transparent anti-corruption triggers, and be transparent in publishing data to the project level. This would then be followed by tracking through quarterly public dashboards of de-mining progress, returnee numbers, grievance redressals, and gender and youth involvement in decision making councils.

Alternatively, advice to the Security Council could be prepared with a goal of developing enabling conditions for recovery. These suggestions may call for assurances of security to protect critical infrastructure corridors for energy and water, provide safe access for de-mining operations, and shield humanitarian personnel. They may also involve assistance in the form of support for UN sponsored ceasefire verification mechanisms and mine action deconfliction systems.

A third deliverable could be an agreement for a newly liberated oblast. It could bundle together immediate priorities such as de-mining, house reconstruction, livelihood projects, and healing from trauma. It could include municipal finance supplements to fund basic services, establish an inclusive planning forum for public engagement, and integrate anti-corruption monitoring with civil society leadership.



Lastly, the representatives could participate in green reconstruction thematic proposals. The proposals would highlight restoring Ukraine's energy sector based on net-zero principles, investing in nature-based flood defense systems, and applying "polluter-pays" to environmental restoration. They could also highlight the importance of environmental data transparency and community-led monitoring so that ecological recovery would be followed by social and economic resilience.

IV. Useful Sources

- UN PBC Mandate: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/mandate>
- UN PBC main page: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission>
- PBC Rules of Procedure & Working Methods:
<https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/rules-procedure-and-working-methods>
- Founding Resolutions: GA A/RES/60/180; SC S/RES/1645 (2005):
<https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/60/180>
- UN Peacebuilding Fund overview: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund>
- MPTF page: <https://mptf.undp.org/fund/pb000>
- PBSO Brochure (2023):
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbso_brochure_2023-09-12_0.pdf
- Lugano Declaration & Principles (URC2022):
https://cor.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-07/urc2022_lugano-declaration.pdf
- Swiss MFA page:
<https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/dossiers/urc2022-lugano.html>
- World Bank/UN/EU RDNA4 (2025):
<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P1801741ca39ec0d81b5371ff73a675a0a8.pdf>



- World Bank press note on updated needs (Feb 2025):
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/25/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released>
- EU Ukraine Facility – Regulation (EU) 2024/792:
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj/eng>
- Commission explainer:
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/ukraine-facility_en
- UNDP Ukraine Recovery Framework (2024):
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-10/undp-ua-recovery-framework-september-2024-en_0.pdf
- United Nations in Ukraine Transitional Framework (2024):
<https://ukraine.un.org/en/download/158239/266221>
- UNMAS Ukraine updates:
<https://www.unmas.org/en/ukraine-mine-contamination-is-lethal-legacy-of-russias-invasion>
- UNMAS Annual Report 2024:
https://www.unmas.org/sites/default/files/publications/unmas_2024_annual_report_fin_1.pdf
- Mine Action Review 2024:
https://www.mineactionreview.org/assets/downloads/Clearing_the_Mines_2024.pdf
- UNEP Ukraine page: <https://www.unep.org/ukraine>
- Kakhovka dam environmental assessments:
<https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/environmental-consequences-war-against-ukraine-preliminary-twelve-month-assessment-february-2022-february-2023-summary-and-recommendations-enuk>

